Pastore v. Pastore

• Decision Date: 25 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 68232,68232
• Citation: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 495,497 So.2d 635
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 495 Rebecca Joyce PASTORE, Petitioner, v. Kenneth Wayne PASTORE, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 635

497 So.2d 635

11 Fla. L. Weekly 495

Rebecca Joyce PASTORE, Petitioner, v.Kenneth Wayne PASTORE, Respondent.

No. 68232.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 25, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1986.

John P. Townsend of Chesser, Wingard, Barr & Townsend, Chartered, Fort Walton Beach, for petitioner.

Laura N. Melvin of Johnson, Green & Locklin, P.A., Milton, for respondent.

ADKINS, Judge.

In Pastore v. Pastore, 480 So.2d 231(Fla. 1st DCA1985), the First District found error in the trial court's treatment of the husband's retirement pension as a marital asset subject to equitable distribution in a dissolution proceeding.The decision conflicts with our recent holding in Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So.2d 265(Fla.1986), and we have jurisdiction.Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.We affirm in part and quash in part the decision under review.

Mr. Pastore, then a second lieutenant in the United States Air Force, married the twenty-year-old Rebecca in October of 1963.Two children were born of the marriage; one son is now eighteen and the other fourteen years of age.At the time of final hearing, Mr. Pastore had attained the rank of colonel, with a monthly net income of $3,981.92.Mrs. Pastore, who remained unemployed over the course of the twenty-year marriage in order to fulfill the duties of a military wife and accomodate her husband's career moves, had obtained employment with a housing authority for a net monthly sum of $525.14.

The trial court, finding neither party more or less at fault in the breakup of the marriage, distributed the parties' property and provided for Mrs. Pastore's support as follows.First, the court found Mr. Pastore's future military retirement benefits a marital asset, and awarded the wife a property interest (rather than alimony interest) in one-half of the benefits as they are received.Second, Mrs. Pastore was awarded exclusive use of the marital home until she remarries or the children attain majority.(The parties had stipulated to child support payments of $375 per child monthly).Mr. Pastore was required, as "unallocated child support and alimony," to pay the monthly house payments, taxes and insurance.Ownership of the home was left in the parties as tenants in common, with an injunction against partition until Mrs. Pastore's right to exclusive possession terminates.Upon the eventual sale of the home, the final judgment provided that one-half of the net proceeds was to be distributed to each party, with no credit to be given the husband for his payments on the house between the date of the final judgment and the date of the net distribution.

The court awarded Mrs. Pastore an automobile and Mr. Pastore a pickup truck and a boat.Mr. Pastore was instructed to sell the boat, valued at $9,125, and apply the proceeds to pay off the balance of $6,375 owing on the automobile.Mr. Pastore was held responsible for all the outstanding indebtedness of the family, $4,767.82, and required to pay permanent alimony to Mrs. Pastore of $250 per month.Finally, he was assigned responsibility for his former spouse's attorneys fees and court costs.

The husband appealed the trial court's order, arguing that the trial court had erred in awarding the wife a vested property interest in his future retirement benefits, in providing for no credit reflecting his expenditures on the marital home during the period of his wife's exclusive possession, and in creating a scheme of distribution in which the total obligation placed upon him unfairly "shortchanged" him.Through cross appeal, the wife argued that the amount of permanent periodic alimony awarded to her was so insignificant as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

The district court accepted each of the husband's arguments, and reversed the trial court on those issues.It affirmed the trial court, however, on those issues raised upon the wife's cross appeal.We quash that portion of the district court's opinion reversing the trial court, and reinstate the findings and holdings of the trial court.When viewed as a whole, we believe, the trial court properly exercised its discretion under Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197(Fla.1980), in reaching a scheme of property distribution and support obligations which reflected the contribution of both parties to the marriage and ensured that neither would pass from "prosperity to misfortune ... [and] be 'shortchanged.' "Id. at 1204.

First, the trial court properly treated the entitlement to the military retirement pension as a marital asset acquired through the labor of both parties over the twenty-year course of the marriage.The decision of Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 456 So.2d 1214(Fla. 1st DCA1984), on which the district court relied in reversing this portion of the lower court's judgment, has been quashed in our decision of Diffenderfer.Under these circumstances, in which the wife for over twenty years devoted herself to her husband and family by furthering the husband's military career and accomodating his career moves, we can find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's recognition of her property interest in the pension benefits.Facts such as these well illustrate our general observation in Diffenderfer that "[i]n most cases ... it may be preferable to deal with pension rights as a marital asset rather than merely a source of support obligations ... [t]o the extent acquired during the marriage, the expected benefits are a product of marital teamwork."491 So.2d at 268.SeeCowan v. Cowan, 389 So.2d 1187(Fla. 5th DCA1980), review denied, 397 So.2d 777(Fla.1981).

Neither did the trial court err in holding that Mr. Pastore was not to receive a credit upon the eventual sale of the home reflecting one-half of the house payments, taxes and insurance which he was required to pay under the final judgment.While the divorce decree did sever the joint tenancy, and vest an undivided one-half interest in the home in each party as tenants in common, section 689.15, Florida Statutes(1985);Ball v. Ball, 335 So.2d 5(Fla.1976), we find the general rule that the paying party in such a situation is entitled to credit for his expenditures on the home, Strollo v. Strollo, 365 So.2d 189(Fla. 1st DCA1978), inapplicable to this case.

The trial court explicitly imposed the duty of making these payments upon the husband as a form of "unallocated child support and alimony."An examination of the...