Patino v. Chevrolet

• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DIETZEN
• Citation: Patino v. Chevrolet, 821 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 2012)
• Decision Date: 26 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. A11–0309.,A11–0309.
• Parties: Laura PATINO, Respondent, v. ONE 2007 CHEVROLET, VIN # 1GNFC16017J255427, Texas License Plate # 578VYH, Appellant.

821 N.W.2d 810

Laura PATINO, Respondent,

v.ONE 2007 CHEVROLET, VIN # 1GNFC16017J255427, Texas License Plate # 578VYH, Appellant.

No. A11–0309.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 26, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

Under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subds. 8(f) and 9(a) (2010), when a claimant makes a timely demand for a judicial determination of the validity of an administrative forfeiture, the provisions of subdivision 9 govern the judicial determination of forfeiture. Under subdivision 9(f), when a person charged with a designated offense appears in court and is not convicted of the designated offense, “the court shall order the property returned to the person legally entitled to it,” provided that the redemption requirements of section 169A.42 (2010) have been satisfied.

Kirk M. Anderson, Anderson & McCormick, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Michelle M. Zehnder Fischer, Nicollet County Attorney, St. Peter, MN, for appellant.

Charles A. Ramsay, Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Roseville, MN, for amici curiae Minnesota Society for Criminal Justice & Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Cort C. Holten, Mark J. Schneider, Jeffrey D. Bores, Chestnut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association Legal Defense Fund.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

This case presents the question of whether a vehicle may be judicially forfeited under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63 (2010) when the vehicle's driver is not convicted of the designated offense of second-degree driving while impaired. Respondent Laura Patino is the owner of the subject vehicle, which was operated by her boyfriend on April 24, 2010, when he was stopped, arrested for driving while impaired (DWI), and the vehicle was impounded. The boyfriend was charged with second-, third-, and fourth-degree DWI and driving after revocation, and the State sought forfeiture of respondent's vehicle pursuant to section 169A.63. Subsequently, the boyfriend pleaded guilty to third-degree DWI. Respondent sought a judicial determination of forfeiture under section 169A.63, subdivision 8(f), and following a hearing the district court ordered forfeiture of the vehicle. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed on the basis that the boyfriend was not convicted of a designated offense, and therefore forfeiture was prohibited under section 169A.63, subdivision 9(f). We affirm.

The material facts are undisputed. Respondent Laura Patino is the owner of a 2007 Chevrolet Suburban. In April 2010 respondent's then-boyfriend Dario Morales–Rosas was driving the vehicle when he was stopped by a state trooper in response to a complaint of erratic driving on the highway. Patino's 10–year–old daughter was in the vehicle with Morales–Rosas. Following the traffic stop, Morales–Rosas was arrested for DWI. Because Morales–Rosas had a prior conviction of fourth-degree DWI that resulted in revocation of his license in 2006, the vehicle was seized, an administrative forfeiture proceeding was initiated, and notice was given to respondent as owner of the vehicle in accordance with Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(b).

Morales–Rosas was charged with second-degree DWI in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2010), under the conditions described in Minn.Stat. § 169A.25, subd. 1(a) (2010); third-degree DWI in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1), under the conditions described in Minn.Stat. § 169A.26, subd. 1(a) (2010); fourth-degree DWI (under the influence of alcohol) in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1); fourth-degree DWI (alcohol content 0.08 or higher) in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5); and driving after revocation in violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (2010). In June 2010, Morales–Rosas pleaded guilty to third-degree DWI, a gross misdemeanor.

Respondent made a timely request for a judicial determination of the forfeiture under section 169A.63, subdivision 8(f), and the matter proceeded to a trial. The State presented the testimony of the state trooper, a copy of Morales–Rosas' driving record, a copy of the citation for driving after revocation and no proof of insurance issued to Morales–Rosas in March 2010, and a copy of a Texas certificate of title in respondent's name. The primary issue at trial was whether respondent was entitled to recover the vehicle because she was an innocent owner. SeeMinn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d).

