Pattee v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 23 May 1888
• Citation: 5 Dak. 267,38 N.W. 435
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Parties: Pattee v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

38 N.W. 435

5 Dak. 267

Pattee

v.Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Dakota.

May 23, 1888.

Appeal from district court, Brule county.

Action for damages for personal injuries by Sarah Pattee against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and the railway company appeals.Burton Hanson, for appellant. J. M. Long, for respondent.

MCCONNELL, J.

This is one of those actions which the growing magnitude of railway building and railway travel has rendered very common in all courts of general jurisdiction throughout the United States. The plaintiff, while a passenger upon one of appellant's trains, received personal injuries, through the derailment of the coach in which she was riding,-an accident resulting from a broken rail. This action is for damages for such injuries; and the substantial issue between the parties upon the trial, briefly stated in general language, was this: Did the plaintiff's injuries result from appellant's negligence? The jury found for the plaintiff a verdict for $3,000. Judgment for this amount was entered after motion for new trial overruled.

Upon the trial, after the testimony had been all given, appellant's counsel requested the trial court to direct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. This request was denied, and appellant excepted. The question involved in this ruling is now pressed by appellant before us, and we shall examine its pertinency preliminary to passing upon such other questions as appellant presents and we deem material for our consideration.

The theory of law upon which appellant's counsel based such request we state in our own language, as follows: Proof of personal injury to a passenger, as such, establishes, as a presumption of law, that such injury resulted from the carrier's negligence. The effect of this presumption is to cast upon the carrier defendant the burden of proving that the injury complained of did not result through his negligence. If thereupon he introduces competent evidence tending to show that his track, vehicle, and motive power were, at the time of the accident, up to the high standard of condition required for the transportation of human beings; were in charge of competent servants, then and there using due care in and about the management of the same; and if such evidence in that behalf remain uncontradicted and unconflicting,-its weight and effect are for the court, and not for the jury, to determine. And if, furthermore, such evidence be to the court clear and satisfactory against the presumption of law that there was negligence, there is no case to go to the jury, and the court should hold accordingly. This theory of the law is sustained by many respectable authorities. “The rule of law is doubtless that, where there is no conflict of testimony, where the existence of a fact is clearly proved by undisputed testimony, the court should hold that the fact is established, and it is error to leave it to the jury to find whether or not the fact exists.” Spaulding v. Railway Co., 33 Wis. 582, citing numerous authorities. In the case above cited, it was argued that the presumption of negligence arising on simple proof of the injury should be held to have the legal effect of conflictlng testimony, so as to entitle the case to go to the jury; but it was held otherwise, and that such presumption, being a presumption of law and not of fact, simply cast upon the defendant the burden of proof under the issue as to negligence. While the theory of law, as above stated, may be unobjectionable, and seems to be in conformity with section 679 of the Code of Civil Procedure of this territory, defining, in certain cases, what shall constitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of railway corporations, the learned trial judge could not have held it applicable to the case at bar consistently with his other rulings. In his opinion, as shown by his ruling, there was competent evidence on the part of the plaintiff tending to rebut the testimony of appellant's witnesses that the condition of the track was good at the place of the accident. Unless, then, we should first decide that all such rebutting evidence was incompetent and improperly admitted, we need not pass upon the correctness of said theory, nor upon its applicability to the case at bar. It will be sufficient for us to pass upon the more immediate assignments of error. These may be broadly stated as twofold,-error in admitting evidence, and error in the charge to the jury.

The alleged errors as to admitting evidence relate to testimony offered as to condition of track at or near the place of accident, and may be considered as one. The testimony admitted, under objection, is that, where the car was derailed, and east and west of that...