Patchette v. State, No. 84-1680

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: Considered by REYNOLDSON; LARSON
• Citation: 374 N.W.2d 397
• Decision Date: 18 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-1680
• Parties: William L. PATCHETTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

Page 397

374 N.W.2d 397 William L. PATCHETTE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee. No. 84-1680. Supreme Court of Iowa. Sept. 18, 1985.

Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, and Deborah Goins, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Gordon E. Allen, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sarah J. Coats, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and McCORMICK, LARSON, CARTER, and WOLLE, JJ.

Page 398

LARSON, Justice.

William L. Patchette was released on a "work-seeking furlough" from the medium-security facility at Mt. Pleasant when he left the home where he was staying, to go jogging, and, apparently, just kept on going. He was later apprehended and, on September 21, 1982, was charged with violating six rules of the Mt. Pleasant facility. Apparently, through an oversight by prison officials, he was not charged with escape.

After a hearing before the prison disciplinary committee, Patchette was found guilty on five of the six charges. His punishment included loss of "good time" and suspension of his honor contract. Patchette filed a postconviction action under Iowa Code chapter 663A to challenge the committee's ruling. After the Attorney General's Office received notice of the postconviction action, it alerted prison officials to the fact they had failed to charge escape. The prison officials responded by (1) rescinding the prior order for loss of good and honor time and (2) filing a substituted complaint which included allegations that Patchette had violated the five rules originally found to have been violated and an additional charge of escape. Following the hearing on the second complaint, Patchette was found guilty on four of the five original counts, and was also found guilty of escape. In a separate postconviction application, Patchette challenged the second disciplinary hearing, and this action was consolidated with his original application. Following an adverse ruling by the district court, Patchette appealed. We affirm.

Patchette complains that (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel in the postconviction proceedings because counsel failed to object to the punishment imposed in the first postconviction hearing; and (2) that the filing of a substituted disciplinary complaint penalized Patchette for filing the original postconviction petition and was tantamount to vindictive prosecution.

I. Does an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Apply in a Prison Disciplinary Case?

At the outset, the parties disagree whether a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised. It is clear such a claim may be made when a conviction is attacked in a postconviction proceeding, see, e.g., Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa 1981); Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d 420, 422-23 (Iowa 1980); Kellogg v. State, 288 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1980). But does this general rule also apply to a postconviction case arising out of a prison proceeding, which is said not to involve the "full panoply of rights due a defendant" in a criminal proceeding? Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 (1974).

Our code provides that postconviction relief is available when there is a claim that "the person is ... unlawfully held in custody or other restraint." Iowa Code § 633A.2(5). We held in Davis v. State, 345 N.W.2d 97, 98-99 (Iowa 1984) that this included challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings.

Our postconviction procedures act also provides that:

[i]f the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of representation, including stenographic, printing, and legal services, these costs and expenses shall be made available to the applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on review.

Iowa Code § 663A.5.

Patchette argues that section 663A.5 implies that effective assistance of counsel must be provided. The State counters that this section merely provides a procedural devise for determining who shall pay the cost of representation, a "mechanism ... through which indigent inmates could afford counsel in their postconviction proceedings," and not a statutory requirement of effective assistance of counsel.

We believe the statutory grant of a postconviction applicant's right to court-appointed counsel necessarily implies that that counsel be effective. We do not believe a different rule should be applied merely because a postconviction proceeding

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is brought to challenge a prison disciplinary ruling, rather than an action attacking the conviction itself. Nothing in our postconviction act indicates an intent on the part of the legislature that a different rule would apply. It would seem to be an empty gesture to provide counsel without any implied requirement of effectiveness.

In an analogous case, the Supreme Court has said that

the promise of ... a right to counsel on appeal--like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel at trial--would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. ----, ----, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836-37, 83 L.Ed.2d 821, 830-31 (1985). See also Heath v. State, 372 N.W.2d 265, 266 (Iowa 1985) (ineffective assistance of counsel raised in administration revocation of parole).

We conclude that the issue of effective assistance of counsel may be raised in a postconviction proceeding arising out of disciplinary hearings. We do so solely on our interpretation of Iowa Code section 663A.5, and we express no opinion as to whether it would be constitutionally mandated in the absence of such a statute.

We now proceed to the question of whether Patchette has sustained his burden of showing ineffective assistance in this case.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a claimant must show the attorney's performance was deficient and that, as a result, there was prejudice to him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, ----, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069-70, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694 (1984); State v. Miles, 344 N.W.2d 231, 233-34 (Iowa 1984). It is...