Pate v. State
| Decision Date | 09 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-287 |
| Parties | Randy PATE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Alexander W. Robbins, The Law Office of Alex Robbins, Bedford, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Randy Pate faces two counts of child molesting, as Class A felonies, and two counts of child molesting, as Level 1 felonies. During the course of the proceedings, Pate sought to depose the alleged victim. However, the trial court denied that motion pursuant to the newly enacted Child Deposition Statute, Indiana Code Section 35-40-5-11.5. In this interlocutory appeal, Pate appeals the court's denial of his motion and raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the statute is a nullity because it impermissibly conflicts with the Indiana Trial Rules governing discovery.
[2] This is the not the first time our Court has considered this issue. Consistent with the other panels, we conclude that the Statute is a procedural statute that impermissibly conflicts with the Trial Rules. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions.
[3] On August 22, 2018, the State charged Pate with two counts of child molesting, as Class A felonies, and two counts of child molesting, as Level 1 felonies, based on allegations that he had molested his granddaughter, A.H. Thereafter, the Indiana General Assembly passed the Child Deposition Statute, which places limitations on a criminal defendant's ability to conduct an oral deposition of a child under the age of sixteen who is alleged to be the victim of a sex offense. The Statute took effect on March 18, 2020.
[4] Pate sought to depose A.H., which request the prosecutor denied pursuant to the Statute. At that point, Pate filed a motion to depose a child witness with the trial court in which he asked the court to determine that the Statute is "unconstitutional and invalid" because it "violates the separation of powers set forth in the Indiana Constitution" and because it "invades the exclusive province of the Judiciary Branch [sic] to adopt, amend, and rescind rules of court that govern and control practice and procedure[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 22. Alternatively, Pate requested that the court issue an order allowing him to depose A.H.
[5] In a brief in support of his motion, Pate asserted that the Statute is a "nullity" because only the Indiana Supreme Court can "establish procedural rules governing the course of litigation." Id. at 24-25. He further asserted that the Trial Rules grant a defendant a "broad" right to depose a witness but that the Statute sets forth "detailed procedural requirements that must be met" before a defendant can depose an alleged child victim. Id. at 25, 27. As such, Pate maintained that the requirements set forth in the Statute "are in direct conflict with Rule 26 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure," such that the Statute and the Trial Rules are "irreconcilable." Id. at 28.
[6] Following a hearing at which the trial court heard oral argument, the court declined to declare the Statute invalid. In addition, the court determined that Pate had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that A.H. would be unavailable for trial or that the deposition was necessary due to the existence of extraordinary circumstances as required by the Statute. Accordingly, the court denied Pate's motion. This interlocutory appeal ensued.
[7] Pate contends that the trial court erred when it relied on the Statute to deny his motion to depose A.H. because the Statute is a nullity. Generally, "[a] trial court has broad discretion with regard to rulings on discovery matters based upon its duties to promote discovery of the truth and to guide and control the proceedings." Moore v. State , 839 N.E.2d 178, 182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). However, questions of law, which include the enforceability and interpretation of a statute, are reviewed de novo. See A.C. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re M.S.) , 140 N.E.3d 279, 282 (Ind. 2020).
[8] Pate contends that the Statute is invalid because it conflicts with Indiana Trial Rules 26 and 30. However, before we reach the merits of Pate's argument on appeal, we must first address the State's claim that Pate has waived this issue because he raises it for the first time on appeal. In particular, the State asserts that Pate only argued to the trial court that the Statute is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers and not that the Statute is a nullity because it conflicts with the trial rules. We cannot agree.
[9] While Pate argued in his motion that the Statute is unconstitutional because "it violates the separation of powers," he also asserted that the Statute "invades the exclusive province of the Judiciary" to adopt, amend, and rescind rules of court. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 22. Further, in his brief in support of the motion, Pate contended that the requirements set forth in the Statute "are in direct conflict with Rule 26 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure," such that the Statute and the Trial Rules are "irreconcilable." Id. at 28. Based on those arguments, we conclude that Pate plainly raised to the trial court the issue of whether the Statute impermissibly conflicts with the Trial Rules. As such, Pate has not waived his argument, and we will address the merits of his appeal.
[10] Pate contends that the Statute is a nullity because it is incompatible with the Trial Rules governing discovery and depositions. As this Court has explained:
It is a fundamental rule of law in Indiana that in the event of a conflict between a procedural statute and a procedural rule adopted by the supreme court, the latter shall take precedence. When a statute conflicts with the Indiana rules of trial procedure, the rules of procedure govern, and phrases in statutes which are contrary to the rules of procedure are considered a nullity. To be in conflict, it is not necessary that the rule and the statute be in direct opposition. The rule and the statute need only be incompatible to the extent that both could not apply in a given situation. A procedural statute may not operate as an exception to a procedural rule having general application. A procedural statute that does not conflict with any of the trial rules may be held operative. However, any statute conflicting with procedural rules enacted by our supreme court shall have no force or effect.
Bowyer v. Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res. , 798 N.E.2d 912, 916-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
[11] Here, the parties first dispute whether the Statute is substantive or procedural in nature. Substantive laws "fix duties, establish rights and responsibilities among and for persons," while procedural laws "prescribe the manner in which such rights and responsibilities may be exercised and enforced in a court[.]" State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Cir. Ct. , 239 Ind. 394, 400, 157 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1959). "The time, place and method of doing an act in court properly fall within the category of procedural rules[.]" Id.
[12] The Statute applies in criminal cases involving a child less than sixteen years of age who is the victim or alleged victim of a sex offense and provides as follows:
I.C. § 35-40-5-11.5. In order to depose an alleged child victim, the defendant is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the circumstances set forth in either subsection (d)(2) or (d)(3). I.C. § 35-40-5-11.5(f), - (g).
[13] Pate contends that the Statute is procedural because it outlines "the manner in which rights are exercised and enforced in Indiana courts." Appellant's Br. at 8. The State responds that, although the Statute "undoubtedly has procedural components," it is primarily "a substantive statute that both recognizes and gives substance to the child victim's need to be protected from psychological harm that may be caused by having to testify about her abuse repeatedly." Appellee's Br. at 17, 21. We agree with Pate.
[14] This Court has recently addressed this question and concluded that the Statute is "a procedural law." Sawyer v. State , 171 N.E.3d 1010, 1015-16 (Ind. Ct. App., 2021), trans. pending. Shortly thereafter, this Court cited Sawyer and reiterated that the Statute "is a procedural law." Church v. State , 173 N.E.3d 302, 305-06 (Ind. Ct. App., 2021), not yet certified. And,...
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