Pasquel v. Owen

Decision Date29 December 1950
Docket NumberNo. 14124.,14124.
Citation186 F.2d 263
PartiesPASQUEL v. OWEN.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Victor B. Harris, St. Louis, Mo. (Smith, Harris & Hanke, St. Louis, Mo., and Mann, Mann, Walter & Powell, Springfield, Mo., were with him on the brief), for appellant.

E. C. Curtis, Springfield, Mo. (Farrington & Curtis, Jack S. Curtis and Richard Farrington, all of Springfield, Mo., were with him on the brief), for appellee.

Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and WOODROUGH and RIDDICK, Circuit Judges.

GARDNER, Chief Judge.

This was an action brought by appellant against appellee to recover damages for the alleged breach of a contract to play baseball in Mexico. Appellee, a professional baseball player, answered admitting the execution of the contract between himself and the appellant, but denied that he had breached the contract and affirmatively alleged by counter-claim that appellant had broken the contract by discharging him as manager. The parties will be referred to as they were designated in the trial court.

The contract pleaded by both parties was in writing and omitting formal parts reads as follows:

"This Agreement, made and entered into this 2nd day of April, 1946, by and between Jorge Pasquel, President, Mexican Baseball League, an individual, hereinafter referred to as the President, and Arnold (Mickey) Malcolm Owen, an individual hereinafter referred to as Mr. Owen.

Article I.

"The president herewith agrees that, in return for Mr. Owen's signature under these conditions, Mr. Owen will become player-manager of the Torreon Club of the Mexican Baseball League, in the City of Torreon, Mexico, and Mr. Owen, in return, herewith agrees to perform the services of player-manager as herein described.

Article II.

"The president herewith pays to Mr. Owen a sum of $12,500 (U. S. currency) as a bonus to sign this agreement, said payment to be paid this date as a condition of signing this agreement.

Article III.

"The president herewith agrees that Mr. Owen will be paid an annuary salary of $15,000 (U. S. currency), free and unencumbered for him, with all boarding expenses, first class, to be paid for him by the president, in Torreon, for a period of five years from this date.

Article IV.

"The president also agrees to provide a first class apartment, with living expenses in Torreon for Mr. Owen and his wife, as well as transportation expenses to and from Springfield, Mo., and Torreon, annually for five years.

Article V.

"The president further agrees that, as of this date, he herewith pays to Mr. Owen one-half of Mr. Owen's first annual salary, to-wit, one-half of $15,000, or $7,500, in U. S. Currency."

On April 12, 1946, at Laredo, Texas, at defendant's request the parties entered into a supplemental contract in writing, which omitting formal parts reads as follows:

"Mr. Owen has received at this city (Laredo, Texas), the sum of $7,500.00 (Seven thousand five hundred dollars). This amount, together with the amount already advanced by Mr. Gillespie at Saint Louis, Mo., makes the completion of his whole salary, for playing baseball, during one season, in the Republic of Mexico.

"Said salary, corresponding to one whole season, has been already received by Mr. Owen, as a guarantee, according with the signed contract.

Mr. Owen will receive his salary in full, for the 1946 baseball season, retaining as a guarantee, the sum that he has received for one baseball season, which sum will apply exclusively in payment of the last baseball season, which Mr. Owen is compelled to play, as per the contract signed at St. Louis, Mo.

"Mr. Bernardo Pasquel, duly authorized by his brother Jorge, executes this contract at Laredo, Texas, together with the following witnesses: Mrs. M. Owen and Danilo Medina.

"Received the sum of $7,500.00 (Seven thousand five hundred dollars), at Laredo, Texas, this 12th day of April, 1946."

