Paskewicz v. Hickey
| Citation | 149 A. 671,111 Conn. 219 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Decision Date | 31 March 1930 |
| Parties | PASKEWICZ v. HICKEY ET AL. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; L. P. Waldo Marvin Judge.
Action by Michael Paskewicz against Daniel J. B. Hickey and others for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendants' negligence. The case was tried to a jury. Verdict and judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
No error.
Philip Reich, of Bridgeport, for appellant.
Charles J. Martin, of New Haven, for appellees.
Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.
The first assignment of error is the denial of the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict. We accord much weight to the views of the trial judge under these circumstances, and in determining whether his action was justified, we give the defendant's evidence the most favorable interpretation which can fairly and reasonably be put upon it. Thus considered, the jury could reasonably have found that about half past 10 on the evening of September 29, 1928, an automobile driven by the defendant Daniel F. B. Hickey and owned by his wife, who, with Mrs. McHugh, was with him in the car, was proceeding at a speed of about twenty miles per hour in a westerly direction on Connecticut avenue in Bridgeport. This avenue is about forty feet wide between curbs and is crossed by Bishop avenue, which is thirty-two feet wide. As he approached the intersection, the driver slackened his speed, and when he had practically passed the intersection so that the light which hung over it was to the rear of the car and the front of the car had crossed the second crosswalk, he suddenly saw the plaintiff for the first time near the right head light of the car. It was misty and the electric windshield cleaner was in operation, clearing a portion of the windshield directly in front of the driver. There was no other traffic at that time immediately in front of the car. The car having passed from under the light, there was a shadow at that point, and the plaintiff seemed to come out of the darkness, running, with the left arm up, and crouching over. Upon seeing him, the driver immediately threw out the clutch and put on the brakes and pulled the car to the left in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the plaintiff, and stopped the car within three or four feet. The testimony of the other occupants of the car was mostly corroborative and nowhere in conflict with the foregoing references to the circumstances of the collision. The plaintiff's injuries were all on the left side, and the slight injuries which the car suffered could have come from its right side.
From the evidence thus summarized and from other details of the testimony, the jury could reasonably have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was not crossing the street through the intersection, but to one side in the shadow, and was either running without looking or hurriedly attempting to get across ahead of the automobile.
Upon the entire evidence as it stood before the jury they could reasonably have found the plaintiff could not have failed, if he had looked after stepping into the street or at any time while walking to the center of it, to note the approach of the car. He had often crossed there and knew that care was necessary, especially at night. He was charged with knowing and understanding what in the exercise of due care he could have seen and understood. In a similar case we said: " Under the evidence the jury could not reasonably have found otherwise than that the plaintiff should have known, if he had exercised due care as he crossed Noble avenue, that the defendant in an automobile with the lights aglow was approaching from the south * * * and that the plaintiff's failure to see that automobile and avoid it was negligence on his part, which was a contributory cause of the collision and injury." Hizam v. Blackman, 103 Conn. 547, 551, 131 A. 415, 416. In this view of the circumstances, the jury could not reasonably have found that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence, and the trial court committed no error in refusing to set aside the verdict.
Other assignments of error relate to certain portions of the charge and the failure of the court to charge as requested upon the doctrine of the last clear chance. That request was not accurately framed, and the court did not err in refusing to submit it to the jury in that form. We have had no occasion to change our statement of the rule upon this subject, which appears in Fine v. Connecticut Co., 92 Conn. 626 631, 103 A. 901, and often since referred to. The court, however, did charge upon the doctrine, and three assignments of error are based upon claimed errors in that statement. Portions of the charge, when considered apart from others on...
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Correnti v. Catino
...of steps in distance and perhaps a second of time between a position of safety and one of danger for the plaintiff." Paskewiez v. Hickey, 111 Conn. 219, 149 A. 671, 673. differing viewpoints finding expression in these opinions requires a reconsideration of the application of the doctrine t......
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Correnti v. Catino
...of steps in distance and perhaps a second of time between a position of safety and one of danger for the plaintiff." Paskewicz v. Hickey, 111 Conn. 219, 149 A. 671, The differing viewpoints finding expression in these opinions requires a reconsideration of the application of the doctrine to......
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...cause of the injury, the question is one of law for the court. Hizam v. Blackman, 103 Conn. 547, 551, 131 A. 415; Paskewicz v. Hickey, 111 Conn. 219, 222, 149 A. 671. In the instant case, it was for the jury to determine whether, considering the evidence as to the conduct of both parties, t......