Pasquini v. Fairmount Behavioral Health Sys.
Decision Date | 25 March 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 2017 EDA 2019,2017 EDA 2019 |
Citation | 230 A.3d 1190 |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Parties | Brianna PASQUINI v. FAIRMOUNT BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEM & UHS of Fairmount, Inc., Appellants |
Andrew C.S. Efaw, Denver, for appellant.
Mark Patrick Merlini Jr., Philadelphia, for appellant.
Joshua Ryan Van Naarden, Philadelphia, for appellee.
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
Fairmount Behavioral Health System & UHS of Fairmount, Inc. (Appellants) appeal from the Order entered on May 14, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting Brianna Pasquini's (Appellee) Motion to Strike Objections to Requests for Admission and requiring Appellants to admit or deny whether they knew a non-party patient was a registered sex offender in January of 2016. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant procedural history herein as follows:
Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/26/19, at 1-2.
On July 8, 2019, Appellants filed their Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal which is a four-page narrative. Therein, Appellants contend they cannot readily discern the basis for the trial court's decision, and therefore, they "generally challenge" the court's finding that they must respond to Appellee's request for admission at issue. Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 7/8/19, at 2. Appellants further state that "this statement of errors includes every subsidiary issue [Appellants] raised in [their] Response to Appellee's Motion to Strike and in [their] Motion for Reconsideration submitted following the entry of the May 14, 2019, Order." Id .2 On September 26, 2019, the trial court filed is Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
In their brief, Appellants present the following Statement of the Questions Involved:
It is axiomatic that "[a]n appeal lies only from a final order, unless permitted by rule or statute." Stewart v. Foxworth , 65 A.3d 468, 471 (Pa.Super. 2013). As previously noted, this Court's September 6, 2019, Per Curiam Order, denied Appellee's motion to quash the instant appeal without prejudice to her right to raise again the issue before the merits panel. Although Appellee has not done so, "since we lack jurisdiction over an unappealable order it is incumbent on us to determine, sua sponte when necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an appealable order." Gunn v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut , 971 A.2d 505, 508 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, we begin by addressing whether we possess jurisdiction to review the trial court's order.
In order to be appealable, an order must be a final order, Pa.R.A.P. 341 - 42 ; an interlocutory order appealable by right or permission, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(a) - (b), Pa.R.A.P. 311 - 12 ; or (3) a collateral order, Pa.R.A.P. 313.3 When considering the appealability of a discovery order concerning one's mental health records and a report pertaining thereto, this Court recently stated:
"The courts of Pennsylvania have uniformly held that, if an appellant asserts that the trial court has ordered him [or her] to produce materials that are privileged, then Rule 313 applies." Farrell v. Regola , 150 A.3d 87, 95 (Pa.Super. 2016), citing Yocabet v. UPMC Presbyterian , 119 A.3d 1012, 1016 n. 1 (Pa.Super. 2015) (), Ben v. Schwartz , 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547, 549 (1999) ( )(distinguishing federal law and reaffirming Pennsylvania law that "orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313"). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that this order is appealable as a collateral order.
Commonwealth v. Segarra appeal of: Complainant Witness, D.G., a minor , 228 A.3d 943, 948–50 (Pa.Super. Feb. 10, 2020).
Applying the above analysis to the case at bar, we reach the same conclusion. We are able to examine the issues of privilege raised by Appellants without analyzing the underlying issues in the case, i.e . Appellants’ alleged negligence, gross negligence, carelessness and recklessness. In addition, Appellants allege the requested material is subject to various privileges and that the potential revelation of this sensitive mental health information implicates the "importance" prong of the collateral order doctrine, as such privacy rights are deeply rooted in public policy. Finally, our failure to review the propriety of the trial court's discovery order at this juncture would result in Appellants’ claim of privilege being irreparably lost, as they could be forced to disclose sensitive information in conformance with the trial court's discovery order, and such compliance could not be undone in a subsequent appeal. See T.M. v. Elwyn, Inc. , 950 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa.Super. 2008).
Having determined that the requirements of the collateral order doctrine have been met and that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, we now proceed to examine the issues Appellants have raised. "In reviewing the propriety of a discovery order, we determine whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and, to the extent that we are faced with questions of law, our scope of review is plenary." Id .
Appellants contend the trial court's May 14, 2019, Order requires them "to disclose [their] knowledge of information obtained from a non-party patient in furtherance of providing mental health treatment to him." Brief for Appellants at 8. Appellants urge this Court to reverse based on either the "psychotherapist-patient privilege," 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 59444 or the "Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act" (MHPA), 50 P.S. § 7111.5 Id . In this regard, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that:
"evidentiary privileges are not favored." Commonwealth v. Stewart , 547 Pa. 277, 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997) ( ). Courts should permit utilization of an evidentiary privilege "only to the very limited extent that ... excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth." Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation , 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990) ).
BouSamra v. Excela Health , 210 A.3d 967, 975 (Pa. 2019).
Herein, during discovery in her underlying action, Appellee sought to determine whether or not Appellants knew of Mr. Hewlett's sexually violent past at the time he allegedly attacked Appellee on January 21, 2016. Appellee served upon Appellants a request for admission, and Appellants responded as follows:
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