Patel v. I.N.S.

Decision Date28 August 1984
Docket NumberNo. 83-7633,83-7633
Citation741 F.2d 1134
PartiesGangaram N. PATEL and Jasuben G. Patel, Petitioners, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Jack I. Kaiser, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioners.

Joseph Ciolino, Regional Counsel, I.N.S., Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Before CHOY, PREGERSON, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Petitioners Gangaram N. and Jasuben G. Patel (Patels), husband and wife, seek review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying their motion to reopen. The Patels contend that the BIA (1) abused its discretion in determining that they had failed to establish extreme hardship for purposes of suspension of deportation under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(a)(1) (1982) and (2) erred in rejecting their contention that section 19 of the Immigration and Nationality Amendments Act of 1981, Pub.L. No. 97-116, Sec. 19, 95 Stat. 1611, 1621 (1981), codified at 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1151 and accompanying note (1982), required the Attorney General to adjust the Patels' status as a matter of law. We affirm the order of the BIA.

The Patels are natives and citizens of India who first entered the United States in June 1974 as nonimmigrant visitors for pleasure. Shortly after arriving here, the Patels entered into a ten-year lease to operate an apartment-hotel. Before their authorized stay expired, the Patels moved the district director to adjust their status under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255. Their application was based on their business investment. The district director denied their application.

The Patels remained longer than authorized and deportation proceedings were initiated. In the deportation proceedings the Patels renewed their application for adjustment of status based on their business investment. After a lengthy deportation proceeding, the BIA concluded that the Patels met the criteria for investor exemption under 8 C.F.R. Sec. 212.8(b)(4) (1975). 1 The BIA, however, denied their application for adjustment of status as a matter of discretion because the BIA believed that the Patels had a preconceived intent to remain in the United States when they applied for their nonimmigrant visitors' visas. The BIA dismissed the Patels' appeal. In an unpublished disposition, we affirmed the BIA's decision. Patel v. INS, 703 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.1983).

On April 8, 1983, the Patels filed a motion to reopen with the BIA to apply for suspension of deportation under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(a)(1) and for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255(a) as nonpreference alien investors.

The BIA concluded that the Patels had failed to make a prima facie showing of hardship under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(a)(1) and that the Patels were not entitled to adjustment of status as a matter of law under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255. Accordingly, the BIA denied their motion to reopen. The Patels filed the present petition seeking review of the BIA's denial.

We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Agustin v. INS, 700 F.2d 564, 565 (9th Cir.1983). The BIA has broad discretion in ruling on motions to reopen but it may not exercise its discretion in a way that is arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law. Batoon v. INS, 707 F.2d 399, 401 (9th Cir.1983).

1. Suspension of Deportation

The Attorney General has the discretion to adjust the status of an alien to that of a lawful permanent resident if the alien establishes (1) continuous physical presence in the United States for a period of at least seven years preceding the date of application, (2) good moral character during that period, and (3) extreme hardship to the alien or the alien's spouse, parents, or child who is a citizen or permanent resident of the United States, if the alien is deported. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(a)(1); Israel v. INS, 710 F.2d 601, 604 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1421, 79 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). The alien bears the burden of demonstrating both statutory eligibility and equities meriting the favorable exercise of discretion. Id. At issue in this case is whether the Patels made a prima facie showing of "extreme hardship".

When an alien moves to reopen the deportation hearing under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(a)(1), the alien must make a prima facie showing that deportation would result in extreme hardship. Id. "The BIA has discretion to construe extreme hardship narrowly." Id. at 605.

The Patels alleged several factors to support their contention that deportation would result in extreme hardship to them. They claimed that deportation would cause them emotional hardship because their family would be separated and they would be uprooted from the community where they had resided for several years and established close ties. The Patels also alleged that they no longer had relatives in India. 2

In addition, the Patels alleged that deportation would result in economic hardship because they would be forced to relinquish their home and their business investment. The Patels emphasized that they had no means of earning a living in India.

Finally the Patels alleged that their deportation would cause Mr. Patel medical hardship because he suffered from hypertension. Deportation would preclude him from continuing treatment with his physician of several years. This was the only allegation of hardship supported by evidentiary material.

