Pate v. State
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | ONION |
| Citation | Pate v. State, 592 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) |
| Decision Date | 23 January 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 62759,No. 1,62759,1 |
| Parties | Robert L. PATE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
Colbert N. Coldwell, on appeal only, El Paso, for appellant.
Steve W. Simmons, Dist. Atty., and Lane C. Reedman, Asst. Dist. Atty., El Paso, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ONION, P. J., and DOUGLAS and W. C. DAVIS, JJ.
This appeal is taken from a felony conviction for possession of cocaine. Following a bench trial upon a plea of not guilty, the punishment was assessed by the court at ten (10) years' imprisonment, probated.
On appeal in two grounds of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to set aside the indictment against him for the failure (1) to accord him a speedy trial under the provisions of Article 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P., and (2) to accord him a speedy trial as required by the Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution, and Article I, § 10 of the State Constitution, and the provisions of Article 1.05, V.A.C.C.P.
The record shows that appellant was arrested for the felony offense of possession of cocaine on May 6, 1977. He was released on bail on May 8, 1977. No further action was taken on the case until an indictment was returned on December 14, 1978. On December 20, 1978, the State filed a written announcement of ready. On December 29, 1978, the appellant filed his motion to set aside the indictment. On January 19, 1979, there was a joint hearing on the motion to set aside the indictment and a motion to reduce bail. At the conclusion of the said hearing, the motion to reduce bail was granted but the motion to set aside the indictment was denied. On April 19, 1979, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the felony charge, and having heard the evidence, the court found the appellant guilty.
Article 32A.02 (Speedy Trial Act), V.A.C.C.P. (effective July 1, 1978), provides in pertinent part:
In Wade v. State, 572 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), this court held that the time periods provided in said Article 32A.02 will run from the Speedy Trial Act's effective date of July 1, 1978 for cases pending on that date.
The instant case was a case pending on July 1, 1978. Appellant was not indicted until December 14, 1978, more than 165 days after July 1, 1978. At the hearing on the motion to set aside the indictment the various time periods were established by the appellant, who pointed out to the trial court that the State had not been ready within 120 days after July 1, 1978. Although the State had filed a written announcement of ready after the filing of the indictment, it did not state at the said hearing that it was ready then and had been ready within the 120 days from July 1, 1978. See and cf. Barfield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). Further, the State offered no evidence...
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Satterwhite v. State
...have proceeded to trial during the required time limits. Calloway v. State, 594 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Compare Pate v. State, 592 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Appellant's ground of error is overruled. We have also considered the grounds of error raised in appellant's untimely filed ......
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Sharp v. State
...on June 16, 1982. See Art. 32A.02, Secs. 1(1) and 2(a). Therefore, according to appellant, under our holding in Pate v. State, 592 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), the State could not have possibly been ready within the 120 day requirement of Art. 32A.02, Sec. 1(1), Due to the complexity of th......
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McGlothlin v. State
...the State cannot be ready for trial on a charge where there is no valid indictment within the 120-day period, citing Pate v. State, 592 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). However, in that case, no indictment was filed until after the 120-day period, id. at 621, whereas here, a valid indictment......
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Nowell v. State
...been ready within 120 days after the August 18, 1981 indictment. Scott v. State, 634 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Pate v. State, 592 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Barfield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 538 Nowell filed his first motion to dismiss on February 8, 1984, and amended that motion on ......