Patrick v. Ridge

• Decision Date: 15 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 04-10194.,04-10194.
• Citation: 394 F.3d 311
• Parties: Clara PATRICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tom RIDGE, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

394 F.3d 311

Clara PATRICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tom RIDGE, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-10194.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

December 15, 2004.

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Noemi Alessandra Collie, Law Office of Noemi A. Collie, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

T.J. Johnson, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, DAVIS, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Clara Patrick appeals the district court's grant of the summary judgment motion of Defendant-Appellee, Tom Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security,¹ dismissing Patrick's claims grounded in age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").² The district court based its dismissal on a determination that (1) Patrick had proved her prima facie cases; (2) her employer had produced legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment action vis-a-vis Patrick; and (3) she had not demonstrated that her employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting her were pretextual. Concluding that the employer's responses do not qualify as "reasons" for purposes of McDonnell Douglas³ and Burdine,⁴ we reverse and remand.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In the instant case, Patrick advances charges of age discrimination and retaliation arising out of the INS's refusal to promote her to a supervisory position for which she had applied. In 1989, Patrick began working for the INS's Central Region Administrative Center ("CRAC") in Dallas, Texas as a Contracting Officer and Realty Specialist at the GS-11 pay grade.⁵ The INS upgraded Patrick to GS-12 pay grade in 1993.

In 1999, Patrick applied for a position as a GS-13 Supervisory Realty Specialist ("SRS"). She was denied this promotion, which was given instead to one of Patrick's co-workers who is more than ten years her junior. Patrick timely filed a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC. She eventually brought suit against the INS on this first claim, but, in 2002, the district court granted the INS's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Patrick's first claim.

Between the time that she brought suit on her first claim and the date of its dismissal, the SRS position again became available and Patrick reapplied. At the time of her second promotion application, Patrick had more than twelve years experience as a Realty Specialist at the INS and had served as an acting SRS on several occasions. The Human Resources Department at the INS selected Patrick and five other applicants as finalists to be interviewed by a three-person panel. Panel member Daniel Pomplun, Director of the Facilities and Engineering Division of CRAC, served as the panel's selecting official and was charged with making the final selection decision.

The panel interviewed the six finalists and rated them based on (1) each candidate's strengths, (2) how each responded to a uniform set of questions, and (3) how the panel members believed that each would fit into the work group. Pomplun acknowledged in a declaration produced in support of the INS's motion for summary judgment that, during the time that he was considering candidates for the SRS position, another employee in his division told him about Patrick's prior EEOC complaint.⁶ In his declaration, Pomplun stated that this information had no bearing on his decision not to select Patrick. In a separate (and contradictory) statement to the EEOC, however, Pomplun claimed not to have had any knowledge of Patrick's former EEO activity.

Pomplun and the panel eventually decided not to select any of the six candidates interviewed for the position. As a result, another panel member, Robert Gawel, recommended that an outside candidate, Margaret Hartigan, be considered for the position. After interviewing Hartigan, Pomplun selected her for the SRS position, stating that Hartigan was the "best qualified" person for the position.

This took place before Patrick's original action was dismissed in 2002 and prompted Patrick to amend her original 1999 complaint to include new charges of age discrimination and retaliation grounded in the agency's 2001 decision to deny Patrick the promotion and hire Hartigan instead. When the district court subsequently granted the employer's first motion for summary judgment and dismissed Patrick's 1999 claims, the INS filed a motion for summary judgment on her 2001 claims, which the district court granted. Patrick timely filed her notice of appeal of the district court's latter grant of the INS's summary judgment motion.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.⁷ A district court may grant summary judgment if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the movant demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.⁸ "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof."⁹

B. McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting

We employ the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when, as here, we review the grant of an employer's summary judgment motion to dismiss an employee's ADEA claims based on only circumstantial evidence.¹⁰ First, the employee must prove a prima facie case of discrimination.¹¹ The requirements for a prima facie case vary slightly with the type of claim brought¹² but an employee's establishment of a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.¹³

To rebut the presumption of discrimination created by the employee's prima facie case, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.¹⁴ As this is a burden of production, the employer need not prove that it was actually motivated by its proffered reason.¹⁵ But, if the employer meets its production burden, the presumption of discrimination created by the plaintiff's prima facie case falls away and the factual inquiry becomes more specific.¹⁶ To avoid dismissal on the employer's motion for summary judgment, the employee must show that the employer's putative legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was not its real reason, but was merely a pretext for discrimination.¹⁷ In other words, after a defendant employer has met its burden of production, an employee plaintiff, like any other civil plaintiff, must now demonstrate that there is a material issue of disputed fact as to discrimination, the ultimate question vel non.¹⁸ In some instances, proof of pretext alone will suffice.¹⁹

1. Context

The framework in which we review this case on appeal is key. First, the ruling we review is one that grants a summary judgment motion before trial, not a motion for judgment as a matter of law following a merits trial or even following the completion of the plaintiff's case when the record is not yet complete. Second, the summary judgment motion was filed by the defendant employer, not the plaintiff employee. If, at this stage of the litigation, the plaintiff employee has produced evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case and the defendant employer has failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination with evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, the employee is entitled to take her case to a jury.²⁰ It is in this context that we proceed.

2. Prima Facie Case

The district court ruled (and the INS does not challenge on appeal) that Patrick succeeded in making out a prima facie case for both age discrimination and retaliation. We therefore do not address this first step in the McDonnell Douglas minuet. Rather, we proceed to the second step — the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its acts.

3. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason for Failure to Promote

An employer may avoid liability for charges of both discrimination and retaliation by producing evidence tending to show that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its disputed decision. In opposition to both of Patrick's claims, discrimination and retaliation, the INS offers the same justifications for its decision. As we conclude that neither putative reason satisfied the INS's burden of production, Patrick's prima facie cases survive.

a. First Reason: Patrick was "Not Sufficiently Suited" For the Position

The INS first proffers as a legitimate reason for not promoting Patrick that she was not "sufficiently suited" for the SRS position. The agency asserts that none of the six applicants initially interviewed was sufficiently suited and that this is why it subsequently conducted an interview with Hartigan and hired her. Yet, no evidence in the summary judgment record clarifies or expands on the statement of the INS that Patrick was not "sufficiently suited for the job" other than Pomplun's statement that he evaluated candidates based not only on work credentials and experience but also on how he thought that the candidate would fit into the work group. The INS gave no explanation of what this means and produced no specifics for why Patrick would not fit in with the group.

Fatal to the INS's position here is the well-established rule that, to meet its burden of production under McDonnell Douglas, an employer must articulate a nondiscriminatory reason with"sufficient clarity" to afford the employee a realistic opportunity to show that the reason is pretextual.²¹ This does not mean that an employer may not rely on subjective reasons for its personnel decisions.²² It does mean, though, that to rebut an employee's prima facie case, a defendant employer must...