Patel v. Lanier Cnty. Ga., No. 19-11253

• Citation: 969 F.3d 1173
• Decision Date: 11 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-11253
• Parties: Nilesh S. PATEL, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. LANIER COUNTY GEORGIA, et al., Defendants, James Smith, Deputy Sheriff, Lanier County, Georgia, in his official and individual capacities, Defendant - Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

969 F.3d 1173

Nilesh S. PATEL, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.LANIER COUNTY GEORGIA, et al., Defendants,James Smith, Deputy Sheriff, Lanier County, Georgia, in his official and individual capacities, Defendant - Appellee.

No. 19-11253

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

August 11, 2020

Christopher Scott Anulewicz, Michael Joseph Bowers, Jessica Nwokocha, Balch & Bingham, LLP, ATLANTA, GA, Austin Alexander, Thompson Hine, LLP, ATLANTA, GA, for Plaintiff - Appellant.

Paul H. Threlkeld, David William Bobo Mullens, Oliver Maner, LLP, SAVANNAH, GA, for Defendant - Appellee.

Before MARTIN, NEWSOM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:

This case principally presents two constitutional questions arising out of a deputy sheriff's decision to place a pretrial detainee in an unventilated, un-air-conditioned transport van on a hot autumn day. First, by placing the detainee in the van—for a total of about two hours, half of that time alone and unsupervised—did the officer use unconstitutionally excessive force? And second, by ignoring the detainee's resulting distress—which included unconsciousness, shaking, profuse sweating, and labored breathing—did the officer exhibit deliberate indifference to a serious medical need? The district court answered both questions in the negative and granted summary judgment for the officer. We will affirm the district court's decision in part—albeit on different grounds—and reverse in part.

We begin from the premises that exposure to uncomfortable heat is part and parcel of life in the South and, accordingly, that not every "hot car" case will give rise to a cognizable constitutional claim. Even so, viewing the facts of this particular case in the light most favorable to our detainee—as we must, given the procedural posture—we hold that the officer violated the Constitution in both respects. And while we conclude that the law underlying the detainee's excessive-force claim was insufficiently "clearly established" to defeat the officer's entitlement to qualified immunity, we hold that the detainee's deliberate-indifference claim should have been allowed to proceed. We also hold that the district court erred in rejecting the detainee's adjunct state-law claims on official-immunity grounds.

I

A

Plaintiff Nilesh Patel and defendant Deputy James Smith present dramatically different versions of the events underlying this appeal. Of course, when "reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we view all the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party," Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega , 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014), and affirm only if the evidence "presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party." Id. (quoting Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co. , 715 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013) ). Accordingly, because the district court granted summary judgment for Deputy Smith over Patel's opposition, we take the facts here in the light most favorable to Patel, and we draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.¹

In 2014, Patel pleaded guilty in Georgia state court to gambling- and tax-related offenses and, as a result, was sentenced to five years’ probation and required to forfeit a store that he had owned—Live Oak Liquors. A couple of years later, Patel was arrested on charges that he had stolen or damaged previously forfeited property from Live Oak Liquors. Although the warrant for Patel's arrest was issued in Lanier County, Georgia, he was held in a jail in the adjacent Cook County because Lanier County's facilities were too small to house all of its detainees.

On October 4, 2016, Deputy Smith was tasked with transporting Patel from Cook County to Lanier County for a bond hearing in connection with his arrest. Deputy Smith initially placed Patel in a transport van and drove him from the Cook County jail to the Lanier County courthouse, without incident. Patel was granted bond at the hearing, but he couldn't post it immediately, so Deputy Smith loaded him back into the van and returned him to the Cook County jail—again, without incident. A friend posted Patel's bond shortly after he arrived back at the Cook County jail, so Deputy Smith put Patel back into the van to return him to Lanier County—this time to the Lanier County Sheriff's Office—to complete some release-related paperwork.

