Passett v. Chase

Decision Date18 March 1926
Citation107 So. 689,91 Fla. 522
PartiesPASSETT v. CHASE, Sheriff.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; A. J. Rose, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceeding by Issidore Passett against Henry R. Chase Sheriff of Dade County. A judgment denied the petitioner's motion for discharge, and remanded him to custody, and he brings error.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

In making laws for District of Columbia, Congress acts as legislative branch of federal government; offenses against laws of United States, applicable to District of Columbia and committed therein, are crimes against United States, and not against District. In making laws for the District of Columbia, Congress acts as the legislative branch of the federal government, so that offenses against the laws of the United States, applicable to the District of Columbia, and committed within such district, are crimes against the United States, and not against the District.

Federal statute, providing procedure for arrest and removal of persons charged with offenses against laws of United States found in federal district other than one wherein crime was committed, held applicable to offenses committed in District of Columbia (Rev. St. U.S. §§ 1014, 1029 [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 1674, 1695]). Section 1014 of Rev. Stats. U.S. (U. S. Comp St. § 1674), provides the procedure for the arrest on complaint and affidavit, preliminary hearing, commitment, and removal of persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States who are found in a federal district other than the district where the crime was committed, which serves the same purpose for the federal courts as extradition proceedings where state offenders are involved, and is applicable to offenses committed in the District of Columbia.

Bench warrant and warrant of commitment after indictment should state fact of indictment and offense, but it is sufficient if it recites fact of indictment and describes offense generally. A bench warrant and a warrant of commitment after indictment should state the fact of indictment and the offense; it is sufficient, however, if it recites the fact of indictment and describes the offense generally.

Warrant of arrest issued in one state, may not be executed in another state; federal court in one district has no authority to issue writ to marshal or any officer of another federal district commanding him to arrest person within jurisdiction but outside that of court issuing it (Jud. Code U.S. § 57 [U. S. Comp. St. § 1039]; Rev. St. U.S. §§ 716, 1014 [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 1239, 1674]). A warrant of arrest, issued in one state, may not be executed in another state, for it has no validity beyond the boundaries of the state by whose authority it was issued. This principle is applicable to federal courts, and a federal court in one district has no authority to issue its writ to the marshal or any officer of another federal district, commanding him to arrest a person within his jurisdiction, but outside that of the court issuing it.

Bench warrant, issued by Supreme Court of District of Columbia, and addressed to marshal of District, confers no authority on marshal of United States District Court for Southern District of Florida, or sheriff of any county within such district, to make arrest thereunder (Jud. Code U.S. § 57 [U. S. Comp. St. § 1039]; Rev. St. U.S. §§ 716, 1014 [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 1239, 1674]). A bench warrant, issued by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and addressed to the marshal of such District, confers no authority upon the marshal of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, or the sheriff or any county within such district, making arrest thereunder.

State court has no right to entertain or exercise jurisdiction in habeas corpus in behalf of prisoner held by federal officer under and by virtue of federal process and authority or color of it. A state court has no right to entertain or exercise jurisdiction in habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner held by a federal officer under and by virtue of federal process and authority or the color of it.

On application to state court for habeas corpus, if it appears party alleged to be illegally restrained is held under authority or claim and color of authority of United States by its officer, writ should be refused; if fact person restrained is held under authority or claim and color of authority of United States by its officer does not appear, state judge, on application for habeas corpus, may inquire into cause of imprisonment, and it is duty of marshal or federal officer having custody of prisoner to give by proper return information in this respect. If, upon application to a state court for a writ of habeas corpus, it apperas that the party alleged to be illegally restrained of his liberty is held under the authority or claim and color of authority of the United States by an officer of that government, the writ should be refused. If this fact do not thus appear, the state judge has the right to inquire into the cause of imprisonment and ascertain by what authority the person is held within the limits of the state, and it is the duty of the marshal or of the federal officer having the custody of the prisoner to give, by a proper return, information in this respect. But, after the state judge has been apprised by the return that the party is held by an officer of the United States by the authority, or under color of authority, of the United States, he can proceed no further, but must leave the question of the illegality of the imprisonment for the determination of the courts or judicial officers of the United States.

