Patrick v. Burget

• Decision Date: 16 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-1145,86-1145
• Citation: 108 S.Ct. 1658,100 L.Ed.2d 83,486 U.S. 94
• Parties: Timothy A. PATRICK, Petitioner, v. William M. BURGET et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

486 U.S. 94

108 S.Ct. 1658

100 L.Ed.2d 83

Timothy A. PATRICK, Petitioner,

v William M. BURGET et al.

No. 86-1145.

Argued Feb. 22, 1988.

Decided May 16, 1988.

Rehearing Denied June 30, 1988.

See 487 U.S. 1243, 108 S.Ct. 2921.

Order on remand, 852 F.2d 1241.

Syllabus

Petitioner, an Astoria, Oregon, surgeon, declined an invitation by respondents to join them as a partner in the Astoria Clinic, and instead began an independent practice in competition with the Clinic.Thereafter, petitioner experienced difficulties in his professional dealings with Clinic physicians, culminating in respondents' initiation of, and participation in, peer-review proceedings to terminate petitioner's privileges at Astoria's only hospital (a majority of whose staff members were employees or partners of the Clinic), on the ground that his care of his patients was below the hospital's standards.Petitioner filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging that respondents had violated §§ 1and2 of the Sherman Act by initiating and participating in the peer-review proceedings in order to reduce competition from petitioner rather than to improve patient care.Ultimately, the court entered a judgment against respondents, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that respondents' conduct was immune from antitrust scrutiny under the state-action doctrine of Parker v. Brown,317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315, and its progeny, because Oregon has articulated a policy in favor of peer review and actively supervises the peer-review process.

Held:The state-action doctrine does not protect Oregon physicians from federal antitrust liability for their activities on hospital peer-review committees.The "active supervision" prong of the test used to determine whether private parties may claim state-action immunity requires that state officials have and exercise power to review such parties' particular anticompetitive acts and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.This requirement is not satisfied here, since there has been no showing that the State Health Division, the State Board of Medical Examiners, or the state judiciary reviews—or even could review private decisions regarding hospital privileges to determine whether such decisions comport with state regulatory policy and to correct abuses.The policy argument that effective peer review is essential to the provision of quality medical care and that any threat of antitrust liability will prevent physicians from participating openly and actively in peer-review proceedings essentially challenges the wisdom of applying the antitrust laws to the sphere of medical care, and as such is properly directed to Congress.Pp. 99-106.

800 F.2d 1498(CA 91986), reversed.

MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for the Court, in which all other Members joined, except BLACKMUN, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Barbee B. Lyon, Portland, Or., for petitioner.

Thomas M. Triplett, Portland, Or., for respondents.

Justice MARSHALLdelivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented in this case is whether the state-action doctrine of Parker v. Brown,317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315(1943), protects physicians in the State of Oregon from federal antitrust liability for their activities on hospital peer-review committees.

I

Astoria, Oregon, where the events giving rise to this lawsuit took place, is a city of approximately 10,000 people located in the northwest corner of the State.The only hospital in Astoria is the Columbia Memorial Hospital (CMH).Astoria also is the home of a private group-medical practice called the Astoria Clinic.At all times relevant to this case, a majority of the staff members at the CMH were employees or partners of the Astoria Clinic.

PetitionerTimothy Patrick is a general and vascular surgeon.He became an employee of the Astoria Clinic and a member of the CMH's medical staff in 1972.One year later, the partners of the Clinic, who are the respondents in this case,¹ invited petitioner to become a partner of the Clinic.Petitioner declined this offer and instead began an independent practice in competition with the surgical practice of the Clinic.Petitioner continued to serve on the medical staff of the CMH.

