Patel v. Bureau of Prisons

• Decision Date: 21 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 09–200 (RDM)
• Citation: 125 F.Supp.3d 44
• Parties: Kamal Patel, Plaintiff, v. Bureau of Prisons, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

125 F.Supp.3d 44

Kamal Patel, Plaintiff,

v.Bureau of Prisons, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 09–200 (RDM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed August 21, 2015

Christopher Ryan Hart, Mary Beth Hickcox–Howard, Frank Gregory Bowman, Thomas Goodman Hentoff, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Wynne Patrick Kelly, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 68). For the reasons stated herein, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. An appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Kemal Patel, filed this lawsuit pro se in 2009. See Dkt. 1. Patel is a citizen of the United Kingdom; when he filed suit, he was a legal permanent resident of the United States and was incarcerated in a facility run by Defendant Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). Id. ¶ 4. The original complaint alleged that Patel was subjected to unfair treatment while incarcerated based on his status as a noncitizen—specifically, he alleged that BOP denied noncitizen inmates the same transfer and prison programming opportunities provided to U.S. citizens. Id. ¶¶ 15–38. An amended complaint, filed on June 8, 2009, added Dale Brown as an additional plaintiff and new claims under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 1, 2009, which added allegations that BOP had wrongfully assigned noncitizen inmates to private prisons where they were subjected to "significantly more onerous conditions of confinement." Dkt. 13 ¶¶ 53–69.

Plaintiffs obtained pro bono counsel in 2010. See Dkt. 45. On July 12, 2010, they filed a motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. Dkt. 65. The Third Amended Complaint included eleven counts: challenges to the BOP's assignment and treatment of noncitizen inmates under the Equal Protection Clause and Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"); an alleged violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"); an Eighth Amendment claim relating to exposure to second-hand smoke; a claim under the Equal Protection Clause and the APA relating to transfers of noncitizen inmates; a claim under the Privacy Act; and three FOIA claims.

Although Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend was not granted until September 7, 2011, Dkt. 90, the instant motion was originally directed at the Third Amended Complaint. See Dkt. 68 at 1. Subsequently, both Patel and Brown were released from BOP custody. In order to clarify the scope of the proceedings in light of their release, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"). Dkt. 118. In the Fourth Amended Complaint, Brown no longer appears as a plaintiff and Patel has dropped many of his claims for injunctive relief. The Complaint includes damages claims under the Equal Protection Clause and RFRA (Counts I and II, respectively), a claim for injunctive relief under the Privacy Act (Count III), and two FOIA counts (Counts IV and V). The parties have agreed that the arguments in the instant motion may be applied to the Fourth Amended Complaint, provided that Defendants will have the opportunity to file a supplemental motion raising additional defenses particular to the Fourth Amended Complaint in the event the case is not dismissed in its entirety. See Dkt. 117 at 2 n.1.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must "treat the complaint's factual allegations as true [and] must grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged."

Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C.Cir.2001). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not necessary, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The Court need not accept as true either a "legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" or an inference drawn by the plaintiff if such inference is unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C.Cir.2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider "the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice." Gustave–Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F.Supp.2d 191, 196 (D.D.C.2002) (citation omitted).

If a Court concludes that it is appropriate to consider additional evidence submitted by the parties, it must convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Whether to convert a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion is "committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Bowe–Connor v. Shinseki, 845 F.Supp.2d 77, 85 (D.D.C.2012) (quotation marks omitted). Before deciding to convert a motion to dismiss, the "court must assure itself that summary judgment treatment would be fair to both parties," Tele–Commc'ns of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1334 (D.C.Cir.1985), and that the parties are provided the opportunity to present all relevant materials, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).

The Court may grant summary judgment where the evidence submitted by the parties shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 ; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden to identify the portions of the record that, in its view, "demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party carries that burden, the opposing party must "designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Equal Protection

Plaintiff asserts his equal protection claim (Count I) against only Defendant Clark in his individual capacity. Dkt. 118 at 16. At oral argument in this matter, however, the Court became aware that Clark had not yet been served. Although counsel for the United States has advanced several arguments for dismissal of the equal protection claim, counsel has also expressly stated that he lacks authorization to represent Clark. Plaintiff filed a proof of service on Clark after oral argument (Dkt. 125); however, there is no indication in the record that counsel for the United States has yet been authorized to represent him.

Because the only defendant against whom Plaintiff alleges his equal protection claim is not represented by any attorney who has appeared, it would be inappropriate for the Court to rule on the merits of the equal protection claim at this time. After an attorney for Clark notices an appearance, Clark will have an opportunity to move to dismiss the equal protection claim against him and raise any appropriate arguments in support of that motion.

B. RFRA

Plaintiff's RFRA allegations focus on his treatment at CI Rivers and CI Big Spring, two private prisons at which he was incarcerated in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Dkt. 118 ¶¶ 90–91, 119, 121. At CI Rivers, Plaintiff, who is Muslim, alleges that he was not permitted to pray while on work duty, and that, as a result, he was unable to pray "at the times required by his religious beliefs." Id. ¶ 95. At CI Big Spring, Plaintiff alleges he was not provided halal meals and was prohibited from choosing kosher meals. Id. at 97. The alternative meals that were offered to Plaintiff allegedly contained ingredients that "would be inappropriate for an inmate following a halal diet." Id. ¶ 98. Plaintiff also alleges that, contrary to BOP policy, the company operating CI Big Spring failed to provide menus and nutritional information to inmates before meals. Id. ¶¶ 99–100. Finally, he alleges that he was not allowed to take all of his meals in the evening on days on which fasting was required outside of Ramadan. Id. ¶ 101. Plaintiff's allegations target Defendant Lappin, the former director of BOP, as well as three John Doe defendants who were allegedly responsible for enforcing BOP policy at CI Big Spring. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.

Defendants argue that these allegations fail to state a claim for three reasons. First, they assert that RFRA does not authorize damages actions against federal officials in their individual capacities. Second, they claim that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient personal involvement by Defendant Lappin for liability to attach to him. Finally, they argue that Plaintiff's allegations are substantively insufficient to state a claim under RFRA. The Court will consider each of these arguments in turn.

1. Individual–Capacity Damages Claims Against Federal Officials

The parties disagree on the issue whether RFRA authorizes individual-capacity damages claims against federal officials. RFRA allows any "person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of [the statute]" to "assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(c). A "government" is defined to "include[ ] a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2(1).

Defendants argue that this definition does not authorize individual-capacity suits against government officials. They assert that the statute's use of the word "official" refers only to official-capacity suits, and that the...