Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., No. 20485
Court | Supreme Court of Utah |
Writing for the Court | HOWE; HALL |
Citation | 777 P.2d 428 |
Parties | Rita L. PATE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MARATHON STEEL COMPANY, an Arizona corporation, Hensel-Phelps Company, a Colorado corporation, and Erico Products, Inc., an Ohio corporation, Defendants and Appellees. MARATHON STEEL COMPANY, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. PLACERS, INC., Third-Party Defendant. |
Docket Number | No. 20485 |
Decision Date | 06 June 1989 |
Page 428
v.
MARATHON STEEL COMPANY, an Arizona corporation,
Hensel-Phelps Company, a Colorado corporation, and
Erico Products, Inc., an Ohio
corporation, Defendants and Appellees.
MARATHON STEEL COMPANY, Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
PLACERS, INC., Third-Party Defendant.
Wilford A. Beesley, Jack Faircough, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Jay E. Jensen, William J. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for Marathon Steel Co.
D. Gary Christian, Salt Lake City, for Hensel-Phelps Co.
Scott W. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for Erico Products, Inc.
Robert W. Brandt, Michael E. Dyer, Salt Lake City, for Placers, Inc.
W. Brent Wilcox, Roger D. Sandack, Edward B. Havas, Salt Lake City, for amici curiae Utah Chapter AFL-CIO and United Mine Workers of America, District 22.
James B. Lee, James M. Elegante, T. Patrick Casey, Salt Lake City, for amici curiae Utah Mfrs. Ass'n, Utah Petroleum Ass'n, and Utah Mining Ass'n.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Rita Pate seeks reversal of a summary judgment granted by the trial court to defendants Marathon Steel Company and Hensel-Phelps Company.
Pate was an apprentice-trainee ironworker who was hired by Placers, Inc., in June 1980, to assist in the construction of the Cove Fort Canyon overpass on Interstate Highway 15 in Sevier County, Utah. Placers was a subcontractor of Marathon Steel, who in turn was a subcontractor of Hensel-Phelps, the general contractor on the project. Pate was assisting in cadwelding, a process which fuses together the ends of reinforcing bars, when a fire accidentally occurred. She endeavored to climb out of the metal concrete forms in which she was working, but because the sides of the forms were slick and oily, her extrication was slowed and she sustained severe burns over one-third of her body. She brought the instant action against Marathon Steel and Hensel-Phelps pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988), claiming they were negligent in the construction and maintenance of the concrete forms. She also joined as a defendant, Erico Products, Inc., manufacturer of the cadwelder and asserted against it a products liability claim. Her immediate employer, Placers, Inc., paid her workers' compensation benefits and was not sued, inasmuch as it was being uncontested that those benefits were her exclusive remedy against Placers under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1988) of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Marathon and Hensel-Phelps moved for summary judgment, contending that they, too, were Pate's employers and were shielded from tort liability by the exclusive
Page 429
remedy provision of section 35-1-60. The trial court granted the motion, stating that "there are no material issues of fact in dispute" and holding that Marathon Steel and Hensel-Phelps were "statutory employers" of Pate under section 35-1-42(2) (1975) (amended as § 35-1-42(3)(b) by 1986 Utah Laws ch. 211, § 3 (Supp.1986)) (amended as § 35-1-42(5) by 1988 Utah Laws ch. 109, § 1 (Supp.1988)) and were entitled to the immunity afforded by section 35-1-60. The trial court certified the order as final under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Pate brings this appeal. The sole question for our determination is whether, assuming Marathon Steel and Hensel-Phelps are statutory employers of Pate under section 35-1-42(2), she can sue them for their negligence pursuant to section 35-1-62 or whether those defendants enjoy immunity from such suit under section 35-1-60.Prior to 1975, section 35-1-62 provided:
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the same employment, the injured employee, or in case of death, his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an action for damages against such third person....
In cases arising under this section, this Court gave the italicized words of the statute a broad interpretation and held that in general other contractors and subcontractors on the project, including "statutory employers" of the injured or deceased worker, were "in the...
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Romero v. Shumate Constructors, Inc., Nos. 15325
...Pacific Constr. Co., 54 Haw. 578, 513 P.2d 156 (1973); Nash v. Damson Oil Corp., 480 So.2d 1095 (Miss.1985); Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989); see generally Benjamin Marcus, Advocating the Rights of the Injured, 61 Mich.L.Rev. 921 (1963); Allan H. McCoid, The Third Perso......
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Land O'Sun Realty Ltd. v. REWJB Gas Investments, Nos. 95-3539
...923 (1960), which defined "notwithstanding" as "without prevention or obstruction from or by; in spite of"); Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah 1989) (noting that "[a]ctually, the word 'notwithstanding' means 'in spite of' In Quiring v. Plackard, 412 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA ......
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Bliss v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., Civ. No. 93-NC-138W.
...also allows those same employees to bring a traditional negligence action against the general contractor. See Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428, 430-31 (Utah 1989)15; Jacobsen v. Industrial Comm'n, 738 P.2d 658, 660 (Utah Ct.App. 866 F. Supp. 1369 1987). However, the categories enume......
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Ghersi v. Salazar, No. 930243
...a "statutory employer" is liable for a common law personal injury action under § 35-1-62 and our ruling in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989), at least if the statutory employer did not pay workers' compensation premiums, as in this case. The issue is a matter of first imp......
-
Romero v. Shumate Constructors, Inc., Nos. 15325
...Pacific Constr. Co., 54 Haw. 578, 513 P.2d 156 (1973); Nash v. Damson Oil Corp., 480 So.2d 1095 (Miss.1985); Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989); see generally Benjamin Marcus, Advocating the Rights of the Injured, 61 Mich.L.Rev. 921 (1963); Allan H. McCoid, The Third Perso......
-
Land O'Sun Realty Ltd. v. REWJB Gas Investments, Nos. 95-3539
...923 (1960), which defined "notwithstanding" as "without prevention or obstruction from or by; in spite of"); Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah 1989) (noting that "[a]ctually, the word 'notwithstanding' means 'in spite of' In Quiring v. Plackard, 412 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA ......
-
Bliss v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., Civ. No. 93-NC-138W.
...also allows those same employees to bring a traditional negligence action against the general contractor. See Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428, 430-31 (Utah 1989)15; Jacobsen v. Industrial Comm'n, 738 P.2d 658, 660 (Utah Ct.App. 866 F. Supp. 1369 1987). However, the categories enume......
-
Ghersi v. Salazar, No. 930243
...a "statutory employer" is liable for a common law personal injury action under § 35-1-62 and our ruling in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989), at least if the statutory employer did not pay workers' compensation premiums, as in this case. The issue is a matter of first imp......