Pate v. Precythe
| Decision Date | 04 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:22-cv-00050-NAB |
| Parties | JERMAINE CORTEZ PATE, Plaintiff, v. ANNE L. PRECYTHE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Jermaine Cortez Pate for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No 5). Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined that plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $39.31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
In support of his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis plaintiff has submitted a copy of his inmate account statement. The account statement shows an average monthly deposit of $196.54. The Court will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of $39.31, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average monthly deposit.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) ( that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Moberly Correctional Center in Moberly, Missouri. He has filed a civil action titled “Complaint Alleging Commerce and Antitrust Regulations Violations Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1337.”[1] The complaint contains allegations pursuant to the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff names Missouri Department of Corrections Director Anne L. Precythe as the sole defendant. (Docket No 1 at 1). She is sued in both her official and individual capacities. In the complaint, plaintiff lists six claims for relief:
To support these claims, plaintiff presents his “Statement of Facts,” in which he asserts that defendant “operates a non-profit canteen organization[,] which was established” pursuant to RSMo § 217.195.[2] He suggests this constitutes a “Mercantile Monopoly” that “currently excludes competition in a relevant market and continues to control prices without regard to the financial status of the consumers.” Plaintiff accuses defendant of excluding “all other available options and vendors from participating in the venture of providing goods to incarcerated people.” He contends that defendant has not “acquired or maintained the monopoly power as a result of a superior product, business acumen, or historical accident.” As such, plaintiff concludes that defendant has been deliberately indifferent “towards the consumers,” thereby violating their Eighth Amendment “right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” In particular, plaintiff alleges a failure “to maintain a constant supply of basic hygiene.”
Plaintiff also notes that defendant “provides goods produced and manufactured by offenders through the Missouri Vocational Enterprise” program. He alleges that these products are being sold in “violation of the Missouri sales and use tax laws,” because they are “being illegally taxed by the defendant to the consumers.” (Docket No. 1 at 3).
Following his “Statement of Facts,” plaintiff sets forth an argument as to why the Court should grant him preliminary injunctive relief. Much of this argument consists of the recitation of case law. In the “Direct Injury” section, though, plaintiff states that he should be allowed “to purchase legal material as well as hygienic supplies from” a vendor “approved” by the “Federal Bureau of Prisons.” (Docket No. 1 at 4). He asserts that he receives only “$8.50 per month as a form of public assistance,” and that “defendant is currently partaking in a form of market manipulation” by “continuously fixing prices since her designation as the Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections.”
By way of a “price fixing” example, plaintiff states that toothbrushes “were previously available [for sale] to the offender population” at $0.54. However, toothbrushes are currently being sold for $2.58. Plaintiff asserts that the “toothbrushes currently being sold are a generic brand and are being bought in bulk, costing defendant” somewhere between $0.10 and $0.50 per unit. He contends that this amounts to a price-fixing conspiracy that has resulted in the fixing of “arbitrary and unreasonable prices.” (Docket No. 1 at 5).
With regard to his antitrust claims, plaintiff expressly asserts a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2. (Docket No. 1 at 6). Reciting the language of that statute, he broadly alleges that “defendant possesses monopoly power in the relevant market and willfully acquired or maintained such power as opposed to gaining it as a result of a superior product, business acumen, or historical accident.” According to plaintiff, “defendant has excluded all other competition and has fixed prices ... to the detriment and with disregard of the offenders affected by the illegalities.” As such, he insists that defendant has “market power” and “monopoly power” that allows her to control prices and exclude competitors. Plaintiff further states that he has requested the “opportunity to purchase items from an approved vendor” but has been denied, subjecting him “to financial hardships.” He claims that defendant has abused “her monopoly power” and has acted unreasonably, breaching her fiduciary duty “to the Inmate Canteen Account Trust operation.”
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant has attempted to create a monopoly under 15 U.S.C. § 2. He argues that defendant “(1) specifically intends to control prices and/or destroy competition in some part of commerce pertaining to goods sold to offenders in the prison system,” and “(2) engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed to accomplishing the unlawful purpose.” Plaintiff states that defendant has disregarded “the financial status of the consumers, and has no intention of increasing the amount of public...
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