Patel v. Diplomat 1419va Hotels, LLC

• Decision Date: 03 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14-10948,14-10948
• Parties: PARESH PATEL, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DIPLOMAT 1419VA HOTELS, LLC, et al., Defendants - Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

PARESH PATEL, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DIPLOMAT 1419VA HOTELS, LLC, et al., Defendants - Appellees.

No. 14-10948

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

June 3, 2015

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-01588-SCJ

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

Before HULL and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,^* District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Paresh Patel¹ appeals the district court's order dismissing his claims on various grounds, including the statute of limitations. Because we find that the district court erred in not granting Paresh leave to amend the complaint, we reverse and remand this case.

Paresh alleged in his complaint that appellees R.C. and Mike Patel formed Diplomat 1419VA Hotels, LLC² for the purpose of acquiring and owning a particular hotel property. Paresh alleged that R.C. and Mike solicited him and his father to invest in Diplomat 1419VA. Anticipating that Diplomat 1419VA would purchase the hotel, Paresh and his father invested $450,000 in Diplomat 1419VA on behalf of Paresh's mother. In the end, Diplomat 1419VA did not acquire title to the hotel; instead, the hotel was acquired by RM Hotels, Inc., an entity partially owned by R.C. and Mike. R.C. and Mike hid this acquisition from Paresh and his mother. R.C. and Mike also burdened Diplomat 1419VA with debts and expenses that were unrelated to its operations. Paresh sued Diplomat 1419VA, R.C., Mike, and others in 2013, filing a ten-count complaint, including claims of fraud, fraudulent transfer, and breach of fiduciary duty.

In the complaint, Paresh alleged that appellees' actions giving rise to the lawsuit began between 2000 and 2002. He further alleged that R.C. sent him a letter in 2002 confirming the capital contribution, ownership interest, and interest payments and stating that a closing of the property at issue had occurred. Paresh alleged that he "was not aware of the . . . facts regarding [appellees'] misconduct, and could not have reasonably learned of the existence of these facts, until 2012."

Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including that the statute of limitations barred the lawsuit. The district court dismissed Paresh's claims of fraud, fraudulent transfer, and breach of fiduciary duty based on the statute of limitations.³ Paresh argues on appeal that the district court erred in dismissing these claims with prejudice and in not allowing Paresh the opportunity to amend the complaint.

Because the statute of limitations bar is an affirmative defense, granting a motion to dismiss on this basis "is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred." La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted); accord Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008). Here, the dates alleged in thecomplaint make it clear that the statute of limitations bars Paresh's claims unless Paresh alleged facts supporting tolling of the statute of limitations. Paresh's complaint attempts to do that. But Paresh's allegation that he "could not have reasonably learned" of the facts on which his claim is based until 2012, without more, is insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements as to tolling.

The district court did err, however, in not granting Paresh leave to amend. The district court dismissed the complaint and directed the Clerk to close the case without addressing whether Paresh should be given leave to replead his claims. Paresh requested that he be given an opportunity to amend the complaint, which had not been previously amended.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) directs that district courts give...