Patten v. Boyd.

• Decision Date: 23 April 1915
• Docket Number: No. 1734.,1734.
• Citation: 20 N.M. 250,150 P. 917
• Parties: VAN PATTENv.BOYD.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

20 N.M. 250

150 P. 917

VAN PATTEN

v.BOYD.

No. 1734.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 23, 1915.Rehearing Denied May 17, 1915.

Syllabus by the Court.

Where, upon the facts found, conceded, or established without dispute at a hearing before the Land Department of the United States, its officers fall into an error in the construction of the law applicable to the case, which causes them to refuse to issue the patent to the lawful claimant, and to give it to another, a court of equity has the power to correct the error, and to invest the rightful claimant with the title.

When the law has confided to a special tribunal the authority to hear and determine certain matters arising in the course of its duties, the decision of that tribunal, within the scope of its authority, is conclusive upon all others.

Until a patent to public lands has been issued by the constituted authority, the legal title to the land remains in the government, and the Land Department is invested with the jurisdiction and power to hear and determine conflicting claims to the same. Its adjudication, upon conflicting facts, is not subject to review by the courts.

The misconstruction of the law must be of the law applicable to the case as established, and not upon the facts of the case as one or the other party may honestly believe them to be. This being true, it is essential for the attacking party to allege and set forth in his complaint the facts, as found by the department, or to allege that such facts were undisputed, in order to invest a court of equity with jurisdiction to entertain his application for relief.

The decision of the proper officers of the Land Department on questions of fact in a contest is conclusive on the courts; and, in the absence of fraud in preventing a party from presenting his case, or fraud practiced by the officers of the department, the decision is not subject to review by the courts by a charge of perjury against witnesses.

Appeal from District Court, Doña Ana County; E. L. Medler, Judge.

Action by Eugene Van Patten against Nathan E. Boyd. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The decision of the Land Department on questions of fact in a contest is conclusive on the courts and, in the absence of fraud connected with the proceeding will not be reviewed because of a charge of perjury against witnesses.

J. H. Paxton, of Las Cruces, for appellant.

J. F. Bonham and W. R. Reber, both of Las Cruces, for appellee.

ROBERTS, C. J.

On September 15, 1909, appellee instituted this action in the court below against appellant, with the stock form of complaint in ejectment, to recover possession of the lands in dispute, which were occupied by appellant, basing his claim of title upon a patent issued by the United States. After proceedings, not included in the transcript of record, on December 2, 1912, appellant filed his second amended answer and counterclaim, in the nature of a bill in equity, seeking to enforce a trust and conveyance of the land in question from appellee to appellant. Appellant's counterclaim attempts to set up two causes of action by way of counterclaim and defense. The first cause of action in the counterclaim is to the effect that appellant is entitled to the land in question under the land laws of the United States, and that appellee procured the said land to be patented to him by a misapplication of the said laws on the part of the Land Department, and in violation of such laws. The second cause of action in the counterclaim is to the effect that appellant is entitled to the land in question under the land laws of the United States, and that appellee procured the said land to be patented to him by means of false and perjured testimony introduced before the land officers of the United States, which it is alleged necessarily affected the judgment of such officers. In each cause of action appellant shows that he prosecuted all forms of appeal possible in the Land Department. The trial court sustained a motion to strike the second cause of action, and a demurrer to the first cause, and, appellant electing to stand upon his pleadings, judgment was entered for appellee.