The BIA concluded that the Patels had failed to make a prima facie showing of extreme hardship. Specifically, the BIA noted that (1) the Patels had barely achieved the minimum physical presence required under Sec. 1254(a)(1), and (2) the Patels owned substantial assets, and (3) the only evidence of medical hardship was that Mr. Patel was under treatment for mild to moderate hypertension.

The Patels essentially contend that the BIA abused its discretion because it failed to consider all relevant factors in support of their claim of extreme hardship and failed to articulate an adequate basis for its decision.

This court has consistently held that BIA must consider all relevant factors in determining whether the alien established extreme hardship and that the BIA must demonstrate that it has done so. Batoon v. INS, 707 F.2d at 401. "Cursory, summary or conclusory statements are inadequate." Id.

We have, however, also emphasized that 8 C.F.R. Sec. 3.8 (1984) requires that a motion to reopen state the new facts to be proved at the reopened hearing and that the motion must be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. See Agustin v. INS, 700 F.2d at 566. "A general statement that evidence will be introduced at the hearing is insufficient." Id. Thus, in the context of a motion to reopen, the BIA is not required to consider allegations unsupported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. See, e.g., Id. at 565-66; Sida v. INS, 665 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir.1981). "Failure to allege new facts supported by evidentiary material is an adequate ground for denial of a motion to reopen." Sida v. INS, 665 F.2d at 853.

Only the Patels' claim of medical hardship was supported by evidentiary material. The Patels failed to submit affidavits from themselves, their children, or members of their community or any other evidentiary material to support their other hardship claims. 3

In these circumstances, the BIA was required to consider only the Patels' claim of medical hardship. The BIA properly concluded that the allegations of medical hardship were insufficient to establish a prima facie case of extreme hardship. The physician's letter submitted by the Patels merely confirmed their allegation that Mr. Patel was under treatment for mild to moderate hypertension and recommended continued treatment. Unlike the physician's affidavit presented in Batoon v. INS, 707 F.2d at 401, the physician's letter in this case did not state that Mr. Patel would suffer serious health problems if deported. Nor was there any evidence to support the Patel's assertion that adequate medical treatment was unavailable in India.

In these circumstances we find that the BIA properly addressed the factors it was required to consider with regard to the Patel's claim of extreme hardship. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Patels had failed to make a prima facie showing of extreme hardship. 4

2. Adjustment of Status

The Patels also sought to reopen their deportation hearing to apply for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255. The Patels insist that they are entitled to adjustment of status as a matter of law under Section 19 of the 1981 efficiency amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1981. Pub.L. No. 97-116, Sec. 19, 95 Stat. 1611, 1621 (1981), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1151(a) and accompanying note. 5 The Patels argue that section 19 of the efficiency amendments of 1981 removed the Attorney General's discretionary authority, expressly granted in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255, to rule on applications for adjustment of status. The Patels claim that they are within the intended beneficiaries of Section 19 and thus the Attorney General must adjust their status.

Contrary to the Patels' assertion, the BIA did address this claim. Our review of Section 19 and its legislative history, convinces us that the BIA was correct in rejecting the Patels' interpretation of the statute.

On its face, Section 19 does not divest the Attorney General of the discretionary authority Congress expressly granted in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255. The plain language of Section 19 only exempts from the numerical limitations established by Congress in 8 U.S.C. Secs. 1151 and 1152 a narrowly defined class of nonpreference alien investors. Thus Section 19 only provided visa availability for those nonpreference alien investors who met the criteria enunciated therein. As such, Section 19 only qualified some alien investors for adjustment of status by making...

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    ...of discretion, it may not exercise its discretion arbitrarily. Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Patel v. INS, 741 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1995) (reaffirming that "`[w]hile agencies must have significant fl......
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    ...unequivocally: When the BIA denies relief as a matter of discretion, it may not exercise its discretion arbitrarily. Patel v. INS, 741 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir.1984). See also INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 26, 97 S. Ct. 200, 201, 50 L. Ed. 2d 190 (1976) (basis for the BIA's discretionary ......
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