The district court found that respondent was not an innocent owner because, although she did not have knowledge that Morales–Rosas would drive the vehicle while impaired, she had knowledge that Morales–Rosas was driving without a valid driver's license. Additionally, the court found that “[a]lthough Morales–Rosas was not convicted of a designated offense (first or second degree driving while impaired), he did commit a violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1), and there were two aggravating factors present at the time of the offense.” The court relied on Mastakoski v. 2003 Dodge Durango, 738 N.W.2d 411 (Minn.App.2007), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 21, 2007), to conclude that a conviction of the designated offense was not required. Accordingly, the court ordered forfeiture of the vehicle but granted respondent's motion to stay the forfeiture order pending appeal.

Before the court of appeals, respondent challenged the district court's holding that she was not an innocent owner under section 169A.63, subdivision 7(d); and argued that the district court erred when it concluded that Morales–Rosas need not have been convicted of a designated offense under subdivision 9(f) of the statute in order for the vehicle to be forfeited. The State relied on Mastakoski to argue that the statute required only that the driver use the vehicle to commit a designated offense, not that the driver was convicted of such an offense. The court of appeals reversed the district court's forfeiture order, holding that subdivision 9(f) of the statute provides that there can be no forfeiture of the vehicle when the driver was not convicted of the designated offense. The court did not reach the innocent-owner issue. We affirm.

I.

The State argues that, although a conviction of a designated offense creates a presumption of judicial forfeiture, such a conviction is not required under the statute. Instead, the State contends that section 169A.63, subdivision 9(f), prohibits forfeiture only if the driver is not convicted of any charge. Respondent counters that subdivision 9 states that when a vehicle owner demands a judicial determination in accordance with subdivision 8(f), and the person charged with the designated offense appears in court as required and is not convicted of the designated offense, forfeiture is not permitted. ¹ To answer the question presented, we must interpret the language of section 169A.63.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 433 (Minn.2009). When interpreting a statute, our goal is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2010); Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn.2010). Words and phrases in the statute are given their plain and ordinary meanings. Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2010); Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.1999). If possible, we must interpret the statute to give effect to all its provisions, Minn.Stat. § 645.16, so that “no word, phrase, or sentence [is] superfluous, void, or insignificant,” Amaral, 598 N.W.2d at 384. If the language of the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, the court's role is to enforce the language of the statute. Minn.Stat. § 645.16. But if the statute is ambiguous, and is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, then the court may look beyond the statutory language to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. Id.; Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., LLC, 785 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Minn.2010).

Section 169A.63 sets forth the procedure for vehicle forfeiture when the vehicle was used in the commission of a designated offense,² or was used in conduct resulting in a designated license revocation. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 6(a). This case involves a forfeiture based on the alleged commission of a designated offense. Generally, the statute describes vehicles subject to forfeiture, limitations on forfeiture, and administrative and judicial forfeiture procedures. “An action for forfeiture is a civil in rem action and is independent of any criminal prosecution.” Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(a).

Subdivision 8 describes the process for administrative forfeiture of a vehicle. The subdivision requires, among other things, that all persons with an ownership interest in the vehicle in question be served with a written notice of the forfeiture and the right to obtain judicial review of the forfeiture. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(b)–(c). Within 30 days after service of the notice under subdivision 8, an owner may challenge the forfeiture by filing a demand for a judicial determination of the forfeiture. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(d). If the owner makes no demand for judicial determination or fails to make such a demand within the allotted time, the vehicle is administratively forfeited and the owner loses all rights to the vehicle. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(c)(3).

When a claimant makes a timely demand for a judicial determination of the validity of an administrative forfeiture, “the forfeiture proceedings must be conducted as provided under subdivision 9.” Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(f). Subdivision 9(a) provides that “[t]his subdivision governs judicial determinations of the forfeiture of a motor vehicle used to commit a designated offense or used in conduct resulting in a designated license revocation.” Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(a). It is undisputed that respondent made a timely demand for a judicial determination under subdivision 8(f). Thus, the administrative proceeding under ...