Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. California Coastal Com.

• Decision Date: 15 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. B056181,B056181
• Citation: 9 Cal.App.4th 592,11 Cal.Rptr.2d 824
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: PATRICK MEDIA GROUP, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 824

11 Cal.Rptr.2d 824

9 Cal.App.4th 592

PATRICK MEDIA GROUP, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B056181.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Sept. 15, 1992.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Roderick Walston, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard M. Frank, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Dennis Eagan, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Nancy K. Chiu and J. Matthew Rodriquez, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendant and appellant.

Stall & Hamlin, Marnie Christine Cody and Richard F. Hamlin, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

Ronald W. Beals, West Sacramento, and Gideon Kanner, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

CROSKEY, Associate Justice.

The California Coastal Commission (the "Commission") appeals from a judgment entered against it and in favor of Patrick Media Group, Inc. ("PMG"), adjudging PMG entitled to compensation under Business and Professions Code sections 5412 and 5412.6 ¹ for the compelled removal of three off-site advertising structures belonging to PMG, as a condition of a coastal development permit issued by the Commission to PMG's lessor, Solana Beach Innsuites Joint Venture ("Solana"). The trial court found, on PMG's motion for summary adjudication of issues, that the Commission was liable for compensation. The parties then stipulated to the amount of damages payable by the Commission if the trial court's finding of liability were to be affirmed on appeal, and judgment was entered as provided in the stipulation.

We determine that the trial court correctly found the provisions of Business and Professions Code sections 5412 and 5412.6 applicable to the Commission's actions respecting PMG's advertising structures. However, we shall conclude that PMG's required remedy under those statutes was by way of administrative mandamus, as provided in Public Resources Code section 30801 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. ²

As PMG failed to avail itself of this remedy, it was barred from bringing the action below. We thus will reverse the judgment with directions that PMG's action be dismissed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April of 1978, PMG's predecessor in interest, Foster & Kleiser Outdoor Advertising ("Foster & Kleiser"), entered into a lease with Solana's predecessor, Solana Beach Properties, by which Foster & Kleiser was granted the right to maintain three outdoor advertising structures on Solana's property. The lease had an original term of seven years, but contained a provision for automatic year-to-year renewals after the original seven years, subject to termination upon written notice by either party not less than sixty days before the end of the original term or the current year. In addition, the lessor had the express right under the lease's terms to terminate the lease upon sixty days' written notice at any time if a building was to be constructed on the property.

At some time prior to December of 1985, Solana applied to the Commission for a coastal development permit for the construction of a 171-unit hotel with meeting rooms, a restaurant and bar, and a swimming pool on approximately 3.4 acres of a 24 acre site on the east side of Old Highway 101 in the community of Solana Beach, California. The Commission took initial action on Solana's application on December 19, 1985. As initially approved, the permit was to be issued on multiple conditions, including the condition that all off-site signs, including Foster & Kleiser's three advertising structures, be removed from the property prior to the commencement of construction.

On January 1, 1986, section 5412.6, providing that compensation must be paid when a governmental entity requires the removal of an advertising display as a condition for issuance of a permit, went into effect. On March 11, 1986, the Commission gave final approval to Solana's permit with all its terms and conditions, including the condition that Foster & Kleiser's advertising structures be removed. ³

It appears that Foster & Kleiser was not given advance notice of either the December 19, 1985 hearing at which Solana's permit was tentatively approved or the March 11, 1986 hearing at which final approval was granted. Instead, Solana merely notified Foster & Kleiser in writing on April 1, 1986 that it was terminating Foster & Kleiser's lease, and requested that the advertising structures be removed by May 1, 1986.

On April 22, 1986, Foster & Kleiser wrote to the Commission. In its certified letter, Foster & Kleiser apprised the Commission of the provisions of section 5412.6 and demanded compensation under the statute in the amount of $34,514, on grounds that the Commission's actions had forced Solana to terminate its lease. On April 28, 1986, the Commission responded to Foster & Kleiser's letter, confirming that removal of the advertising structures was a requirement of the permit issued to Solana and stating that Foster & Kleiser would have to discuss the issue of compensation with Solana.

