Paterson v. State
| Decision Date | 25 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 21430,21430 |
| Citation | 915 P.2d 724,128 Idaho 494 |
| Parties | , 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,372 Martha PATERSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STATE of Idaho, and The Department of Administration, State of Idaho; and James Skinner, an individual, Defendants-Appellants. . Boise, December 1995 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, Boise, for appellants. Candy W. Dale argued.
Risch, Goss & Insinger, Boise, for respondent. R. John Insinger argued.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment entered against the state of Idaho and James Skinner (collectively appellants). The jury found that James Skinner (Skinner) willfully violated the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA) seventy-five times and that the state of Idaho willfully violated IHRA on ninety-eight occasions. The appellants alleged numerous errors with the district court's denial of their post-trial motions. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Martha Paterson (Paterson) worked as an information specialist for the state of Idaho, Bureau of Supplies, Department of Administration, Division of Purchasing. Skinner was her immediate supervisor. During Paterson's probationary period, Skinner told Paterson that he expected his employees not to be offended by the use of crude language, that he had the power to fire people at will, and that he was willing to fire anybody who did not "fit in."
During Paterson's employment, crude language and off-color humor pervaded the workplace at the Bureau of Supplies, a fact known to upper management. In fact, Division Administrator Colleen Grant stated that she allowed such behavior to continue because Skinner's management style appeared to be working and because she noticed no discomfort on the part of the employees. Out of a desire to "fit in," Paterson "occasionally" used crude language and engaged in discussions of a sexual nature.
However, the type of comments made by Skinner were more offensive and degrading than the crude language freely used in Paterson's workplace. Skinner constantly subjected Paterson and other female employees to sexually charged remarks and sexual innuendo. At trial, Paterson detailed a minimum of 275 individual examples of sexually charged comments directed at her, as well as sexually derogatory comments about other female employees. Skinner denied making nearly all of the remarks Paterson attributed to him. As to the remaining comments, he admitted to commonly using the phrase "my memory is as long as my dick," but stated that the other comments were taken out of context.
Out of fear that she would be fired, Paterson did not complain to either Skinner or In early 1989, one of Paterson's female co-employees filed a grievance against Skinner and the Bureau of Supplies alleging sexual harassment. After an interview with the deputy attorney general investigating the matter, Paterson decided to file a sexual harassment complaint against Skinner. Following her filing, the state of Idaho placed Paterson on a paid administrative leave while it investigated her complaint.
[128 Idaho 498] Grant. Instead, she placed her name on the lateral transfer register for an information specialist position with another state agency. She also sought out employment in the private sector.
The director of the Department of Administration determined that sexual harassment had occurred and ordered Skinner to be suspended without pay for three days. However, on appeal by Skinner, the Department of Administration initiated a second investigation which concluded that there was insufficient proof to sustain a probable cause finding of sexual harassment. As a result, no disciplinary action was undertaken against Skinner. Colleen Grant received a verbal reprimand for allowing such conduct to occur in the Bureau of Supplies.
Upon completion of the initial investigation, some three weeks after Paterson was placed on administrative leave, Grant informed her that she could return to work. Paterson was transferred to the Central Records Management for the Bureau of Printing Services, located in the basement of the state employee parking garage. Paterson's pay grade and employment classification remained unchanged. Her new assignment was to publicize and prepare work reports regarding the potential opening of a records retention center as well as various other work projects, to be assigned. Her new office was not equipped with either a telephone or typewriter, equipment necessary to her assignment.
Over the next several weeks, Grant and Paterson met frequently to discuss Paterson's apparent lack of work at her new position. Paterson became frustrated that her skills and training were not being properly utilized and she felt that she was being punished for filing a grievance against Skinner. After a month in this new position and on her own initiative, Paterson applied for and obtained a position as an information specialist with the Idaho Department of Water Resources.
Paterson filed suit in district court alleging, among other things, violations of the IHRA, I.C. § 67-5901, et seq. Pursuant to I.C. § 67-5908(3)(e), Paterson sought to amend her complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. Although the court granted her motion to amend, Paterson never filed an amended complaint containing a prayer for punitive damages.
Upon the completion of the evidence, both sides discussed the language to be used in the jury instructions. Counsel for the defendants stated, "[s]ince I don't have to specifically preserve any rights, I won't here, except that I do have some comments that might be helpful." Counsel and the judge then continued to modify the wording of the jury instructions, but no formal objection to any instruction in particular was ever raised.
The jury returned a special verdict awarding Paterson $5,000 in compensatory damages. The jury found that Skinner willfully violated IHRA seventy-five times and imposed a $500 penalty for each violation ($37,500). The jury also found the state of Idaho to have willfully violated IHRA on ninety-eight occasions and assessed a $1,000 penalty for each violation ($98,000). The jury indicated the number of violations and amount of punitives awarded against the state of Idaho included the number of violations and amount awarded against Skinner.
The district court then entered separate judgments against Skinner and the state of Idaho. Judgment against Skinner was entered for $42,500, $5,000 of which was joint and several with the state of Idaho. Judgment against the state of Idaho for $103,000 was also entered. The defendants moved to alter or amend the judgment against Skinner. The defendants also filed a motion for a new trial, or in the alternative a motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
[128 Idaho 499] The district court denied all post-trial motions.
Skinner and the state of Idaho appealed.
A. Whether plaintiff's hostile work environment claim could establish more than one violation of I.C. § 67-5908(3)(e).
B. Whether the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on the elements of a hostile work environment and the sufficiency of the evidence of unwelcome conduct.
C. Whether punitive damages should have been awarded against defendants.
D. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination of the amount and allocation of the number of willful violations of I.C. § 67-5909(1).
E. Whether the district court erred in holding that the punitive damage award was not disproportionate to the compensatory damage award.
F. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of compensatory damages.
G. Whether the judgment against Skinner should be altered or amended.
The Supreme Court reviews a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) just as the trial court would and gives no special deference to the trial court's conclusions. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). The moving party admits the truth of all evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence are construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. On motion for j.n.o.v., the Court does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, but seeks to determine if there was substantial evidence to justify the submission of the case to the jury. Id.; Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Hous. Auth., 124 Idaho 450, 455-56, 860 P.2d 653, 658-59 (1993).
However, review of a motion for a new trial and/or a motion for a remittitur of damages is governed by a wholly different and more deferential standard. Quick, 111 Idaho at 766, 727 P.2d at 1194. The trial court is permitted to weigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses to determine if the verdict is in accord with its own assessment as to the clear weight of the evidence. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court will not reverse the trial court's decision in this regard absent proof that the trial court manifestly abused the wide discretion granted to it. Id., at 770, 727 P.2d at 1198; Jones v. Panhandle Distributors, Inc., 117 Idaho 750, 755, 792 P.2d 315, 320 (1990).
IHRA seeks to secure for all individuals freedom from discrimination in employment because of, inter alia, sex. I.C. § 67-5901(2). IHRA makes...
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