Pasqua v. Cnty. of Hunterdon & Hunterdon Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders
| Decision Date | 11 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civ. Action No.: 14-4203 (FLW) (TJB),Civ. Action No.: 15-3501 (FLW) (TJB) |
| Parties | MARGARET PASQUA and KIMBERLY BROWNE, Plaintiffs, v. THE COUNTY OF HUNTERDON and HUNTERDON COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, Defendants. MARGARET PASQUA and KIMBERLY BROWNE, Plaintiffs, v. THE COUNTY OF HUNTERDON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
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Plaintiff Margaret Pasqua formerly held the position of Chief Financial Officer/Treasurer at the County of Hunterdon ("the County"), and Plaintiff Kimberly Browne (collectively, "Plaintiffs") was an at-will employee who served as the Director of Finance. The County terminated both Plaintiffs on December 30, 2013, for, inter alia, allegedly authorizing improper payments of medical benefits and failing to maintain accurate financial records. Plaintiffs brought two separate lawsuits in state court challenging their terminations, which cases were later removed to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. In Civil Action No. 14-4203 ("Pasqua I"), Plaintiffs claim that the Hunterdon County Board of Chosen Freeholders (the "Board") decided to terminate them without just cause, and that they are entitled to a de novo review of that decision pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:9-25. Furthermore, Plaintiffs accuse the County and the Board (collectively, "County Defendants"), for allegedly terminating them for political reasons, and for holding Plaintiffs' termination hearing in a manner that violated Plaintiffs' due process rights.
In Civil Action No. 15-3501 ("Pasqua II"), Plaintiffs assert against the County Defendants substantially similar, if not identical and duplicative, state and federal claims arising from the same allegedly wrongful terminations. Plaintiffs also assert those same claims against other individual county employees and officers: Cynthia J. Yard, George B. Melick, William G. Mennen, Robert G. Walton, J. Matthew Holt, John King, John E. Lanza, Suzanne Lagay, and Edward J. Florio (collectively, the "Individual Defendants").1 In addition to these defendants, Plaintiffs bring state professional malpractice and tort claims against the following accounting firms and accountants: Donohue Gironda & Doria, Louis J. Garbaccio, Frederic J. Tomkins ("Donohue Firm"), Samuel Klein & Co., Michael McGuire ("Samuel Firm"), Wiss & Co., LLP and David J. Gannon ("Wiss Firm") (collectively, "Accountant Defendants"). With regard to these particular defendants, Plaintiffs allege that their audits led and contributed to Plaintiffs' terminations.
In Pasqua I, Plaintiffs move for summary judgment as to all claims and the County Defendants cross-move for summary judgement on the same claims. Additionally, the County Defendants request that the Court strike, as violative of L. Civ. R. 7.2(a) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), Plaintiffs' certifications, submitted in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. Pending inPasqua II are separate Motions to Dismiss filed by each of the accounting firms. Because the subject matter and factual background in both cases are substantially similar, all of the motions will be resolved in this Omnibus Opinion.
For the reasons set forth below, in Pasqua I, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and the County Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. State and federal claims asserted in Counts Two through Seven against the County Defendants are dismissed. Both Motions for Summary Judgment on Count One, Plaintiff Pasqua's state statutory claim under N.J.S.A. 40A:9-25, are DENIED without prejudice; the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on that claim. As such, Civil Action No.: 14-4203 shall be remanded to the state court.2 In Pasqua II, the Accountant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED in their entirety. Further, Plaintiffs shall show cause within 15 days from the date of the Order accompanying this Opinion as to why the federal claims asserted in Pasqua II should not be dismissed based on this Court's decision in Civ. Action No. 14-4203.
Because the Court is considering the facts of Pasqua I in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in the context of each motion. The following facts are not in dispute unless otherwise noted.
Plaintiffs are former employees of the County. Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts not in Dispute ( ) ¶ 1; Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' Statement of Material Facts ( ) ¶ 1. In May 2008, Ms. Pasqua was appointed to the positions of County Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer, and served in these positions until her termination on December 30, 2013.3 Ms. Browne was employed in the position of Director of Finance in May 2008, and served in this position until she was terminated on December 30, 2013.4 Pls.' Statement at ¶ 3; Defs.' Resp. Statement at ¶ 3.
