Paterson v. Dakin

• Citation: 31 F. 682
• Parties: PATERSON and others v. DAKIN and others.
• Decision Date: 23 July 1887
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

31 F. 682

PATERSON and others v. DAKIN and others.

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama.

July 23, 1887

R Inge Smith and R. H. Clarke, for libelants.

G. L. &amp H. T. Smith, for respondents.

TOULMIN J.

This libel is filed against George Dakin, master of the ship Austria, and Wylie, Fisk & Co., brokers and agents of the owners of the ship. It is filed for three purposes, viz.: (1) To enjoin the defendants from enforcing a claim for demurrage against the cargo, the charter- party providing that the master or owner is to have a lien on the cargo for all demurrage; (2) to require defendants to execute and deliver to libelants a proper clear bill of lading for the cargo; (3) to recover of the defendants such damages as libelants may have sustained by the failure and refusal of the master to sign a clear bill of lading.

On the hearing of the exceptions in this case I held that the court had no power to grant the injunction prayed for, and that the exceptions to so much of the libel as sought this relief were sustained. But, being inclined to the opinion that the admiralty court had the power to compel the execution and delivery of a proper bill of lading, and could award damages for a breach of the contract, which provides that the master is to sign bills of lading, I retained the case, and proceeded with it upon those questions. The libel in seeking to compel the master to sign and deliver clear bills of lading is in the nature of a bill in equity seeking specific performance of a contract. The master is the person to sign bills of lading, and he is bound to sign proper bills of lading. But, if he fails or refuses to do so, has this court the jurisdictional power to compel him to do it?

Judge STORY says:

'Courts of admiralty are not, by their constitution and jurisdiction, confined to the mere dry and positive rules of the common law; but they act upon the enlarged and liberal jurisprudence of courts of equity, so far as their powers extend. But courts of admiralty have no general jurisdiction to administer relief as courts of equity. If a maritime contract is broken, the admiralty, concurrent with courts of law, can only give damages for the breach of it; whereas the chancery court may compel the party, in some cases, to a specific performance. A court of admiralty has no more power to compel such specific performance than it has to set aside the contract for fraud, or correct a mistake, or decree the execution of a trust. These are matters properly subject to the cognizance of courts of equity and not of the admiralty. ' Brown v. Lull, 2 Sum. 443.

In Andrews v. Essex F. & M. Ins. Co., 3 Mason, 16, the same judge broadly declares that courts of admiralty cannot entertain a libel for specific performance. 'Courts of admiralty,' he says, 'have jurisdiction over maritime contracts when executed, but not over those leading to the execution of maritime contracts. If there was a contract to sign a shipping paper, or to execute a bottomry bond, and the party refused to perform it, the admiralty court cannot take jurisdiction and enforce its performance.'

But it may be said that the contract, the specific performance of which was sought in this case, was not a maritime one, but only preliminary to the execution of a maritime contract. This is true, but still the broad proposition is asserted that courts of admiralty cannot entertain a libel for specific performance. The remedy invoked in such case is purely an equitable one. In Kellum v. Emerson, 2 Curt. 79, Judge CURTIS says: 'It is often said that a court of admiralty is a court of equity, acting on maritime affairs. ' 'A court of admiralty,' says he, 'applies the principles of equity to the subject within its jurisdiction. But that jurisdiction differs widely from the jurisdiction of courts of chancery. ' In Davis v. Child, Daveis' Ware, 81, it is said: 'It was never contended that a court of admiralty has the authority to decree a specific performance of an agreement.'

I am bound, then, to conclude that, although a court of admiralty is in many respects a court of equity acting in maritime affairs, it has no chancery powers. Its jurisdiction differs from that of a court of equity. The power to decree a specific performance of a contract is purely equitable, and belongs exclusively to chancery. That a court of admiralty does not entertain a libel for a specific performance of a contract, nor to compel the execution of one, see Henry, Adm. Jur. 65, Sec. 25, and note; 1 Add.Cont. § 497; The Ives, 1 Newb.Adm. 205.

Can this libel be maintained on the question of damages? This is a suit against the master, and Wylie, Fisk & Co., the ship agents, in personam, and from them damages are claimed for a breach of contract. The charter-party is the contract, and it stipulates that the master is to sign bills of lading,--and this of course means proper bills of lading. If there was no just claim for demurrage, a proper bill of lading in this case would have been a clear bill of lading. It is contended by libelants that there was no just claim for demurrage, a proper bill of lading in this case would have been a clear bill of lading. It is contended by libelants that there was no legal and just claim for demurrage, and that the master's refusal to give them a clear bill of lading was a breach of the contract, by which they were damaged. From my construction of the charter-party, and in my view of the evidence in this case, my opinion is there was no legal and just claim for demurrage; that the master should have given a clear bill of lading, and that from his refusal to do so there has been a breach of the contract. I will have more to say on this subject hereafter. But the question recurs, can the court award damages in this case for a breach of the contract? A charter-party is a maritime contract, and, as between the parties to it, a court of admiralty has jurisdiction to determine the obligations arising therefrom, and whether they have been violated; and that, in an action in personam or in rem. Post v. Jones, 19 How. 150; The Fifeshire, 11 F. 743; Maury v. Culliford, 10 F. 388; The A.M. Bliss, 2 Low.Dec. 103; Oakes v. Richardson, Id. 173.

The parties to this contract, which is the charter-party, are the owners of the vessel, and the libelants. The master is not a party to it, and Wylie, Fisk & Co. are connected with it only as agents of said owners. The refusal of the master to issue a proper bill of lading is a breach of the contract, which can be enforced in rem against the vessel, or in personam against the owners, for any damage the libelants may have sustained thereby. But my opinion is that the libelants cannot recover of these defendants any damages for a breach of the contract, even if libelants had shown any to have been sustained.

But it is further contended that, independently of the charter-party, there was imposed by law on the master a duty to sign proper bills of lading, and that he failed and refused to perform this duty, while, vexatiously to set up an unfounded claim to demurrage, and to impair the negotiability of the bill of lading which he did given, and to destroy or impair the salability of the cargo, he indorsed a protest and claim for demurrage on said bill, to the loss and damage of libelants.

There is no question that a duty was imposed by law on the master to sign a proper bill of lading. See Macl. Shipp. 368, and authorities cited in note; The Ferreri, 9 F. 468. And if he refused to do so vexatiously, and set up an unfounded claim to demurrage, to inconvenience and damage libelants, the4 I think libelants would be entitled to vindictive damages whether...