[1] The first cause of action set up in the counterclaim proceeded upon the theory that the officers of the Land Department had, by a misconstruction of the law, issued a patent for the land in question to the appellee, whereas, had the law been correctly interpreted, appellant would have been invested with the legal title to the same. It is well settled that, where, upon the facts found, conceded, or established without dispute at the hearing before the department, its officers fell into an error in the construction of the law applicable to the case which caused them to refuse to issue the patent to the lawful claimant, and to give it to another, a court of equity has the power to correct the error, and to invest the rightful claimant with the title. James v. Germania Iron Co., 107 Fed. 597, 46 C. C. A. 476; Cunningham v. Ashley, 14 How. 377, 14 L. Ed. 462; Barnard's Heirs v. Ashley's Heirs, 18 How. 43, 15 L. Ed. 285; Garland v. Wynn, 20 How. 6, 15 L. Ed. 801; Lytle v. Arkansas, 22 How. 193, 16 L. Ed. 306; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 24 L. Ed. 848; Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U. S. 242, 13 Sup. Ct. 244, 37 L. Ed. 152. This principle of law is conceded by appellee. The first count of the counterclaim is attacked by the demurrer upon the ground, among others, that it fails to state sufficient facts to show that appellant is entitled to the relief sought, in that it fails to set out the facts found by the department, or that the facts alleged in the complaint were the undisputed facts, upon which the decision of the department was predicated. The allegations of the counterclaim, which attempt to set up the mistake of law, and the facts upon which the law was applied are as follows:

“That defendant is, and was at all times herein mentioned, * * * a qualified homestead entryman under the laws of the United States, and the said land hereinbefore described being then public domain of the United States, undisposed of and subject to entry. * * * That defendant has fully complied with all the requirements of the laws of the United States for patenting and acquiring title to the said land, as such homestead entryman thereon. * * * Although defendant was then and there in actual possession and occupancy of the same under his homestead entry hereinbefore described; and although defendant's said homestead entry was then a valid subsisting homestead entry upon the records of the United States land office at Las Cruces, N. M., and upon the records of the General Land Office of the United States; and notwithstanding defendant's said pre-existing and then existing homestead entry on said north half of the southwest quarter of section 7, and notwithstanding defendant's said pre-existing and then existing possession and occupancy thereof. * * * Defendant's said homestead entry thereon being a valid subsisting homestead entry upon the records of the said United States land office at Las Cruces, N. M., and upon the records of the General Land Office of the United States. * * * That plaintiff's said amendment * * * was finally and unappealably allowed * * * contrary to the laws of the United States, and particularly in manifest violation of the provisions of the statute of the United States made and provided in the case of amendments to public land entries, the same being United States Revised Statutes, § 2372 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 4780). * * * That defendant's said homestead entry * * * continued to be a valid, subsisting entry upon the records of the United States Land Office at Las Cruces, N. M., and upon the records of the General Land Office of the United States, until the 23d day of August, A. D. 1909. * * * That defendant's said homestead entry was finally canceled by reason of the plaintiff's said amendment to his homestead entry. * * * That without plaintiff's said amendment to his homestead entry defendant would now be entitled to, and in due course of law would now have, a United States patent for his said homestead entry. * * * That plaintiff's said United States patent for his said amended homestead entry is plaintiff's sole and only ground for his suit in ejectment herein.”

[2] It is well settled that, in the absence of mistake or fraud:

“When the law has confided to a special tribunal the authority to hear and determine certain matters arising in the course of its duties, the decision of that tribunal, within the scope of its authority, is conclusive upon all others.” Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 20 L. Ed. 485.

[3] Until a patent to public lands has been issued by the constituted authority, the legal title to the land remains in the government, and the Land Department is invested with the jurisdiction and power to hear and determine conflicting claims to the same. Its adjudication, upon conflicting facts, is not subject to review by the courts.

Section 2372, R. S. U. S. (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 4780), authorizes the amendment of an entry of public lands, either before or after the issuance of patent, where certain prescribed conditions exist, but such amendment cannot include lands theretofore sold by the United States, and public land theretofore entered by a qualified entryman would be “sold” within the meaning of the statute, and after such entry no longer subject to further disposition by the government. Such being the case, if the counterclaim had alleged that the facts therein set forth were found to exist by the Land Department, or that such facts were undisputed, it would have stated grounds for the relief sought. But it does not do this. It sets up what the appellant claims the facts to be, which, briefly summarized, were: (1) That he was a qualified entryman; (2) that he has fully complied with all the requirements of the laws, etc.; (3) that his entry was a valid and subsisting entry...