Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering
Decision Date | 10 August 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 76360,76360 |
Citation | 211 Ill.Dec. 314,166 Ill.2d 337,654 N.E.2d 1365 |
Parties | , 211 Ill.Dec. 314, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,499 David R. PASQUALE, Adm'r of the Estate of Diane K. Pasquale, Deceased, for the Benefit of Samantha Pasquale, Appellant, v. SPEED PRODUCTS ENGINEERING et al. (F & B Manufacturing Company, Appellee). |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Leonard M. Ring & Associates, P.C. (William J. Jovan, Leonard M. Ring and Leslie J. Rosen, of counsel), and Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Altheimer & Gray, all of Chicago, for appellant.
John W. Bell and Charles P. Rantis, Johnson & Bell, Ltd., Chicago (Thomas H. Fegan and Mindy Kallus, of counsel), for appellee.
Womick & Associates, Chtd., Carbondale (John P. Womick, of counsel), for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
Plaintiff, David R. Pasquale, as administrator of Diane K. Pasquale's estate, brought a wrongful-death action against Great Lakes Dragway and Speed Products Engineering in the circuit court of Cook County for the benefit of Samantha Pasquale, the surviving next of kin, and himself (David), the surviving spouse. Wesley Law, acting as the special administrator of the estate of Raymond Law, deceased, joined in bringing the action as co-plaintiff. Prior to trial, plaintiff settled with Great Lakes Dragway (Great Lakes) in the valued amount of $861,789. The case proceeded to trial on plaintiff's fourth-amended complaint and on cross-claims for contribution by the two remaining defendants. The complaint alleged, inter alia, a wrongful-death action sounding in strict liability against joint tortfeasors Speed Products Engineering (Speed) and F & B Manufacturing Company (F & B) in benefit of Samantha (count I), and a separate wrongful-death action sounding in strict liability against Speed alone in benefit of David (count II). After the parties rested, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on a separate claim by plaintiff, as an individual, against Speed, seeking recovery for emotional distress based on a theory of strict liability (count III). The refusal, in effect, granted Speed a directed verdict on that count.
Jury verdict of $1.5 million was subsequently returned against Speed and F & B for the benefit of Samantha, and a separate jury verdict of $150,000 was returned against Speed for the benefit of David. The trial court entered two judgments, nunc pro tunc, on the two verdicts.
During post-trial proceedings, the court denied F & B's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Samantha, but granted its request for a setoff of the settlement amount. The trial court directed a setoff of $430,894.50 against the judgment in benefit of Samantha. The trial court additionally denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial on damages and reinstatement of count III.
F & B subsequently appealed the trial court's denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as well as the setoff application. Plaintiff, as administrator and individually, cross-appealed the sufficiency of the damages and the grant of directed verdict in favor of Speed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's rulings, with the exception of the ruling applying the setoff. The appellate court determined that the trial court should have entered one wrongful-death judgment on the two separate verdicts for Samantha and David, and then applied a setoff of $861,789, the full amount of the Great Lakes settlement, against that portion of the judgment, $1.5 million, for which F & B and Speed were jointly and severally liable. The appellate court reversed and remanded with directions to that effect. (252 Ill.App.3d 724, 191 Ill.Dec. 899, 624 N.E.2d 1277.) Presiding Justice Jiganti dissented, regarding the directed setoff application. Plaintiff's petition for a rehearing and alternative request for certificate of importance were later denied.
We granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal (145 Ill.2d R. 315), allowed F & B's request for cross-relief (145 Ill.2d R. 315(g)), and permitted the filing of an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff (134 Ill.2d R. 345(a)). For reasons which follow, we now affirm the judgment of the trial court in directing a verdict in Speed's favor on plaintiff's individual action for emotional distress and denying F & B's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in benefit of Samantha. We also affirm that part of the trial court's judgment granting a setoff of $430,894.50 against the judgment in Samantha's benefit.
The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by (1) allowing directed verdict in favor of Speed on David's claim for emotional distress brought under a theory of strict liability; (2) denying F & B's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and (3) allocating the wrongful-death settlement to the claims of individual beneficiaries and applying setoffs against those beneficiaries' individual recoveries.
