Patrick v. Commissioner of Correction

Decision Date07 June 1967
PartiesPaul R. PATRICK v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Louis M. Nordlinger, Boston, for petitioner.

James B. Krasnoo, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, KIRK, SPIEGEL, and REARDON, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

By this petition for a writ of mandamus, the petitioner, a prisoner at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole (Walpole), seeks to compel the Commissioner of Correction to credit to his term of imprisonment specified good conduct deductions as provided in G.L. c. 127, § 129, as amended.

The judge made findings and rulings of which the following is a summary. On June 14, 1963, the petitioner was convicted of the crime of armed robbery and sentenced to serve not less than five nor more than seven years at Walpole. Shortly thereafter he was transferred to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk (Norfolk). On September 18, 1963, he attempted to escape from that institution. He was subsequently charged with the crime of attempted escape (G.L. c. 268, § 16) and was convicted of that offence on February 13, 1964. He was sentenced to a term at Walpole for not less than one nor more than two years, the sentence to commence on the expiration of his prior sentence.

General Laws c. 127, § 129, provides for a tentative deduction from a prisoner's maximum term on account of good conduct; it further provides that certain deductions are to be forfeited if, during his term of imprisonment, the prisoner commits any offence for which he is convicted and sentenced. At the time the petitioner attempted to escape from Norfolk in September, 1963, the matter of forfeitures of good conduct deductions was governed by § 129, as amended by St.1959, c. 445, § 2. The 1959 amendment provided: 'If during the term of imprisonment of a prisoner confined in a correctional institution * * * such prisoner shall commit any offense of which he shall be convicted and sentenced, all deductions hereunder from the former sentence of imprisonment * * * shall be thereby forfeited.' In October, 1963, however, approximately four months before the prisoner was convicted and sentenced for his attempted escape, the 1959 amendment was stricken by St.1963, c. 535, 1 and the following was inserted in its place: 'If, during the term of imprisonment of a prisoner confined in a correctional institution * * * such prisoner shall commit any offense of which he shall be convicted and sentenced, he shall not be entitled to any deductions hereunder from the new sentence or sentences of imprisonment.' It is to be noted that the forfeiture of good conduct time with respect to a prior sentence was eliminated; the forfeiture under the 1963 amendment applies only to the new sentences, namely, those arising out of the offences committed during the term of imprisonment.

The petitioner, in response to an inquiry made to Walpole officials, was told that his entitlement to good conduct deductions with respect to his earlier sentence was governed by the 1959 amendment rather than the 1963 amendment and that because of his conviction and sentence for the attempted escape he had forfeited those deductions. Thereupon, the petitioner filed this petition.

The judge ruled that the petitioner's forfeiture of good conduct deductions under § 129 was governed by the 1959 amendment and that he was not entitled to any deductions on his earlier sentence. From an order for judgment dismissing his petition, the petitioner appealed.

Under G.L. c. 127, § 129, good conduct time deductions are forfeited upon the occurrence of two events: (1) the commission of an offence by the prisoner, and (2) the subsequent conviction and sentence therefor. It is clear that the forfeiture is intended to penalize the prisoner for the commission of the offence. Nevertheless, such forfeiture is not affected until the occurrence of the later event--the conviction and sentencing. The petitioner's forfeiture thus became effective in February, 1964. The question presented is whether that forfeiture is to be imposed under the terms of the 1959 amendment, which was in force at the time of the petitioner's attempted escape but not at the time when the forfeiture finally became effective.

We are of opinion that G.L. c. 4, § 6, Second, is determinative of this question. Section 6 provides certain rules which shall be observed in construing statutes, 'unless their observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body or repugnant to the context of the same statute.' Section 6, Second, provides in part: 'The repeal of a statute shall not affect any punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect * * *.'...

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22 cases
  • State v. Reis, 27171.
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • 21 August 2007
    .... . at the time the offence for which punishment is imposed is committed.'") (ellipses in original) (quoting Patrick v. Comm'r of Corr., 352 Mass. 666, 227 N.E.2d 348, 351 (1967)); State v. Johnson, 285 Md. 339, 402 A.2d 876, 880 (1979) (holding that a penalty is incurred "at the time of th......
  • School Committee of Springfield v. Board of Ed.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 12 November 1974
    ...no retroactive effect in this case. Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. 552, 554--557, 11 N.E.2d 461 (1937). Patrick v. Commissioner of Correction, 352 Mass. 666, 669, 227 N.E.2d 348 (1967). The court states that if c. 636 is viewed and considered against the historical background and other facts ......
  • Watts v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 6 May 2014
    ...the offence for which punishment is imposed is committed,’ [ Commonwealth v.] Dotson, supra, quoting Patrick v. Commissioner of Correction, 352 Mass. 666, 669, 227 N.E.2d 348 (1967), ‘a newly enacted [penal] statute is presumptively prospective.’ Commonwealth v. Galvin, [466 Mass.] 286, 290......
  • State v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 26 June 1979
    ...30 (1964); In re Schneck, 78 Kan. 207, 96 P. 43 (1908); State v. Dreaux, 205 La. 387, 17 So.2d 559 (1944); Patrick v. Commissioner of Correction, 352 Mass. 666, 227 N.E.2d 348 (1967); Tellis v. State, 84 Nev. 587, 445 P.2d 938 (1968). Thus we conclude that the provisions of Article 1, § 3 a......
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