Along the way, Deputy Smith had to make a stop in Lowndes County to pick up Brittney Grant, another pretrial detainee who was being taken to Lanier County to be released on bond. When Deputy Smith reached the Lowndes County jail, he parked in a sally port—described here as "a metal garage attached to the jail with large steel doors on both ends." The outside temperature that day was at least 85 degrees Fahrenheit, and although the port provided some shade to the van, the port's doors were closed, resulting in "very hot" conditions within the port generally and, more to the point, inside the van. Deputy Smith left Patel in the van for almost an hour—without any fan or air conditioning running—while he went inside to retrieve Grant.

When Deputy Smith returned to the van escorting Grant, he "banged on the window" several times, asking if Patel was "okay in there." Having received no response, Deputy Smith opened the rear doors of the van to find Patel lying unconscious on the floor, sweating and hyperventilating. By performing a "sternum rub," Deputy Smith was able to rouse Patel, who then told Smith that he had passed out from heat and asked for some water. Deputy Smith told Patel that he would get him "some water on the way back to Lanier County," assisted Patel back onto the bench in the back of the van, got into the driver's seat, and headed for Lanier County. It is undisputed that once Deputy Smith cranked the van, a ventilation fan circulated some air in the middle section, where Grant was seated. But Grant testified that the fan didn't "move very much air at all" and, further, that because of a metal screen separating the middle section of the van from the rear section—where Patel was detained—she didn't "believe any air could circulate into the back area." Grant also explained that although she "could hear the air conditioner running in the front section of the van," because of "a solid plexiglass screen between the driver and the back of the van ... no cool air made it into the prisoner area of the van."

During the drive to Lanier County, Patel again fell from the bench to the floor of the van, where he remained—unconscious, hyperventilating, and with mucus and saliva running from his nose and mouth—until Deputy Smith again roused him upon their arrival. Deputy Smith never stopped for water, as he had promised.² By the time they arrived in Lanier County, Patel had been in the back of the van for more than two hours.

At the Lanier County Sheriff's Office, Deputy Smith again roused Patel and helped him to his feet, and Patel immediately got a drink from a water fountain. Patel then waited in a holding room where he continued to show signs of distress—he was shaking and sweating profusely, he had mucus running from his nose, he was still hyperventilating, and he was having noticeable difficulty speaking. Many of the events at the Sheriff's Office were captured on a security camera.³

When Deputy Smith entered the holding room with the bond paperwork, Patel requested an ambulance. After initially objecting—"[W]hat do you need an ambulance for? You're being released."—Deputy Smith complied. When paramedics arrived, they transported Patel to a local hospital, where he was diagnosed with heat exhaustion

, heat syncope, and panic attack.

B

Patel sued Deputy Smith—along with other defendants, since voluntarily dismissed—claiming that Smith had violated the Fourteenth Amendment in two ways: (1) by using unconstitutionally excessive force when he placed Patel in an unventilated, un-air-conditioned transport van and kept him there for an unreasonable amount of time; and (2) by exhibiting deliberate indifference when he recklessly disregarded Patel's serious medical needs.⁴

Patel also brought state-law claims, including—as relevant to this appeal—allegations of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Deputy Smith moved for summary judgment, challenging Patel's claims on the merits and claiming entitlement to qualified immunity with respect to Patel's federal constitutional claims and official immunity with respect to his state-law claims. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Deputy Smith hadn't violated the Constitution and that official immunity barred Patel's negligence and intentional-infliction of emotional distress claims.

This is Patel's appeal. We will begin by analyzing Patel's constitutional claims, and then move to his state-law claims.

II

Patel's two Fourteenth Amendment claims—alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need—are both subject to the doctrine of qualified immunity, which bars many damages actions against government officials. "An officer asserting a qualified-immunity defense bears the initial burden of showing that he was ‘acting within his discretionary authority.’ " Piazza v. Jefferson Cty. , 923 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Skop v. City of Atlanta , 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007) ). The district court here held that Deputy Smith was acting in the scope of his discretionary authority, and Patel hasn't challenged that determination on appeal. Accordingly, Patel bears the burden to show not only (1) that Deputy Smith "violated a constitutional right" but also (2) that "this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Caldwell , 748 F.3d at 1099 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland , 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004) ).⁵ We will apply this framework to both of Patel's constitutional claims, beginning with...