Patrick v. Patrick

• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CATHELL
• Citation: Patrick v. Patrick, 649 A.2d 1204, 102 Md.App. 438 (Md. App. 1994)
• Decision Date: 01 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 320,320
• Parties: Daniel E. PATRICK, Sr., Personal Representative of the Estate of Edna Lorraine Patrick v. Rosalie PATRICK, et al. ,

Page 438

102 Md.App. 438

649 A.2d 1204

Daniel E. PATRICK, Sr., Personal Representative of the Estate of Edna Lorraine Patrick v. Rosalie PATRICK, et al.

No. 320, Sept. Term, 1994.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 2, 1994.

Timothy P. Thurtle (Saul McCormick, on the brief), Glen Burnie, for appellant.

J. Darby Bowman (Morrow & Hassani, P.A., on the brief), Towson, for appellees.

Argued before WENNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

Appellant, Daniel E. Patrick, Sr., personal representative of the estate of Edna Lorraine Patrick (the testatrix), appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The trial court found that the testatrix had attempted to revoke a $5,000 bequest to her granddaughter, Rachel, in trust, and a bequest of one-half of the residuary estate to her son, David, by drawing lines through portions of her will. It determined that the testatrix's attempt was an attempt to create a new will and was, thus, ineffective. The trial court then held that the first will, the will as it existed without the deletions, remained operative. Appellant raises the following questions:

1. Does Section 4-105 of the Estates and Trusts Article provide for partial revocation by the Testatrix through the cancelling of certain provisions in her will without adhering to the statutory requirements of Section 4-102 of the Estates and Trusts Article?

2. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, can the trial court consider prior statutes based on slightly different language and its accompanied case law, in order to determine the legislative intent of a clearly drafted statute?

3. Should Maryland's restricted approach to partial revocation be followed when other jurisdictions provide a much better method by employing a literal approach to Section 4-105 of the Estates and Trusts Article?

We shall reverse the order of the trial court as to the $5,000 bequest to Rachel because, as to that bequest, we believe that the trial judge read the language from two early Court of Appeals cases, which interpreted an earlier version of § 4-105 of the Estates and Trusts Article, too broadly. We shall otherwise affirm. We explain.

THE FACTS

As relevant to this appeal, the testatrix's will provided (with the lined and emphasized portions representing the text she crossed out and the portions enclosed in brackets representing the text she added):

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

OF EDNA LORRAINE PATRICK

I, EDNA LORRAINE PATRICK of Baltimore County, Maryland, being of sound mind and memory, and not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence of any person whatsoever, do make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will and Testament, and I revoke all previous Wills and Codicils made by me.

FIRST: I direct that all my just debts, expenses of my last illness and funeral, expenses of the administration of my estate, and estate and inheritance taxes on the whole of my estate be paid out of the first available funds as administrative expenses.

SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath the sum of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars . [Rick's and Dave's] I give, devise and bequeath the additional sum of Dollars to my at which time it is to be distributed to her along with any accumulated earnings.

THIRD: I give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of my property, after payment of debts, expenses and taxes provided for in the First Item above, whether such property be real, personal or mixed, of whatever kind or character or wheresoever situated to Daniel E. Patrick, Sr. and equally, share and share alike.

The trial court held, and neither party disputes, that the testatrix had made the changes in the will and that she "had the intent to alter the Will as initially executed and thereby to strike provisions which would have benefitted her son, David, and his heirs." (Footnote omitted.) Specifically, the trial court found that she attempted to revoke the $5,000 bequest to her granddaughter, Rachel, apparently the daughter of David, in trust, and the bequest of one-half of her residuary estate to her son David M. Patrick, Sr.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Appellant contends that the trial court erred by not following the literal language of Md.Code (1974, 1991 Repl.Vol.), § 4-105 of the Estates and Trusts Article and by following the precedent of two Court of Appeals cases that interpreted an earlier statute that used the word, "clause," instead of the word, "part," which is currently used. As stated above, we believe that the trial court erred in its interpretation of those Court of Appeals cases, but we agree with the trial court in its holding that the legislature did not intend to change the meaning of § 4-105 when it substituted the word, "part," for the word, "clause."

Section 4-105 currently reads, in pertinent part:

A will, or any part of it, may not be revoked in a manner other than as provided in this section.

(1) Subsequent will.--By provision in a subsequent, validly executed will which (i) revokes any prior will or part of it either expressly or by necessary implication, or (ii) expressly republishes an earlier will that had been revoked by an intermediate will but is still in existence;

(2) Destruction.--By burning, cancelling, tearing, or obliterating the same, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence and by his express direction and consent.... [Emphasis added.]

The 1991 replacement volume of the Estates and Trust Article does not contain any Revisor's Note or Comment. The 1974 volume, however, did. The Revisor's Note from that volume provided, "This section formerly appeared as Article 93, § 4-105. Changes are in style and language." The Comment to former Article 93, § 4-105 provided, in pertinent part:

This section adopts, without change of substance, former § 351, which was recently reconsidered and amended by the General Assembly.

Article 93 § 351, in turn, provided:

No will or codicil in writing, nor any clause thereof, shall be revoked otherwise than as provided herein:

(a) By some other will, codicil, or other writing, executed as provided in § 350, altering or revoking said will or codicil.

(b) By burning, cancelling, tearing or obliterating the same, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence and by his express direction and consent. [Emphasis added.]

Appellant requests that we ignore the Comment to section 4-105, which would then permit us to ignore the Court of Appeals's decisions interpreting language very similar to that of Article 93 § 351. By examining the current language of section 4-105 of the Estates and Trust Article in this vacuum, appellant suggests that, under the plain meaning rule of statutory construction, the testatrix was allowed to strike certain portions of her will regardless of the effect this would have on the rest of her will. We disagree and explain.

In Barr v. Barberry Bros., Inc., 99 Md.App. 33, 38-39, 635 A.2d 64 (1994), we quoted from Mazor v. Dep't of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 360-61, 369 A.2d 82 (1977), and Subsequent Injury Fund v. Ehrman, 89 Md.App. 741, 746-47, 599 A.2d 875 (1992), and stated:

[S]ix principal guidelines of statutory interpretation [are]:

"The cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain and carry out the real intention of the Legislature....

The primary source from which we glean this intention is the language of the statute itself....

And in construing a statute we accord the words their ordinary and natural signification....

If reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless....

Similarly, wherever possible an interpretation should be given to statutory language which will not lead to absurd consequences....

Moreover, if the statute is part of a general statutory scheme or system, the sections must be read together to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature."

While the language of the statute is the primary source from which to glean the legislative intent, we do not ignore other possible sources of that intent. The Court of Appeals, in Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513-14, 525 A.2d 628 (1987), stated:

Of course, in our efforts to discover purpose, aim, or policy we look at the words of the statute. That is the thrust of the plain-meaning rule relied on by Kaczorowski, and the rule comports with common sense, because what the legislature has written in an effort to achieve a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal. But the plain-meaning rule is not rigid.

We also recognize the rule that where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975); Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 170 A.2d 212 (1961). In such circumstances, the court, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.

Tucker [v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.], 308 Md. at 75, 517 A.2d at 732 [ (1986) ] [some citations omitted].

The Court added:

When we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed in the Annotated Code. We may and often must consider other "external manifestations" or "persuasive evidence," including a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given...