Pascucci v. Vagott

Decision Date25 June 1976
Citation362 A.2d 566,71 N.J. 40
PartiesAntoinette PASCUCCI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret VAGOTT, Director of Welfare of Trenton, et al., Defendants-Respondents, and Antoinette PASCUCCI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONS AND AGENCIES et al., Defendants-Respondents. Lydia LADYKA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONS AND AGENCIES et al., Defendants-Respondents.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Dennis S. Brotman, Westfield, for appellant Pascucci (Alice Ashley Costello, Director, Legal Aid Society of Mercer County, Trenton, attorney; Dennis S. Brotman, Robert A. Obler and Jane B. Terpstra, Trenton, of counsel and on the brief).

Robert P. Corman, Asst. Deputy Public Advocate, West Orange, for appellants Ladyka, Gray and Van Ness (Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Advocate, Trenton, attorney; Robert P. Corman and Michael C. Parks, East Orange, on the brief).

Raymond J. Lesniak, Interim Director, Elizabeth, for amicus curiae State Office of Legal Services.

Stephen Skillman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents Dept. of Institutions and Agencies, et al. (William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen., attorney; Stephen Skillman of counsel; Guy S. Michael, Deputy Atty. Gen., on the brief).

Raymond B. Demski, Trenton, for respondents Vagott, et al. (George T. Dougherty, Trenton, attorney).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

HUGHES, C.J.

These appeals (certified here while pending unheard in the Appellate Division, 68 N.J. 176, 343 A.2d 463 (1975)) challenge the validity of a regulation of the Division of Public Welfare, New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies, setting lower levels of financial assistance to persons classified as 'employable' than to those classified as 'unemployable.' The primary issue is whether that classification is arbitrary and unreasonable on its face or as applied; related to this question is the collateral issue of whether the classification violates the Equal Protection clause or is contrary to the policy and purpose of the controlling statute.

There are subsidiary questions such as whether the relief afforded employables is sufficient to meet their basic needs for survival; whether a municipal director of welfare has the authority or duty to extend 'general assistance' in an amount exceeding that prescribed by valid state regulation, and whether initial jurisdiction to consider the questions presented belonged in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court or in the Appellate Division.

The intervention of the Public Advocate and other legal services groups directs our attention not only to the rights of the individual appellants but to those of other recipients of public assistance ('welfare') similarly situated.

In light of our finding that the challenged regulation is incompatible with the legislative policy and standard of the statute, we need to address only the additional jurisdictional question.

I.

The individual appellants are welfare recipients. Pursuant to a regulation of the Division of Public Welfare, General Assistance Manual § 2.300A(III)(4) (hereafter the 'regulation'), a maximum allowance of $178 per month is provided to adults who 'because of physical, mental or emotional handicaps are unable to accept employment.' This class is designated as unemployable. As to adults who are employable, however, Schedule II of the regulation limits the monthly allowance to $119. The regulation was promulgated on September 1, 1971, by the Commissioner of Institutions and Agencies (hereafter 'Commissioner') pursuant to the General Public Assistance Law, N.J.S.A. 44:8--107 Et seq. The individual appellants are classified as employables and hence are only entitled to the lower monthly allowance.

General assistance, which is sometimes referred to as 'municipal welfare,' is a state-supervised, municipally administered public assistance program available to needy persons not otherwise provided for under state laws, that is to say persons not qualifying for 'categorical' welfare aid such as old age assistance, aid to the blind, disability assistance, aid to families with dependent children or aid to families of the working poor.

General assistance is considered a 'residual' or last resort program under which aid is given to needy single persons and married couples between 18 and 65 years of age who have no minor children. Under the statute cited, the State regulates the program for approximately 400 municipalities which accept state financial assistance.

Before 1971 general assistance grants were based on the extent of need as calculated for individual cases. A budget was prepared to correlate an applicant's actual costs, for shelter, clothing, personal and household needs and scheduled sums for food, to his income and resources. N.J.A.C. 10:85--2.1 Et seq. In 1971, however, all state welfare programs including categorical assistance and general assistance eliminated such individualized computations and instituted a 'flat grant' system. It was then that the employable-umemployable classification was introduced as part of the general assistance scheme. The history of the regulation is essentially silent on the basis for the distinction, and no public hearings were held before its promulgation.

As of 1974 there were approximately 16,495 general assistance recipients in the state and of these an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 were employables.

Neither classification of welfare aid is extended to persons able to work who refuse to accept employment when it is available. All able recipients must continuously seek work or face loss of aid. See N.J.S.A. 44:1--94, 44:8--118. The individual appellants herein have complied with this requirement and thus these cases do not involve persons unwilling to work, but on the contrary persons who are anxious to work but unable to find jobs.