State court has jurisdiction in habeas corpus in cases where person is held in custody by state officer under color of, but without actual, federal authority; on showing that state officer is holding prisoner under void federal process, conferring no authority on him to arrest or hold such person, state court has duty to order discharge of such person on habeas corpus, especially where dealing with officer of such court. But the state court has jurisdiction in habeas corpus in cases where the person alleged to be unlawfully restrained of his liberty is held in custody by a state officer under color of, but without actual, federal authority; and, where it appears that such is the case, and that such state officer is restraining such person under void federal process which confers no authority upon him to arrest or hold such person in custody, the state court has the power and jurisdiction, and it becomes its duty, to order the discharge of the prisoner from such unlawful custody; and especially so where, as in this case, the state court before whom the habeas corpus proceedings is pending is dealing with an officer of such court.

State tribunals have broad common-law jurisdiction and powers under writ of habeas corpus to inquire into all sorts of unlawful detentions within jurisdiction, excepting as jurisdiction is limited by national Constitution and laws of Congress pursuant thereto. State tribunals are vested with the broad common-law jurisdiction and powers, under the ancient writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into all sorts of unlawful detentions within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of such courts, excepting only in so far as that jurisdiction has been limited, in certain narrow respects, by the national Constitution and laws of Congress passed pursuant to its authority.

COUNSEL

Bart A. Riley and M. H. Rosenhouse, both of Miami, for plaintiff in error.

J. B. Johnson, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

OPINION

BROWN C.J.

The plaintiff in error was arrested by the sheriff of Dade county, Fla., and imprisoned in the jail in Miami, Fla., whereupon he sued out a writ of habeas corpus before a judge of the circuit court. The return of the sheriff showed that the plaintiff in error was being held in his custody by virtue of a bench warrant issued by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, attested by the clerk of said court, and under the seal of the court. The clerk's name was signed by a rubber stamp. The warrant did not state any offense but ordered that the defendant, Issidore Passett, alias Harry Weise, 'if to be found in your district,' be taken and produced before the criminal court of such district immediately to answer the United States 'touching the offense charged herein.' Attached to said warrant was a certified copy of the indictment against Passett charging him with neglecting, and refusing to provide for the support and maintenance of Wallace Passett, a minor child of the age of seven years, in destitute and necessitous circumstances, 'contrary to the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and government of the United States.' This copy of the indictment was certified by the clerk, and also bore a certificate by the Chief Justice to the effect that the attestation of the clerk was in due form; also a certificate of the clerk that Hon. Walter I. McCoy, who had signed as Chief Justice, was the Chief Justice of said court, etc. The petitioner moved that he be discharged upon several grounds, among them being that the return showed that there was no predicate laid for the arrest of the petitioner; that the warrant was invalid, charged no offense; and that prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations of two years. The judge of the circuit court denied the motion, and remanded the plaintiff in error to the custody of the sheriff.

In making laws for the District of Columbia, Congress acts as the legislative branch of the federal government, so that such laws are laws of the ...

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  • Wall v. Quin
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 21 Noviembre 1927
    ... ... Jud. Code U.S. sec. 57; U. S. Comp. St., sec ... 1039; U. S. Rev. St., sec. 716-1014; U. S. Comp. St., secs ... 1239-1674; Passett v. Chase, Sheriff (Fla.), 107 So ... Any ... evidence procured by unlawful search or seizure is ... inadmissible. Faulkner v. State, 134 ... ...
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    ...in any county under the regulations prescribed by statute. Sections 8204, 8318, 8321, 8375, C. G. L. 1927. In the case of Passett v. Chase, 91 Fla. 522, 107 So. 689, the court discusses a commitment after indictment and formalities required. Counsel for the respondent argue that while the c......
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    ...were without power to issue process effective beyond the borders of the state. This general rule we understand is true. Passett v. Chase, 91 Fla. 522, 107 So. 689. Nor can civil process operate beyond the limits of the state so as to form a basis for a money judgment against one residing wi......
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