According to the County Defendants, as part of Plaintiffs' job duties, they were responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the County's financial records and statements. Defs.' Supplemental Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. ( ) ¶¶ 4-5, 7-9, 12-13, 16-19, 21, 25-28; but see Rule 56.1 Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Statement of Material Facts not in Dispute ( ) at corresponding paragraphs. However, in 2013, the County Defendants conducted an investigation and audits of the County's financial records that purportedly revealed that for years, numerous aspects of the County's finances were misstated and misrepresented with negative financial consequences to the County. Defs.' Suppl. Statement ¶¶ 6, 29-30, 35, 39, 44, 45, 53-55, 58-59, 62, 71-72, 74, 78, 86, 98, 105; Pls.' Resp. Statement at corresponding paragraphs. The County Defendants claim that Plaintiffs were responsible for these errors and that when Plaintiffs were confronted such evidence, "they resistedthe auditors' and the County's efforts to redress these issues and refused to fully cooperate to the point of insubordination." Defs.' Br. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Defs.' Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. and to Strike Pls.' Certs. ( ) 1-2; see County. Defs.' Suppl. Statement ¶¶ 123-34; Pls.' Resp. Statement at corresponding paragraphs.
Plaintiffs maintain that, contrary to the County Defendants' assertions, many of the errors in the County's financial records originated from failures by the County's human resources department to perform its designated responsibilities. County. Pls.' Statement at ¶¶ 11-12, 15; Defs.' Resp. Statement at corresponding paragraphs. Furthermore, Plaintiffs claim that a number of the errors already appeared in the County's financial books in May 2008, when Plaintiffs were appointed to their respective positions in finance department. Pls.' Statement at ¶¶ 16-17; Defs.' Resp. Statement at corresponding paragraphs. Consequently, Plaintiffs take the position that they are not responsible for audit issues detected in the County's financial records.
On September 24, 2013, both Plaintiffs were served by the County Administrator, Cynthia J. Yard, with the following formal disciplinary charges:
Pls.' Statement at ¶ 4 (numbering added); Defs.' Resp. Statement at ¶ 4. The County scheduled the first hearing on both Plaintiffs' charges for the same day. Pls.' Statement at ¶ 7; Defs.' Resp. Statement at ¶ 7. Before the commencement of the hearing, both Plaintiffs, through their sharedattorney, argued that each was entitled to a separate hearing on the ground that the charges against them were not the same (although they involved similar circumstances). Pls.' Statement at ¶ 7; Defs.' Resp. Statement at ¶ 7. Plaintiffs asserted that a joint hearing was inappropriate, because they would be unable to "guess or surmise whether the testimony about a performance concern was directed against them or the other employee." Pls.' Statement ¶ 7; Defs.' Resp. Statement ¶ 7. The County opposed Plaintiffs' request for separate hearings, and the Hearing Officer proceeded to conduct all nine days of Plaintiffs' hearings jointly. Pls.' Statement at ¶¶ 7-8; Defs.' Resp. Statement at corresponding paragraphs.
During the nine days of hearings, both sides presented testimony and documentary evidence. Pls.' Statement at ¶¶ 8, 22; Defs.' Resp. Statement at corresponding paragraphs. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel - indeed the same attorney - and were permitted to cross-examine witnesses. See Hearing Transcripts (Dkt. Nos. 22.9-22.16). On December 27, 2013, the Hearing Officer issued a Preliminary Report, in which he recommended that Plaintiffs be terminated based on the asserted charges. Pls.' Statement at ¶¶ 21-22; Defs.' Resp. Statement at corresponding paragraphs; see also Hearing Officer's Prelim. Report (Dkt. No. 22.7). Plaintiffs assert that this Preliminary Report "failed to provide a rationale for [the Hearing Officer's] yet to be issued future recommendation, nor did it include adequate findings of fact nor did it provide an expression of reasoning which, when applied to the found facts, resulted in the recommended decision." Pls.' Br. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. ( ) 2. Eventually, on May 16, 2014, but several months after Plaintiffs had been terminated, the Hearing Officer issued his Final Report. Pls.' Statement ¶ 24; Defs.' Resp. Statement ¶ 24.
On December 30, 2013,...
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