Patterson v. Collier

• Decision Date: 25 May 1897
• Citation: 113 Mich. 12,71 N.W. 327
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PATTERSON ET AL. v. COLLIER ET AL.

71 N.W. 327

113 Mich. 12

PATTERSON ET AL. v. COLLIER ET AL.

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 25, 1897

Error to circuit court, Oakland county; Joseph B. Moore, Judge.

Action by John W. Patterson and another against Charles F. Collier and others on a note. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed.

Aug. C Baldwin and Edward J. Bissell, for appellants.

John H Patterson, Charles F. Collier, and Clarence Tinker, for appellees.

HOOKER J.

The defendants were stockholders in a corporation known as the Holly Vinegar Works; defendant Pomeroy being president, and defendant Wilson being secretary, of the concern. In June, 1884, this corporation needed some money and a conference was had by these defendants with one Seeley who refused to loan it upon the credit of the company, but consented to furnish it upon the paper of the stockholders and on June 21st these defendants made their joint note, payable to Daniel Seeley or bearer, for $1,000, payable in one year, with interest at 8 per cent., and obtained $1,000, which was paid over to the vinegar works. Two or three payments were made upon this note by the Holly Vinegar Works; one of them being made by or through defendant Pomeroy, against whom the plaintiffs were allowed to recover. It is perhaps inferable that these payments were made with the knowledge of the defendants, and that it was the arrangement, made when the money was borrowed, that the company should pay the note. The defense interposed is the statute of limitations, and the only question is whether the case is taken out of the statute by these payments. Counsel for the plaintiff contend that the Holly Vinegar Works was made the agent of the defendants to pay this note, and, therefore, that the payments were made on their behalf and by their consent. On the other hand, the defendants insist that the payments were not made for them, or upon their behalf, or by the use of their funds. It is manifest that all parties knew that this was accommodation paper, and that payments made by the vinegar company were made on its own behalf, upon an obligation that it was morally bound to pay, and that the defendants wished and expected it to pay. There is nothing in this that ought to be construed into authority to pledge the defendants' credit. If the case is taken out of the statute by such payment, it is by reason of a technical application of the doctrine of agency. Had the vinegar...