Patrick v. United States, 8259.

• Citation: 288 F.2d 292
• Decision Date: 27 March 1961
• Docket Number: No. 8259.,8259.
• Parties: Talbot PATRICK and Commercial Bank of Charlotte, Administrator of the Estate of Alethia M. Patrick, deceased, Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

288 F.2d 292 (1961)

Talbot PATRICK and Commercial Bank of Charlotte, Administrator of the Estate of Alethia M. Patrick, deceased, Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant.

No. 8259.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued January 25, 1961.

Decided March 27, 1961.

Arthur I. Gould, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson and Melva M. Graney, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., and Joseph E. Hines, U. S. Atty., Spartanburg, S. C., on brief), for appellant.

Robert M. Ward, Rock Hill, S. C., for appellees.

Before SOPER and HAYNSWORTH, Circuit Judges, and LEWIS, District Judge.

LEWIS, District Judge.

This is an action to recover income taxes paid under a deficiency assessment arising from the disallowance of a deduction for legal fees paid to taxpayer's and his former wife's attorneys for services rendered in connection with a property settlement incident to a divorce of the parties.

The District Court for the Western District of South Carolina, hearing the case without a jury, sustained the contentions of the taxpayer, 186 F.Supp. 48, and the Government appealed.¹

We adopt the findings of fact by the District Court which are substantially as follows:

The taxpayer was sued for divorce. The wife sought an absolute divorce, court supervision of the properties, a property settlement, child custody and attorney fees. The taxpayer neither admitted nor denied the alleged grounds for divorce. He did not testify at the trial. Extended negotiations were carried on by attorneys for both parties, culminating in a property settlement. The trial court in South Carolina granted the wife an absolute divorce, approved the property settlement and ordered the taxpayer to pay all attorney fees for both parties, provision for which had also been previously agreed upon.

At the time of the institution of the divorce proceedings and for some years prior thereto the taxpayer was the operating head of the Herald Publishing Corporation. He owned 28% of the stock and his wife owned 28%. The eldest son owned 9% and the balance thereof was held in trust for the use and benefit of the children. The only other income-producing property was real estate (a building mainly occupied by the publishing corporation). The taxpayer had an 80% undivided interest therein and the wife had a 20% undivided interest.

The pertinent portion of the settlement agreement provided the taxpayer would purchase the wife's 28% interest in the publishing corporation stock at fair market price, conditioned upon the further agreement that the stock acquired from the wife, together with the taxpayer's stock in the publishing corporation (56%) would pass to the children on his death, or if the stock was sold prior thereto, the proceeds would become the property of the children. The undivided interests of the taxpayer and his wife in the income-producing real estate were placed in trust for the children, subject to a lease to the publishing corporation for a term of years.

The attorney fees incurred by the parties for the divorce action and settlement agreement were $12,000 each, or a total of $24,000, $4,000 of which was for handling of the divorce, $4,000 for placing the real estate in trust ($3,200 of which was charged to the taxpayer and $800 to the wife), and $16,000 for the rearranging of stock ownership and control of the Herald Publishing Corporation. Prior to the institution of the divorce proceedings the taxpayer, because of family unity, controlled the publishing corporation and was editor and publisher of the newspaper and drew salaries therefrom.

During the pendency of the divorce proceeding there was more than a possibility the control of the publishing corporation would be sold and that the income-producing real estate might be partitioned and/or sold. Prospective purchasers of the publishing corporation were interviewed by the wife's attorneys. The wife made no immediate threat upon taxpayer's operation or control of the newspaper and did not seek to enjoin or encumber his interest therein. The eldest son appeared to favor the mother in the marital difficulties and the wife and children were very much opposed to the apparent remarriage of the taxpayer.

The taxpayer contends that that portion of the attorney fees paid for legal services rendered solely in connection with the property settlement was deductible pursuant to Title 26 U.S.C. § 212(2) (1954 ed.).²

The District Court found the legal fees in the amount of $3,200 and $16,000 were reasonably and proximately related to the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income and were therefore an allowable deduction to the taxpayer. We agree.

The Government insists however, that legal fees paid in connection with a divorce proceeding, accompanied by a property settlement, are incurred in relation to the dissolution of a personal family relationship, and that Title 26 U.S.C. § 262 (1958 ed.)³ specifically denies a taxpayer a deduction with respect to a personal or family expense. Such is correct, in those cases where the expenses incurred were paid for legal services in representing the parties in a divorce proceeding, or in contesting the liability accruing as a result thereof. In this case $4,000 in legal fees were incurred in the handling of the divorce proceeding. No deduction or claim therefor was made. The taxpayer incurred additional legal fees in the amount of $3,200 for services rendered in connection with the preparation of the trust agreement and the leasing of the income-producing real estate, of which he owned a 4/5th undivided interest, and $16,000 in additional legal fees for the rearranging of the stock ownership and control of the Herald Publishing Corporation.

The Government does not deny the reasonableness of the fees or the necessity therefor. It contends: "When the distinction between immediate purpose and incidental consequence is given effect, attorneys' fees paid in relation to a property settlement under a divorce decree are necessarily nondeductible as being personal expenses, regardless of whether there is an effort by one spouse to maintain and conserve income-producing property". With this we do not agree.

The Eighth, Sixth and Fifth Circuits and Court of Claims⁴ have all reached the opposite result in regard to this question. An examination of those cases indicates the legal fees were allowed as a deduction because they were not expended to resist a liability, but were spent to find a manner in which it could be met without depriving taxpayer of his income or income-producing property.

In the Baer case the Court stated 196 F.2d 649:

"* * *. The controversy did not go to the question of the liability but to the manner in which it might be met by the petitioner without greatly disturbing his financial structure. * * *."

In the Bowers case the Court allowed a $45,000 attorney fee as claimed, with the statement that, as in the Baer case, "* * * there was little occasion for the services of a taxpayer's lawyers, in divorce proceedings proper, * * * such services were largely devoted to adjusting the taxpayer's liability to his wife * * *." 243 F.2d 907

In the Owens case the Court stated 273 F.2d 256:

"* * *. The ultimate and only fact before the Tax Court and before us was and is whether the $7,500 was actually paid to the attorney in connection with the saving of the business in which the husband was interested. * * *. In other words, the domestic dispute furnished the occasion, but not the motive, for the payment of the $7,500 to the attorney."

In the McMurtry case the Court of Claims gave the taxpayer an opportunity to show to what extent legal expenses were incurred in conservation and maintenance of property.

The Government relies mainly upon Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 72 S.Ct. 585, 96 L.Ed. 791, and Lewis v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 253 F.2d 821. Neither of these cases are in conflict with the above cited cases. In the Lykes case deductibility turned wholly upon the activities to which they were related. The taxpayer gave away stock with a fixed value and the Commissioner of Internal...