Patel v. Bandikatla
| Decision Date | 17 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 18 Civ. 10227 (LGS) |
| Parties | HEMANT PATEL, M.D., P.C., Plaintiff, v. THEJASWI BANDIKATLA, M.D., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Hemant Patel, M.D., P.C. (“Patel”) employed Defendant Thejaswi Bandikatla, M.D., and terminated her employment before the parties' agreed-upon date. The surviving claims are Patel's claim for breach of contract and Bandikatla's five counterclaims for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, liability under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and liability under the New York State Human Rights Laws (“NYSHRL”) and New York City Human Rights Laws (“NYCHRL”). Patel moves for summary judgment on its claim and all counterclaims. Bandikatla moves for partial summary judgment on Patel's claim and the counterclaims for breach of contract (liability only) and violation of the TVPA (liability only). For the reasons discussed below Patel's motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Bandikatla's motion is denied.
The background facts below are drawn from the parties' Rule 56.1 statements and other submissions on these motions. The facts are either undisputed or based on evidence in the record drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Bandikatla is a medical doctor who attended medical school in India and completed her medical residency in the United States. Seeking to remain in the United States, Bandikatla successfully applied for an open position at Patel's clinics to begin the process of obtaining a J-1 visa waiver. The parties signed an employment contract on October 15, 2015, which specified an employment term of three years. The employment contract listed two work locations but also required Bandikatla to work at hospitals and medical facilities with which Patel was affiliated.
Bandikatla retained a law firm to assist in the preparation of all immigration-related documents, and Bandikatla paid the associated legal fees. Bandikatla's J-1 waiver application identified a single “Proposed Practice Site” and was approved by the United States Citizen and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) on October 11 2016.
Bandikatla worked for Patel at several different offices. On October 25, 2017, Bandikatla was advised that the office at West 125th Street, the same one listed in the J-1 waiver application, was closing. Upon obtaining new legal counsel, she was advised that she was in violation of the terms of her visa due to work for non-approved entities and non-approved locations. Bandikatla approached Patel about filing an amended H-1B application. Ultimately, Bandikatla filed the amended application and paid the associated fees.
In August 2018, Bandikatla sought from USCIS a transfer of her H-1B Visa to Central Florida Medical Associates (“CFMA”). On September 17, 2018, the same week USCIS approved her transfer, Bandikatla tendered her resignation to Patel and advised that her last day of work would be October 5, 2018. On October 9, 2018, Patel commenced a lawsuit against Bandikatla. On February 15, 2019, Patel filed an Amended Complaint naming Bandikatla's subsequent employer, CFMA and Dr. Syed-Bilal Ahmed, M.D., as additional defendants. The Amended Complaint seeks specific performance of the contract by Bandikatla and $10 million in damages. It also sought $6.5 million in damages from CFMA and Dr. Ahmed for tortious interference of contract, but on May 16, 2019, these claims were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. On June 15, 2020, the U.S. Department of Labor (the “DOL”) found that Patel had committed violations for “failure to pay wages as required and required payment of the additional petition fee.” Wages withheld in the amount of $7, 729.24 were assessed. This included Bandikatla's wages for her training from November 7, 2016, to November 20, 2016, in the amount of $2309.00 and for her last weeks of employment with Patel from September 24, 2018, to October 5, 2018, in the amount of $3691.64.
a. Legal Standard
When parties cross-move for summary judgment, the Court analyzes the motions separately, “in each case construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Schwebel v. Crandall, 967 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is appropriate where the record establishes that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for a nonmoving party.” Frost v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 980 F.3d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2009)). New York law applies to the state law claims because the parties' submissions assume that it does. See In re Snyder, 939 F.3d 92, 100 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[I]mplied consent is . . . sufficient to establish the applicable choice of law[.]” (quoting Trikona Advisers Ltd. v. Chugh, 846 F.3d 22, 31 (2d Cir. 2017)).
Patel argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Bandikatla's counterclaims because claims related to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., require that administrative remedies be exhausted, which Bandikatla purportedly has failed to do. See, e.g., Palmer v. Trump Model Mgmt., 175 F.Supp.3d 103, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). However, Bandikatla's counterclaims are not INA claims but rather use Patel's purported violations of the INA as evidence to support the counterclaims. See, e.g., Adia v. Grandeur Mgmt., Inc., 933 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2019) (). The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Bandikatla's counterclaims.
The parties cross-move for summary judgment on their respective breach of contract claims. The parties entered into the employment contract on October 15, 2015. Patel's theory of breach is that Bandikatla terminated her employment early, in violation of the contract. Bandikatla's theory of breach is that Patel failed to pay Bandikatla's wages and immigration fees, which were Patel's responsibility. These respective motions are both denied because, reading the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are genuine disputes of material fact as to each party's adequate performance. Breach of contract under New York Law requires proof that the party asserting the claim adequately performed under the contract. Donohue v. Cuomo, 980 F.3d 53, 67 (2d Cir. 2020) (). Neither party is entitled to summary judgment because the record does not establish, as a matter of law, that either party adequately performed its or her obligations under the contract.
Bandikatla is not entitled to summary judgment on the contract claim and counterclaim because, viewing the evidence in Patel's favor, a reasonable jury could find that Bandikatla did not fulfill her contractual obligation to work for a three-year term. Bandikatla argues that she was excused from this obligation under § 2 of the contract, which states that Bandikatla “agrees to the contractual obligations set forth in § 214(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” 8 U.S.C. § 1184(1). That provision of the immigration law requires an alien to work for a health care organization for not less than three years unless the Attorney General determines that extenuating circumstances exist. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(1)(1)(C)(ii). Bandikatla sought from USCIS a transfer of her H-1B Visa based on extenuating circumstances and was approved for that transfer on September 17, 2018. Although this is a colorable argument, it does not entitle Bandikatla to summary judgment on her breach of contract claim because the contract is ambiguous, which raises a question of fact for the jury. See Ellington v. EMI Music, Inc., 21 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (N.Y. 2014) (“Ambiguity in a contract arises when the contract, read as a whole, fails to disclose its purpose and the parties' intent or when specific language is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations.”); Rhoda v. Rhoda, 110 N.Y.S.3d 35, 37 (2d Dep't 2019) (“The resolution of an ambiguous provision, for which extrinsic evidence may be used, is for the trier of fact.”). Reasonable minds might differ on whether the three-year term was without exception or whether the incorporation of 8 U.S.C. § 1184(1) also incorporated the statutory exception, particularly since the immigration statute requires the same three-year term of employment as the contract.
Bandikatla further argues that the DOL issued a determination that Patel failed to pay wages, thus definitively establishing Patel's breach. This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, even if Patel's failure to perform were established beyond dispute, Bandikatla would still need to prove that she fulfilled her contractual obligations in order to recover for breach of contract. Second, Patel's failure to perform is not established beyond dispute. In substance, Bandikatla is arguing that the principle of collateral estoppel applies. Collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating an issue that was decided against the party in a prior action. See Simmons v. Trans Express Inc., 37 N.Y.3d...
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