Foster & Kleiser removed its advertising structures from the Solana property on May 23, 1986. On July 22, 1986, Foster & Kleiser presented to the Commission a formal claim for compensation. The Commission responded on August 11, 1986, advising that, pursuant to Government Code sections 910 and following, a claim was required to be filed with the State Board of Control, and giving the address where such a claim should be filed. On August 25, 1986, Foster & Kleiser filed with the State Board of Control a formal claim for compensation under section 5412.6. Shortly thereafter, in September of 1986, Foster & Kleiser's assets and liabilities were conveyed to PMG. ⁴ On October 8, 1986 the Board of Control rejected Foster & Kleiser's claim for compensation under section 5412.6. A notice of the rejection, as provided in section 913 of the Government Code was mailed to PMG's attorney on October 14, 1986. PMG filed its complaint for compensation under section 5412.6 on February 24, 1987.

Upon PMG's motion for summary adjudication of issues, the trial court found as a matter of law that PMG was entitled to compensation from the Commission under sections 5412 and 5412.6.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

The Commission contends that PMG was not entitled to compensation under sections 5412 and 5412.6, because: (1) Solana's permit, including the condition for removal of PMG's advertising displays, was issued before the effective date of section 5412.6; (2) the project for which the permit was issued fell within an exception to section 5412.6 for projects "for the construction of a building or structure which cannot be built without physically removing the display"; (3) sections 5412 and 5412.6 do not apply to actions of the Commission; (4) the Commission is immune from the provisions of sections 5412 and 5412.6 pursuant to Government Code section 818.4; and (5) the removal of PMG's advertising displays was not compelled by the Commission's action, but by Solana's exercise of its right under PMG's lease to terminate the lease whenever a building was to be erected on the subject property.

In the alternative, the Commission contends that PMG waived any rights it may have had to compensation under sections 5412 and 5412.6 by failing to challenge the order to remove advertising displays by means of a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus, as required by Public Resources Code section 30801 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.

DISCUSSION

1. Sections 5412 and 5412.6 Apply to Actions by the Coastal Commission.

There is no merit in the Commission's arguments that the provisions of sections 5412 and 5412.6 do not apply to it. Acting under its mandate of protecting, maintaining, enhancing, and restoring the overall quality of the coastal zone environment (Pub.Resources Code, § 30001.5), ⁵ the Commission ordered PMG's lessor, Solana, to remove PMG's advertising displays from Solana's property as a condition for issuance of a permit to build a hotel on a portion of the property. This was plainly the kind of order that falls within the purview of section 5412.6, which provides that an order to remove an advertising display as a condition for issuance of a permit constitutes a "compelled removal" and requires compensation as provided in section 5412.

The Commission argues, however, that sections 5412 and 5412.6 do not apply to it, because there are no specific references to the Commission either in those sections or in the Outdoor Advertising Act as a whole. This argument is unavailing. By their terms, sections 5412 and 5412.6 apply to the laws, ordinances, and regulations of "any governmental entity." (§ 5412, p 1.) Specific references elsewhere in the Act to other governmental entities such as the Department of Transportation and local governments (see, e.g., §§ 5209, 5230, 5250) do not, as the Commission contends, establish that the entire Act applies only to those entities, but rather make clear that the Legislature knew how to limit particular provisions of the Act to particular agencies when it wanted to do so. Where broader language is used, a broader application was, inferably, intended. ⁶

It is axiomatic that when a statute's language is clear, its plain meaning should be followed. (Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal.3d 152, 155, 137 Cal.Rptr. 154, 561 P.2d 244.) Only when application of the statute's plain meaning would frustrate the manifest purpose of the legislation as a whole or would lead to absurd results is the plain meaning disregarded. (Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (Wertz) (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1098, 282 Cal.Rptr. 841, 811 P.2d 1025.) The manifest purpose of section 5412.6--assuring that the owners of advertising displays receive just compensation when displays are ordered removed for public purposes--is hardly frustrated by applying the statute to the Coastal Commission. Nor would an absurd result follow from...