Following the execution of this contract defendant, having received $12,500.00 designated as a bonus and $15,000.00 for his fifth year's salary, departed for Mexico but enroute apparently changed his mind and attempted to make a deal with an American baseball club to play in the United States. He testified that had he succeeded he would have returned the money received as a bonus and the $15,000 for the fifth year's salary because in his opinion he had not earned any money. He again changed his mind and proceeded to Mexico where he reported not to the Torreon Club as provided in the contract but by mutual consent of the parties reported to the Vera Cruz Club, which club was owned by plaintiff. Without protest or objection he played with the Vera Cruz Club for five or six weeks simply as a player and was then made manager. About July 5, 1946, after defendant had been manager for about five weeks he was relieved of his duties as manager of the Vera Cruz Club. He, however, remained as a player with the Vera Cruz team for approximately another month, receiving the compensation provided for in his contract. Late in the afternoon of August 5, 1946, he and his wife suddenly decided to leave Mexico and drove by automobile all the way to the border, a continuous trip of some eighteen hours. Defendant testified that his reason for leaving Mexico was that he had been unable to see the plaintiff after his removal as manager and that this embarrassed him and hurt his pride. When he was relieved of his duties as manager he received a written notice to that effect which he signed. Defendant testified that he had been dissatisfied in Mexico because of the way plaintiff operated his ball club; that plaintiff had frequently gone onto the playing field and argued with the umpire, and occasionally countermanded an order which the defendant had given. He admitted that it was customary for a baseball club owner to take an active interest in the team but he objected to the manner in which plaintiff interferred. He testified that it is the usual practice in baseball to remove a manager summarily and that this practice was well known to him. His salary was $2,146.86 per month which was paid to him by plaintiff up to the time he left Mexico. He gave no notice to plaintiff of his intention to leave. He did not write plaintiff a letter and he did not know whether plaintiff was actually in Mexico at the time of his departure. Plaintiff at no time repudiated the contract or declined to pay defendant's salary. His departure from Mexico and his arrival in the United States became a matter of news and he was interviewed by sports writers. There is some dispute as to what he said but defendant admitted that he told various reporters that he owed plaintiff money; that what he had in mind at that time was the $15,000.00 paid him in advance for the 1950 baseball season; that he did not think he was entitled to that because he had not earned it. Other facts will be developed in the course of this opinion.

Plaintiff requested a number of instructions, all of which were refused. One of these instructions was to the effect that if the jury should find from the evidence that the $12,500.00 which defendant received from plaintiff as a bonus at the time the contract was entered into was so paid with the understanding that the defendant would in good faith carry out the agreement and if they should find that the defendant had not in good faith carried out the agreement the defendant's failure to return the $12,500.00 should be considered as part of plaintiff's damages. Another instruction so refused was to the effect that the defendant was not entitled to recover against plaintiff on his counterclaim for the United States income taxes for the years 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950, and another was to the effect that defendant was not entitled to recover anything against plaintiff on his counterclaim for salary after his departure from Mexico. Another requested instruction was to the effect that in fixing defendant's damages the jury should consider any monies earned by defendant since he left Mexico and any sums he might reasonably have earned in the exercise of due diligence.

The court in its instructions told the jury as a matter of law that plaintiff had no right to recover the $12,500.00 paid at the time of the execution of the contract as a bonus. The court also in effect instructed the jury that if the plaintiff removed defendant as manager this constituted a breach of the contract entitling defendant to recover damages, the instruction in this regard being as follows:

"Now, you understand, the contract is before you, that he went down there as player-manager — as player-manager — and I may say to you as a matter of law that the plaintiff could not discharge him from either one or the other because his contract was that he was a player-manager; that he had to do both. That was the contract."

This instruction was in effect repeated as follows:

"Now, as I said, the contract provided he go to Old Mexico as manager-player. When he was removed as manager, if he were removed as manager — if he were removed as manager — then it would be my duty to tell you that was a breach of the contract, if he were removed as manager of the baseball club, because that was a part of the contract. He was to be a player-manager."

Exception was duly saved to the refusal to give the requested instructions and the giving of the above noted instructions. The jury returned a verdict for $51,428.52 in favor of the defendant and judgment was duly entered thereon.

On this appeal the plaintiff contends, among other things, substantially as follows: (1) the instruction that the removal of defendant as either player or manager constituted a breach of the contract amounted to a directed verdict for the defendant and was erroneous; (2) the court erroneously instructed that defendant was entitled to retain the $12,500.00 bonus paid him at the signing of the contract; (3) the admission in evidence of Exhibit 6-A, a letter from p...

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