Patrick v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

• Decision Date: 23 February 2023
• Docket Number: CV-21-00631-PHX-JJT
• Parties: Kimberly Susan Patrick, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Kimberly Susan Patrick, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.

No. CV-21-00631-PHX-JJT

United States District Court, D. Arizona

February 23, 2023

ORDER

Honorable John J. Tuchi United States District Judge

At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Kimberly Susan Patrick's Application for Disability Insurance Benefits by the Social Security Administration under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's Opening Brief (Doc 17, “Pl.'s Br.”), Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner's Answering Brief (Doc. 21 “Def.'s Br.”), and Plaintiff's Reply Brief (Doc. 22, “Reply”). The Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 14 “R.”) and now reverses the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ”) decision (R. at 12-26) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R. at 1-3) and remands for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the instant application for Title II Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“SSDI”) on February 16, 2018, for a period of disability beginning May 16, 2018. (R. at 15.) Plaintiff's last date insured for purposes of Title II benefits was December 31, 2019. (R. at 18.) Plaintiff's claim was denied initially on May 4, 2018 and was denied again upon reconsideration on October 30, 2018. (R. at 15.) Plaintiff had previously filed an application for SSDI on December 8, 2014, which was denied by an ALJ on August 23, 2017. (R. at 90-93.)

For the instant application, Plaintiff testified telephonically before the ALJ on May 19, 2020. (R. at 41-57.) Upon consideration of the medical records, opinions, and testimony presented, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled in a decision dated August 19, 2020. (R. at 12-26.) Prior to explaining her findings, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff did not present any new and material evidence regarding her conditions to support a departure from the prior ALJ's 2017 determination. (R. at 16.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis of the right foot and ankle status post total ankle arthroplasty, fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), social phobia, agoraphobia with panic disorder, and major depressive disorder. (R. at 18.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 18.) The ALJ then considered Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) and found that although Plaintiff's impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (R. at 23.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except that

[she] can only sit for about 6 hours out of an 8-hour day and stand and/or walk about 4 hours out of an 8-hour day; occasionally operate foot controls with her right lower extremity; occasionally climb ramps and stairs, never climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds; frequently balance, stoop, crouch and kneel, occasionally crawl; occasional exposure to non-weather related extreme temps and humidity, pulmonary irritants, like chemicals, odors, dusts, fumes, and gases; avoid hazards, including moving machinery and unprotected heights; occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors but can work in vicinity of others.

(R. at 20.)

On February 22, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for a review of the ALJ's decision. (R. at 1-3.) Plaintiff filed this action on April 13, 2021. (Doc. 1.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

In determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner's disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises three arguments for the Court's consideration, submitting that the ALJ erred by (1) adopting the previous ALJ's determination of Plaintiff's mental capacities; (2) rejecting the medical opinions of Plaintiff's treating rheumatologist, Ravi Bhalla, M.D. (“Dr. Bhalla”); and (3) rejecting Plaintiff's symptom testimony. (Pl. Br. at 1-2.) In her Response Brief, Defendant argues that any error made by the ALJ in adopting the previous ALJ's disability determination was harmless and that the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Bhalla's opinions and Plaintiff's testimony was proper and supported by substantial evidence. (Def. Br. at 3, 6, 10.) In Plaintiff's Reply Brief, she again asserts each of her three arguments and maintains that the ALJ committed materially harmful error. (Reply at 3.) Plaintiff requests the case be remanded for award of benefits under the “credit-as-true” doctrine, or in the alternative, for a de novo hearing and new decision. (Pl. Br. at 25.) The Court considers Plaintiff's three arguments, in turn.

A. The ALJ Did Not Commit Reversible Error in Adopting the Previous ALJ's Determination of Plaintiff's Mental Capacities.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by adopting the previous ALJ's determination of her mental capacities. (Pl. Br. at 13-15.) “The principles of res judicata apply to administrative decisions, although the doctrine is applied less rigidly to administrative proceedings than to judicial proceedings.” Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1988). “The claimant, in order to overcome the presumption of continuing nondisability arising from the first administrative law judge's findings of nondisability, must prove ‘changed circumstances' indicating a greater disability.” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985)); see SSAR 97-4(9), 1997 WL 742758, at *3 (Dec. 3, 1997).

Plaintiff previously filed for disability in 2014 and the prior ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled in a decision dated August 23, 2017. (R. 90-107.) On the current application, the ALJ applied Chavez and SSAR 97-4(9) and stated, “[t]he claimant did not meet her burden to show there was new and material evidence that supports deviating from the prior ALJ decision.” (R. at 16.) The ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff “had no new impairments, received similar treatment and had similar exam findings as was present in the prior decision.” (R. at 16.) Plaintiff argues this was error because Plaintiff had new impairments, increased severity of past impairments, and had received different treatment since the previous ALJ's determination. (Pl. Br. at 14-15.)

Defendant concedes that the ALJ misstated that Plaintiff did not show any changed circumstances. (Def. Br. at 4.) However, Defendant advances that the misstatement of Plaintiff's condition was harmless error since the ALJ nonetheless accounted for Plaintiff's new impairments and the increased severity of past impairments in her decision, which considered all of the evidence Plaintiff presented. (Id.)

The Ninth Circuit has long recognized that harmless error principles apply to Social Security cases. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). “[A]n ALJ's error is harmless where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Court must look at the entire record to determine whether an error altered the outcome of the case. Id.

The ALJ committed error by incorrectly stating that Plaintiff had no new impairments and had not experienced any “changed...