II.

The appellants set their cases in the context of the present economic climate including not only the high state unemployment figures and the widespread unavailability of work, but inflationary increases in the cost of food, housing, transportation and health needs. They contend that the present state of the economy renders the distinctions between employables and unemployables especially onerous and oppressive. On the other hand, the Department of Institutions and Agencies and the City of Trenton through its Department of Welfare point to the finite nature of welfare resources and the potential economic strain of providing all general assistance recipients with equal benefits.

The predicament of the individual appellants dramatically portrays this confrontation of interests and needs. Appellant Antoinette Pascucci is a single woman living alone. She has received general assistance from the City of Trenton since November 1973. Considered an employable as defined by the regulation, her grant would be limited to $119 per month. 1 Her expenses are alleged to be $207 per month, detailed as follows: mortgage payment, $70; food $65; clothing, $5; personal items, $10; transportation to find work, $7; utilities, $45; cleaning bills, $5. She has fallen behind in her mortgage payments and faces foreclosure; her diet is inadequate and she suffers from hunger; she is unable to provide heat for her home when needed and contends that the assistance provided her is 'woefully inadequate' even for mere existence.

Following a refusal by the Director of the Trenton Municipal Welfare Department to increase her financial aid from $119, the amount prescribed by the regulation, Ms. Pascucci brought suit in the Mercer County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court challenging the denial and asserting the invalidity of the regulation placing a lower ceiling on aid to employables.

The Department of Institutions and Agencies intervened in that litigation and moved that the action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The trial judge held that he did not have jurisdiction to rule on the administrative regulation, and that the proper forum was the Appellate Division pursuant to R. 2:2--3(a)(2). He therefore dismissed the action.

Appellant Lydia Ladyka lives alone in a Trenton apartment. She worked for the State of New Jersey until May 1974. In August of that year she began receiving municipal assistance from the City of Trenton. After a partial recovery from illness, she reverted, under the regulation, from the unemployable maximum of $178 to the employable maximum of $119 a month. She pays monthly rent of $157, is able to receive food stamps for the expenditure of an additional dollar and pays between $7 and $9 for electricity. She cannot afford to pay for a phone or purchase necessary clothing and claims to be without the 'necessities of life.'

Appellant Anna Mae Gray lives alone in a Trenton apartment and has received general assistance from the City of Trenton since November 1974. She is classified as employable and thus her grant is $119 her month. She pays monthly rent of $110, $1 for food stamps and is left with $8 for all of her other expenses including gas, electricity, transportation, clothing and personal items.

The departmental respondents do not contest any of these individual proofs, nor do they agree with their factual content.

On behalf of the parties Ladyka and Gray and all others similarly situated, the Public Advocate sought review in the Appellate Division of the reguation specifying lower payments to employables. We first deal with that basic issue.

III.

The persistent unavailability of work to the individual appellants is a result of an economic phenomenon whose effects are particularly critical in New Jersey. For instance, as of November 1974 many thousands in addition to appellants were unable to find work, the Mercer County area labor market suffering an unemployment rate ranging from 6.5 percent to 8.4 percent. In September 1975 the seasonally adjusted rate of unemployment in New Jersey was 13.6 percent according to statistics...

To continue reading

Request your trial
71 cases
  • Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • June 13, 1984
    ...1352, certif. den., 84 N.J. 469, 420 A.2d 1296 (1980), applied prospectively except as to parties before court); Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 50-51, 362 A.2d 566 (1976) (setting aside of classification standards under welfare statute applied prospectively except as to litigants); and Dar......
  • Franklin v. New Jersey Dept. of Human Services
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • May 31, 1988
    ...and capricious" and therefore invalid. Texter v. Dept. of Human Services, 88 N.J. 376, 389, 443 A.2d 178 (1982); Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 50, 362 A.2d 566 (1976). When an administrative regulation is challenged on these grounds, a reviewing court is required to defer to the expertise......
  • Salorio v. Glaser
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • June 8, 1983
    ...or other governing bodies in comparable cases, providing the opportunity to devise alternative funding schemes. See Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 362 A.2d 566 (1976) (holding effectiveness of invalidity of general assistance benefit schedule postponed for at least "60 days from the date o......
  • Vreeland v. Byrne
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • February 11, 1977
    ...Did the executive action contravene a statute, thus invading the constitutional prerogative of the Legislature (Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 362 A.2d 566 (1976))? Does the statute measure up to a plain constitutional imperative (Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); State......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT