Patterson v. Anderson
Decision Date | 26 January 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 3970,3970 |
Citation | 194 Va. 557,74 S.E.2d 195 |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | OUNER ANDERSON PATTERSON v. ROSETTA ANDERSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF PHILIP ANDERSON, DECEASED. Record |
Anna F. Hedrick, for appellant.
J. B. Allman, B. A. Davis, III, R. G. Allman, for appellee.
This case, which was before us on a former appeal, 1 involves the questions whether the appellant, Ouner Anderson Patterson, is the legitimate daughter of Philip Anderson, deceased, is entitled to a share in his personal estate, and has inherited an interest in the real estate of which he died seized and possessed.
In January, 1947, the appellant filed her bill of complaint in the court below against Rosetta Anderson, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Philip Anderson, deceased, alleging that the appellant was born on March 18, 1902, in the District of Columbia, the daughter of Ida Gray and Philip Anderson, who had previously entered into a common-law marriage in the District; that on October 6, 1902, Philip Anderson had gone 'through a marriage ceremony with one Rosetta Richardson, now known as Rosetta Anderson, the defendant;' that Anderson had died on January 30, 1946, as the result of injuries received in an automobile collision; that shortly thereafter Rosetta Anderson had qualified in the clerk's office of the Circuit Court of Arlington county as administratrix of the decedent's estate; that unless ordered to do so by the court the administratrix would not account to the plaintiff for and deliver to her her share of decedent's estate, and would unless restrained 'endeavor to sell and convey' certain real estate which the decedent owned at the time of his death.
The prayer of the bill was that the heirs of Philip Anderson, deceased, be determined; that the defendant administratrix be required to account to the plaintiff for and deliver to her her share of decedent's personal estate; and that a decree be entered setting forth the plaintiff's interest in the decedent's real estate and quieting title thereto in her name.
Later the plaintiff filed an amended bill, repeating the allegations in the original bill and in addition thereto alleging that she was the 'legitimate daughter' of Philip Anderson and that she had been 'judicially determined' to be such 'by this Honorable Court in an action at law' wherein she was the plaintiff and Rosetta Anderson, 'individually and as administratrix of the estate of Philip Anderson, deceased,' was the defendant.Hence, she alleged, the issue of her legitimacy was res judicata between the parties to the present suit.The amended bill further alleged that the plaintiff was the decedent's 'heir' and 'owner in fee simple of the real estate' which he owned at the time of his death.The prayer of the amended bill was substantially the same as that of the original bill.
Rosetta Anderson, individually and as administratrix of the decedent's estate, filed a joint and separate answer to the original and amended bills, in which she denied the alleged common-law marriage between the decedent and Ida Gray and that the plaintiff was the legitimate daughter of the decedent and entitled to share in his estate.
While the answer admitted that an action at law had been instituted and prosecuted by the plaintiff against the defendant in the same court and had resulted in a judgment of $1.00 for the plaintiff, it denied that in that action the plaintiff'had been judicially determined to be the legitimate daughter of Philip Anderson.'The answer alleged further that the defendant, Rosetta Anderson, was lawfully married to the decedent at the time of his death and was his sole distributee and heir at law.
On motion of the plaintiff the lower court entered a decree striking out the allegations in the answer denying that the plaintiff was the 'daughter' or 'legitimate daughter' of decedent as the result of the latter's common-law marriage with Ida Gray, on the ground that these matters had been determined in the previous action at law between the parties and were res judicata.
On the former appeal we reversed that decree and remanded the cause, because, as we held, it did not appear on the face of the record then before us that 'the defendant, Rosetta Anderson, individually, was a necessary party' to the action at law and that 'her individual rights' in the amount collected and held by the administratrix 'had been actually litigated and decided.'The determination of that matter, we said, depended upon the production, proof and examination of the complete record of the prior action at law.(189 Va., at page 799, 55 S.E.2d at page 4.)
Shortly after the mandate from the appellate court was received in the clerk's office below, Rosetta Anderson filed a cross-bill against Ouner Anderson Patterson directly attacking the judgment in the action at law on the grounds, among others, that it was not a valid personal judgment against her, Rosetta Anderson, and that, in any event, it had been procured through the fraud and perjury of Ouner Anderson Patterson and witnesses testifying in her behalf.
Ouner Anderson Patterson filed an answer to the cross-bill, denying fraud in the procurement of the judgment in her favor in the prior action at law and reasserting her claim that her legitimacy had been adjudicated and established in that action.
Subsequently Rosetta Anderson filed an amended cross-bill praying that Ida Gray(then known by her married name as Ida Gray Davis) be made a party to the proceeding.Upon the service of process upon her Ida Gray Davis appeared and filed an answer stating that 'her dower in the estate of Philip Anderson' was barred by Code, § 64-35, and admitting that she claimed 'no interest, right or title' in the estate or property of decedent.Accordingly, she was dismissed as a party to the suit.
The original and cross equity suits were consolidated and the evidence taken ore tenus by the trial court.Two issues were presented: (1) Whether the complete record of the previous action at law between the parties established that Ouner Anderson Patterson was the legitimate daughter of Philip Anderson, and if so, whether the determination of her status as such was res judicata in the present equity proceeding; and (2) whether, aside from such prior adjudication, the evidence adduced showed that Ouner Anderson Patterson was in fact and in law the legitimate daughter of Philip Anderson.
Upon consideration of the evidence the lower court decided both issues adversely to the appellant, Ouner Anderson Patterson, and entered a decree adjudicating that she was not the legitimate daughter of Philip Anderson, that she had no interest in the property of which he died seized and possessed, and dismissing her bill.From that decree the present appeal has been taken.
We shall deal first with the contention of the appellant that the evidence adduced before the trial court in the consolidated equity suits established the fact that she was the legitimate child of Philip Anderson, being the daughter of a valid common-law marriage in the District of Columbia between him and Ida Gray.
The appellant produced a birth certificate filed in the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the District of Columbia, showing that on March 18, 1902, Ida Gray gave birth to a daughter in the District, and that Philip Anderson was the father of the child.This certificate, as filed in the Bureau on March 21, 1902, did not give the name of the child.In a supplement added to the certificate on December 9, 1946, the name of the child was stated to be Ouner Anderson.More will be said of this later.
There is evidence that during her childhood, and even later, Ouner was generally known and acknowledged by Anderson as his child and that he showed affection for her down to the time of his death.There is also evidence that in 1902 common-law marriages were valid in the District of Columbia.But when we come to examine the evidence as to whether Philip Anderson and Ida Gray entered into a common-law marriage prior to the birth of their daughter we see that it is far from convincing.
Ida Gray Davis testified that at the time the child was born and shortly prior thereto she was living with her cousin at 1800 T street in Washington.She did not claim that Anderson lived at the same address, but on the contrary, admitted that he was living with his mother and sister in what is now Arlington county, Virginia, where he maintained his home.Her relation with Anderson is thus detailed on her direct examination:
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Ida Gray Davis made no claim that she had ever assumed Anderson's name.She admitted that she knew that Anderson had married Rosetta Richardson in October, 1902, scarcely six...
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