Patrick G. v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 2
Citation | 40 F.4th 1186 |
Decision Date | 26 July 2022 |
Docket Number | 20-1372 |
Parties | PATRICK G., BY AND THROUGH his parents and next friends, STEPHANIE G. and Daniel G., Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. HARRISON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Defendant - Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
Jack D. Robinson, Spies, Powers & Robinson, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
John R. Stanek, Anderson, Dude & Lebel, P.C., Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before HOLMES, BALDOCK, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, or "IDEA," requires states receiving federal funding to offer children with disabilities a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") in the "[l]east restrictive environment." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). Patrick G. is a seventeen-year-old boy with autism
who qualifies for special educational services under the IDEA and who, since 2013, has been attending the Alpine Autism Center for school. In 2016, Harrison School District No. 2 (the "School District" or the "District") proposed transferring Patrick from Alpine to a special program at Mountain Vista Community School allegedly tailored to Patrick's needs. Plaintiffs-Appellants Patrick's parents challenged this decision on Patrick's behalf, first in administrative proceedings and then in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that the School District committed a host of violations in crafting an "individualized educational plan" ("IEP") for Patrick in 2015 and 2016.
After several years of litigation, the district court, relying on two of our recent IDEA decisions—both of which also involved challenges to Harrison School District No. 2's placement of children with autism—determined that the expiration of Patrick's 2016 IEP rendered the Parents’ lawsuit moot; in other words, there was no longer a live controversy for the court to resolve. Significantly, the district court held several related issues—including the Parents’ request for attorney's fees from the administrative proceedings, their argument that the School District had incorrectly reimbursed the Parents’ insurance provider instead of the Parents themselves, and their motion for a "stay put" injunction to keep Patrick in his current educational placement during the proceedings—were also moot. The Parents contend the district court erred by failing to find their substantive IDEA claims fall into the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness. And, even if their substantive IDEA claims do not fall within this exception, they posit that their requests for attorney's fees, reimbursement, and a "stay put" injunction continue to present live claims.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and reverse in part . The Parents’ substantive IDEA claims are moot, and do not fall within the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception. And because those substantive claims are moot, the Parents’ stay-put claim—which implicitly depends on the substantive IDEA claims—is now also moot. The Parents’ claims for attorney's fees and reimbursement, however, continue to present live controversies. We hold these claims are not moot, and we remand to the district court to rule on the merits of these claims in the first instance.
We begin by describing the IDEA's underlying legal and procedural framework. We then summarize the relevant factual and procedural history that led to the district court's challenged mootness determination.
The IDEA, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. , is a federal statute enacted pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause power. See Chavez ex rel. M.C. v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't , 621 F.3d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 2010) ; Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs. , 565 F.3d 1232, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 2009). Among other things, it "requires states that accept federal special education funds to provide disabled children with a ‘free appropriate public education’ (‘FAPE’) in the ‘least restrictive environment.’ " Ellenberg v. N.M. Mil. Inst. , 478 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2007). The "primary tool" in ensuring that "all eligible children with disabilities" are provided with a FAPE "is the [statute's] requirement that the state create an individualized education plan (‘IEP’) for each disabled child." Miller , 565 F.3d at 1236. The IEP "is the means by which special education and related services are ‘tailored to the unique needs’ of a particular child," and it "must be drafted in compliance with a detailed set of procedures" by "a child's ‘IEP Team’ (which includes teachers, school officials, and the child's parents)."
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1 , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 988, 994, 197 L.Ed.2d 335 (2017) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 181, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) ); see also Miller , 565 F.3d at 1236 . "Review of IEPs must occur at least annually, and [they] are to be revised as appropriate." Ellenberg , 478 F.3d at 1268.
In the event of "inevitable conflicts" between students, parents, and state agencies, Chavez , 621 F.3d at 1277 —and especially "[w]hen parents believe their child is not being provided a FAPE in the least restrictive environment"—the IDEA offers an opportunity "to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the ... educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child," Miller , 565 F.3d at 1236 (omission in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) ); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii) ( ). In addition to informal or "somewhat ... formal[ ]" dispute resolution options, such as "[p]reliminary meeting[s]" and "mediation," Endrew F. , 137 S. Ct. at 994 ( )(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), (f)(1)(B)(i) ), the IDEA entitles a complaining party to "an impartial due process hearing," Miller , 565 F.3d at 1236 ; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (); id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) (). "The party requesting the due process hearing shall not be allowed to raise issues at the due process hearing that were not raised in the notice [of due process complaint], unless the other party agrees otherwise." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B).
"[A]t the conclusion of the administrative process, the losing party may seek redress in state or federal court." Endrew F. , 137 S. Ct. at 994 ; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) . The IDEA also enables "a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability" in "any action" brought under § 1415—including the administrative proceedings—to move for attorney's fees, which the district court may award at its discretion. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
Lastly, § 1415(j), often referred to as the IDEA's "stay put" provision, entitles a child involved in IDEA proceedings to "remain in [his or her] then-current educational placement" until "all such proceedings have been completed." Id. § 1415(j) ; 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a) (). The stay-put provision thus operates as an "automatic statutory injunction," Miller , 565 F.3d at 1252 n.13 (quoting Norman K. ex rel. Casey K. v. St. Anne Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 302 , 400 F.3d 508, 510–11 (7th Cir. 2005) ), which "prevent[s] school districts from ‘effecting unilateral change in a child's educational program,’ " Erickson v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs. , 199 F.3d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S. ex rel. Heidi S. , 96 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1996) ).
With this legal framework as background, we turn to the Parents’ dispute with the School District.
Patrick G. is a legal minor "who has been diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder (autism ) and speech delays."1 Aplts.’ App., Vol. III, at 706 (Dec. of Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), dated Apr. 18, 2017). Patrick was eleven years old when the conflict between his Parents and the School District began; he is now seventeen years old. It is uncontested that Patrick's condition qualifies him for "special education services adequate to provide [him a] FAPE." Id. at 707.
In August 2013, Patrick's parents enrolled him in the School District after his family moved to Colorado Springs. As part of...
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