Patrick v. Rai Serv. Co.
| Decision Date | 09 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-00852-HGD |
| Parties | SHAWN CHRISTOPHER PATRICK, Plaintiff v. RAI SERVICE COMPANY, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff filed a response, defendant filed a reply, and plaintiff filed a sur-reply. (Docs. 10, 11 & 14). A hearing on the motion was held on September 7, 2016. Present were plaintiff Shawn Christopher Patrick, proceeding pro se, and Tamula Yelling for defendant. Defendant presented testimony from Scott Lefelar, in-house counsel for defendant's Human Resources Department.
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint alleging defendant violated the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in connection with his employment and termination. The complaint in this action and the testimony at the hearing reflect that plaintiff was working for defendant in 2012, when defendant implemented an arbitration agreement for its employees.1 Continued eligibility for bonus payments which had been paid to employees such as plaintiff prior to 2012 was conditioned upon acceptance of the arbitration agreement. Plaintiff refused to sign the agreement in 2012; therefore, he was deemed ineligible for any bonus payments from 2012, which would have been paid in 2013. In fact, plaintiff did not receive any bonus in 2013 for 2012.
Mr. Lefelar testified that on February 22, 2013, he reached out by email to any employees who had failed to sign the arbitration agreement, including plaintiff. (Doc. 11-3, Emails). Plaintiff did not respond to the February 2013 email. Lefelar sent another email to plaintiff on August 5, 2013, again giving plaintiff an opportunity to sign the arbitration agreement and reminding plaintiff he would be eligible for 2013bonus payments in 2014 only if he did so. Plaintiff responded on August 12, 2013, asking when the deadline for signing would be. After Lefelar advised plaintiff that the deadline was October 1, 2013, plaintiff emailed Lefelar that he would make his decision after he took "the CBT" which was due around the same time. Lefelar testified that he emailed plaintiff a PDF version of the arbitration agreement with a blank signature line. Plaintiff testified that he went to Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for business during the week encompassing September 30, 2013, and believed that he might be fired over his failure to sign the arbitration agreement. He also testified he was in meetings 12 to 14 hours a day during this time and does not recall asking Lefelar to send him a copy of the arbitration agreement.
On September 30, 2013, at 9:16 p.m., an email was sent by plaintiff from his work email account to Lefelar. The email read:
Scott, I did not get your e-mail until I got back to the room tonight. I signed the document the only way I could. I will call you tomorrow to see if this will work if not, I will sign the hard copy like you suggested.
(sic) . Attached to the email was a document entitled "Arbitration Agreement (Live Sig) (3).pdf." (Id.). Lefelar testified that the attachment to the email was a copy of the arbitration agreement, showing a typed signature in a box, "Shawn Patrick," on the "Employee Signature" line and a typed signature in a box, "Shawn Patrick," on the "Print Name" line. The document furthercontains a statement at the end, reading "YES-By answering 'Yes,' I acknowledge that I have read the Arbitration Agreement for Employees of RAI and Its Affiliated Companies and agree to be bound by its terms." Beside that statement is a line on which appears a box containing the typed word "Yes."2 Plaintiff testified that after he sent the email, Lefelar told him on the telephone, "I'll take care of it," a comment plaintiff denies understanding. Lefelar does not recall telling plaintiff this. Plaintiff did not call Lefelar on October 1, 2013, or after about signing a hard copy of the arbitration agreement, nor was he ever contacted about affixing his signature to a hard copy of the arbitration agreement.3
Plaintiff testified that he had a Topaz "signature gem," which he described as an electronic pen provided by defendant that could be used to sign a signature on a computer screen, and the signature appears like a handwritten signature. He also testified that his pen was not working on September 30, 2013. Plaintiff further testified that he engaged in a strategy to delay and avoid signing the arbitration agreement, on advice of counsel. Plaintiff denied that he "wilfully and voluntarily"signed the arbitration agreement and stated that at no time did he ever type his name on any arbitration agreement. Lefelar also denied signing the arbitration agreement on plaintiff's behalf and testified he is unaware of anyone else signing the agreement for plaintiff.
The evidence reflects that plaintiff received bonuses of $14,704 in 2014 and $13,874 in 2015. (Doc. 11-2). He would not have received the bonuses had defendant not considered him to have signed the arbitration agreement. Plaintiff became aware of the bonus payments when they were deposited in his bank account. However, he never asked defendant about why he was receiving the bonuses, and he did not reject or refund the bonus payments. Lefelar testified that the first time he became aware that plaintiff denied signing the arbitration agreement was when he saw plaintiff's response to the Motion to Compel Arbitration filed in this litigation. Plaintiff stated he told defendant he did not sign the arbitration agreement during a company investigation of him in 2015. Plaintiff was terminated by defendant on June 10, 2015.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., provides that a written arbitration agreement in certain contracts "shall be valid, irrevocable, andenforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Because of the FAA, federal courts are required to place arbitration clauses on equal footing with other contracts. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010); Janiga v. Questar Capital Corp., 615 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 2010) (). Nonetheless, federal courts interpret arbitration clauses broadly where possible. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1986). The result of such broad interpretation is that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 650 () (quotation omitted). "[A]s with any other contract, the parties' intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (alteration supplied).
However, "the presumption of arbitrability only [applies] where a validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous about whether it covers the dispute at hand." Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 301 (2010). See also Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Capital Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d522, 526 (2d Cir. 2011) ().
American Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Morton, 812 So.2d 282, 284 (Ala. 2001), quoting Jim Burke Auto., Inc. v. Beavers, 674 So.2d 1260, 1265 n.1 (Ala. 1995)). See also Kenworth of Birmingham, Inc. v. Langley, 828 So.2d 288, 290 (Ala. 2002); Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So.2d 277, 280 (Ala. 2000).
The existence of a valid contract to arbitrate is determined by state law. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). There are two prerequisites for a valid arbitration contract under Alabama law: "(1) there must be a written agreement calling for arbitration[;] and (2) the contract in which the arbitration agreement appears must relate to a transaction involving interstate commerce." Prudential Sec. v. Micro-Fab, Inc., 689 So. 2d 829, 832 (Ala. 1997) (citing Maxus, Inc. v. Sciacca, 598 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. 1992)) (alteration supplied).
Defendant contends plaintiff electronically signed the arbitration agreement dated September 30, 2013. An electronic signature has the same effect as a handwritten signature; however, the signature still must be attributed to that person before it can be established as the act of that person. Ala. Code § 8-1A-9 (2015). Whether an electronic signature is attributable as an act of that person "may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure. . . [and] from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the parties' agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided by law." Id.
In Granite Rock Co., the Supreme Court held that issues concerning contract formation are generally reserved for the courts to decide. 561 U.S. at 296. Indeed, it found that such a determination is the threshold question in any dispute involving arbitration. Id....
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