On May 27, 1979, Burgess Clayton Harris, a professional race car driver, was driving his top fuel race car at Great Lakes Dragway when an unknown failure in the car's driveline caused the engine's speed to greatly accelerate. As the engine's speed accelerated, the clutch assembly's rotations also accelerated to the point where the assembly flew completely apart. The intact clutch parts burst out of a bellhousing or containment device in which they were enclosed and flew through the air into the crowd of spectators. One of the clutch parts struck Diane Pasquale in the head, killing her. David Pasquale, Diane's husband, was seated next to her at the time.
Evidence at trial would later reveal that the driveline failure did not cause the accident; such failures happen with frequency due to the amount of power produced by race car engines. Expert testimony was also presented that the accident was caused by the bellhousing's failure to contain the clutch parts. Undisputed expert testimony was presented that steel used in the bellhousing, when tested, yielded a low level of tensile and impact strength, meaning that the material was very brittle. Furthermore, the type of fractures to the container's surface also indicated that the material was brittle. The material did not meet specifications established by the Speed Equipment Manufacturer's Association, an organization which has developed performance specifications and testing procedures for race car parts in order to provide greater safety for drivers and spectators.
The chassis of Harris' car was built by Peek Brothers (Peek), which purchased the bellhousing from Speed on January 12, 1978. Speed was a well-known distributor of race car parts. Speed's owner at the time of the accident was David Russell. Speed did not manufacture any of the parts it sold; it merely operated out of a single room and employed only two non-highly technically skilled employees. Peek ordered the bellhousing or "high gear can" from Speed's catalogue.
Roy Fjastad, the prior owner of Speed, originally contracted with F & B to manufacture the cans. Russell subsequently acquired the company, but continued the practice of ordering the cans from F & B in the same manner as Fjastad. F & B, at the time of trial, was the largest hydroforming company in the world. Hydroforming is the process by which a flat metal plate is stretched to form a desired shape through the use of a die and a diaphragm which exerts pressure on the metal causing it to stretch. F & B was engaged in the manufacture and assembly of certain products, including, but not limited to, designing, engineering and testing. F & B represented itself in at least one trade journal as capable of providing complete technical engineering and development services with over 20 years' experience.
This opinion will present additional facts as the discussion warrants.
David's Claim for Emotional Distress Based on Theory of
Count III of the fourth-amended complaint was an action by David, as an individual, solely against Speed, and sought damages for emotional distress under a theory of strict products liability. Count III alleged:
Speed subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. The trial court ruled that damages for emotional distress were not recoverable under a strict products liability theory.
At trial, evidence established that David and Diane were in the stands at Great Lakes Dragway watching the auto race. David testified that when a race car took off, he heard a noise. Then something which felt like a handful of sand hit the side of his face. David looked over at Diane and saw that she was sitting upright, but was falling over towards him. According to David, Diane's brains and blood were "all over the place." The entire interior of Diane's head, including the backs of her eyeballs, was exposed to David's sight. After he placed the top of Diane's head back in place, he felt her face for a while, then picked her up and carried her down the stands to a waiting ambulance. David then became sick and went into shock. David was aware that Diane was dead as he carried her.
David testified that after Diane's death, he became a "basket case." He could not work lost weight, was eventually fired from his job and had a difficult time finding work later. He also testified that he was ...
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...Auth., 225 Ill App3d 930, 590 NE2d 539, 168 Ill Dec 902 (2nd Dist 1992), §§14:325, 14:326 Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering , 166 Ill.2d 337, 654 N.E.2d 1365 (1995), §33:80 Pasquinelli v. Village of Mundelein , 257 Ill App3d 1057, 630 NE2d 113, 196 Ill Dec 416 (2nd Dist 1994), §16:262 ......
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Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
...for the same injury or wrongful death for which the tortfeasor was ultimately found liable. [ Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering , 166 Ill2d 337, 654 NE2d 1365 (1995).] §33:81 Allocation of Settlement Award Among Different Injuries: Tortfeasors Joined in One Suit The determination as to......
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Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
...for the same injury or wrongful death for which the tortfeasor was ultimately found liable. [ Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering , 166 Ill2d 337, 654 NE2d 1365 (1995).] §33:81 Allocation of Settlement Award Among Different Injuries: Tortfeasors Joined in One Suit The determination as to......
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Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
...for the same injury or wrongful death for which the tortfeasor was ultimately found liable. [ Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering , 166 Ill2d 337, 654 NE2d 1365 (1995).] §33:81 Allocation of Settlement Award Among Different Injuries: Tortfeasors Joined in One Suit The determination as to......