Patterson's Ex'rs v. Patterson

• Decision Date: 14 January 1926
• Citation: 131 S.E. 217
• Parties: PATTERSON'S EX'RS et al. v. PATTERSON et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

131 S.E. 217

PATTERSON'S EX'RS et al.

v.PATTERSON et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 14, 1926.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Rockingham County.

Chancery suit by C. L. Weast and another, executors of William C. Patterson, deceased, and another, against Edith Patterson and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and rendered.

Chas. A. Hammer, of Harrisonburg, for appellants.

Ward Swank, of Harrisonburg, for appellees.

WEST, J. This is a chancery suit in which O. L. Weast, G. K. Foster, executors of William C. Patterson, deceased, and Verdie P. Weast are complainants, and Edith Patterson, Jacob F. Patterson, Blanche A. Leap, Kathleen Patterson, Craig Patterson, and William C. Patterson, Jr., are defendants.

The bill alleges the death of William C. Tatterson and the probate of his last will and testament, a copy of which is filed with and made a part of the bill.

Among the other allegations contained in the bill are the following: That the complainants Verdie P. Weast, Blanche A. Leap, Jacob F. Patterson, and Floyd A. Patterson are allof the children of the testator, and are named as beneficiaries in his will; that Floyd A. Patterson departed this life since the death of the testator, leaving surviving him his widow, Edith Patterson, and his three children, Kathleen, Craig, and William C. Patterson, Jr., who are infants under the age of 14 years; that the lots of land in controversy, located in the town of Grottoes, were disposed of by the eighth paragraph of the testator's will, by which they were devised to Floyd A. Patterson and Verdie P. Weast, in equal shares; that the executors, being of the opinion that they had the power, under the will, to sell these lots, sold them at public auction to the highest bidders, at which sale Verdie P. Weast purchased 7 lots, J. S. Pirkey 2 lots and J. E. Eutsler 2 lots; that the executors executed deeds to the purchasers, and placed them in possession of the lots; that the purchasers have made valuable improvements upon the lots; that the proceeds of the sales, with the knowledge and consent of Floyd A. Patterson and Verdie P. Weast, who were present at the sale, went into the hands of the executors, and by them were distributed as a part of the testator's estate, Floyd A. Patterson receiving his portion of the fund; that the executors made final settlement before the commissioner of accounts; in which they accounted for the proceeds of the sale of lots sold by them, and showed payment of the fund to Floyd A. Patterson and Verdie P. Weast; that Floyd A. Patterson thereafter died intestate, leaving surviving him his widow and three infant children above mentioned; that Floyd A. Patterson having seen the purchasers buy the lots and seen them in possession, and having received his portion of the purchase money, was bound to carry such sales into effect, and, he having died intestate, his heirs at law, upon whom the title to the lots descended, are estopped from questioning the title of the purchasers, and will be required to carry out said purchases.

The prayer of the bill is that the will of William C. Patterson be construed, and that the sales made by the executors be ratified, approved, and confirmed, and that a commissioner be appointed to convey the interests of the infant defendants in the lands to those entitled thereto, by deeds in which Edith Patterson may unite, and that the titles of the vendees to the lots sold them may be declared firm and stable, and for general relief.

Jacob F. Patterson and Blanche A. Leap filed answers, saying they had no interest in the lots sold, and therefore had no objection to the confirmation of the sales to the purchasers. The purchasers, who were also parties, filed answers, saying they had put valuable improvements on the lots purchased by. them in good faith, and, as Floyd Patterson received his portion of the purchase price, his heirs are estopped from claiming title to the lots. Edith Patterson filed her answer, saying her husband, Floyd A. Patterson, was paid his proportion of the purchase money received from such sales, and that she does not claim dower in the lots, or any of them, and is willing to unite in any conveyance which may be necessary to make the title of the grantees of the executors and those claiming under them firm and stable. The infant defendants, Kathleen Patterson, Craig Patterson, and William C. Patterson, Jr., filed their answer and cross-bill, by Ward Swank, their guardian ad litem, in which they deny that the executors were authorized by the will to sell or convey any of the real estate of which William C. Patterson died seized, and aver that the acts of the executors in attempting to make such sales and conveyances are void and did not divest the respondents of their interests in said real estate. They say they are all infants under the age of 5 years, and have been guilty of no acts or conduct respecting the real estate in question which would now estop them from asserting their legal right to their interests therein. They aver that the rule of "caveat emptor" applies to sales of real estate by executors, and that it was incumbent upon the purchasers to ascertain from the will, which was of record, what power the executors had to make such sales. They further aver that they are entitled, as the heirs of their father, to an undivided one-half interest in all of the said real estate; that the improvements were placed thereon since the death of their father, without their knowledge or consent, and that they are entitled to said real estate in its present condition, without allowance to any one for any improvements placed thereon. They pray that a proper decree may be entered establishing their ownership of a one-half undivided interest in said real estate and quieting their title thereto.

The case was heard upon the foregoing pleadings and the depositions of witnesses taken in behalf of the complainants, and the decree now under review was entered dismissing the complainants' bill.

The question for our determination is, Can the complainants maintain their bill, and are they entitled to the relief prayed for?

The complainants' bill and the cross-bill of the infant defendants are, in effect, bills quia timet, and the jurisdiction of equity to declare and establish such rights, whether heretofore properly exercised by courts of equity or not, is clearly conferred upon them by the Declaratory Judgment Act, approved March 28, 1922 (Acts 1922, p. 902). Section 1 of the act provides, in part, as follows:

"In cases of actual controversy, courts of record within the scope of their respective jurisdictions shall have power to make binding adjudications of right, whether or not consequential relief is, or at the time could be, claimed and no action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a judgment or ordermerely declaratory of right is prayed for. Controversies involving the interpretation of deeds, wills, [and] other instruments in writing * * * may be so determined, and this enumeration does not exclude other instances of actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right." (Italics ours.)

Section 5, cl. 4, refers in terms to suits or actions, "to declare a right to, in or with reference to land or other real estate. * * * "

Section 8 says the act is remedial, and that "its purpose is to afford relief from the uncertainty and insecurity attendant upon controversies over legal rights, without requiring one of the parties interested so to invade the rights asserted by the other as to entitle him to maintain an ordinary action therefor, " and that the act "is to be liberally interpreted and administered with a view to making the courts more serviceable to the people."

The words "actual controversy" and "actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right" were intended to prevent the consideration of moot questions by the court, and not to deprive the courts of jurisdiction to enter a declaratory decree where, as in the instant case, there is actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right. The bill avers that the purchasers of the lots have a right to retain them in their possession and have their titles to them confirmed, while the crossbill of the infant defendants asserts that the purchasers have no right to the lots and that these defendants' ownership of an undivided...