After petitioner established his independent practice, the physicians associated with the Astoria Clinic consistently refused to have professional dealings with him.Petitioner received virtually no referrals from physicians at the Clinic, even though the Clinic at times did not have a general surgeon on its staff.Rather than refer surgery patients to petitioner, Clinic doctors referred them to surgeons located as far as 50 miles from Astoria.In addition, Clinic physicians showed reluctance to assist petitioner with his own patients.Clinic doctors often declined to give consultations, and Clinic surgeons refused to provide backup coverage for patients under petitioner's care.At the same time, Clinic physicians repeatedly criticized petitioner for failing to obtain outside consultations and adequate backup coverage.

In 1979, respondentGary Boelling, a partner at the Clinic, complained to the executive committee of the CMH's medical staff about an incident in which petitioner had left a patient in the care of a recently hired associate, who then left the patient unattended.The executive committee decided to refer this complaint, along with information about other cases handled by petitioner, to the State Board of Medical Examiners(BOME).RespondentFranklin Russell, another partner at the Clinic, chaired the committee of the BOME that investigated these matters.The members of the BOME committee criticized petitioner's medical practices to the full BOME, which then issued a letter of reprimand that had been drafted by Russell.The BOME retracted this letter in its entirety after petitioner sought judicial review of the BOME proceedings.

Two years later, at the request of respondentRichard Harris, a Clinic surgeon, the executive committee of the CMH's medical staff initiated a review of petitioner's hospital privileges.The committee voted to recommend the termination of petitioner's privileges on the ground that petitioner's care of his patients was below the standards of the hospital.Petitioner demanded a hearing, as provided by hospital bylaws, and a five-member ad hoc committee, chaired by respondent Boelling, heard the charges and defense.Petitioner requested that the members of the committee testify as to their personal bias against him, but they refused to accommodate this request.Before the committee rendered its decision, petitioner resigned from the hospital staff rather than risk termination.²

During the course of the hospital peer-review proceedings, petitioner filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.Petitioner alleged that the partners of the Astoria Clinic had violated §§ 1and2 of the Sherman Act,ch. 647,26 Stat. 209,15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2.Specifically, petitioner contended that the Clinic partners had initiated and participated in the hospital peer-review proceedings to reduce competition from petitioner rather than to improve patient care.Respondents denied this assertion, and the District Court submitted the dispute to the jury with instructions that it could rule in favor of petitioner only if it found that respondents' conduct was the result of a specific intent to injure or destroy competition.

The jury returned a verdict against respondents Russell, Boelling, and Harris on the § 1 claim and against all of the respondents on the § 2 claim.It awarded damages of $650,000 on the two antitrust claims taken together.The District Court, as required by law, see15 U.S.C. § 15(a),38 Stat. 731, trebled the antitrust damages.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.800 F.2d 1498(1986).It found that there was substantial evidence that respondents had acted in bad faith in the peer-review process.³The court held, however, that even if respondents had used the peer-review process to disadvantage a competitor rather than to improve patient care, their conduct in the peer-review proceedings was immune from antitrust scrutiny.The court reasoned that the peer-review activities of physicians in Oregon fall within the state-action exemption from antitrust liability because Oregon has articulated a policy in favor of peer review and actively supervises the peer-review process.⁴The court therefore reversed the judgment of the District Court as to petitioner's antitrust claims.

We granted certiorari, 484 U.S. 814, 108 S.Ct 65, 98 L.Ed.2d 29(1987), to decide whether the state-action doctrine protects respondents' hospital peer-review activities from antitrust challenge.⁵We now reverse.

II

In Parker v. Brown,317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315(1943), this Court considered whether the Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive actions of a State.Petitioner in that case was a raisin producer who brought suit against the California Director of Agriculture to enjoin the enforcement of a marketing plan adopted under the State's Agricultural Prorate Act.That statute restricted competition among food producers in the State in order to stabilize prices and prevent economic waste.Relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, this Court refused to find in the Sherman Act"an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents."Id., at 351, 63 S.Ct., at 313.The Sherman Act, the Court held, was not intended "to restrain state action or official action directed by a state."Ibid.

Although Parker involved a suit against a state official, the Court subsequently recognized that Parker' § federalism ra- tionale demanded that the state-action exemption also apply in certain suits against private parties.See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,471 U.S....