Patterson v. Dempsey

• Decision Date: 25 February 1965
• Citation: 207 A.2d 739,152 Conn. 431
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: J. Tyler PATTERSON v. John DEMPSEY, Governor, et al. STATE ex rel. J. Tyler PATTERSON v. Raymond S. THATCHER, Comptroller, et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 739

207 A.2d 739

152 Conn. 431

J. Tyler PATTERSON v. John DEMPSEY, Governor, et al.

STATE ex rel. J. Tyler PATTERSON v. Raymond S. THATCHER, Comptroller, et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 25, 1965.

John J. Bracken, Hartford, with whom were Leonard G. Tracy, Hartford, George A. Saden, Bridgeport, and, on the brief, Morton C. Hansen, Jr., Simsbury, for appellant (plaintiff)

[152 Conn. 434] Louis Weinstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom was Harold M. Mulvey, Atty. Gen., for appellees (defendants).

Before KING, C. J., and MURPHY, ALCORN, COMLEY and SHANNON, JJ.

KING, Chief Justice.

These two cases were tried together on stipulated facts, and in each a separate judgment for the defendants was rendered. Pursuant to a further stipulation, both appeals were consolidated and a single record covering both cases was printed. The first case, hereinafter called the Patterson case, is an action for a declaratory judgment and ancillary injunctive relief. The second case is a mandamus action and will hereinafter be referred to as such. The governor, the comptroller and the secretary of the state are the defendants in the Patterson case, and the comptroller and the secretary of the state are the defendants in the mandamus action.

I

The first important question raised in each case is the power of the governor to disapprove specific sections of a statute while approving the balance of that statute, or, in other words, the governor's right of partial veto.

The 1963 General Assembly enacted Special Act No. 386, entitled 'An Act Making Appropriations for the Expenses of the State for the Fiscal Period Ending June 30, 1965.' 31 Spec. Acts, pp. 395-451. The act contained itemized appropriations for the operation of all major divisions of the state government during the fiscal biennium from July 1, 1963, through June 30, 1965.

The special act was duly presented to the governor, and on June 28, 1963, he disapproved or vetoed §§ 7, 10, 11 and 12, ¹ and approved the remainder of the act. We take judicial notice of the fact that the regular session of the 1963 General Assembly adjourned on Wednesday, June 5, 1963. Thus, no effort was made to reconsider the disapproved sections and pass them over the executive veto. Sections 7, 10 and 11 are set out in footnotes ^{2, 3} and ⁴, respectively, and the voto message of the governor is set out in footnote. ⁵ Article fourth of the constitution of Connecticut treats of the executive department, and § 14 of that article contains the provisions conferring on the governor the power to disapprove or veto any bill which has been passed by both houses of the General Assembly and has been properly presented to him. This section of the constitution, of course, confers no power to disapprove or veto any bill, whether or not an appropriation bill, except as an entirety. Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410, 413, 57 S.Ct. 252, 81 L.Ed. 312; 42 Am.Jur., Public Funds, § 51, p. 753; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 107, p. 108.

What is now § 15 of article fourth was, in November, 1924, adopted as article XXXVII of the constitution of Connecticut. General Statutes, Rev.1930, p. 47. Section 15, the construction and application of which is crucial in each of these cases, reads as follows: 'Sec. 15. The governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any bill making appropriations of money embracing distinct items while at the same time approving the remainder of the bill, and the part or parts of the bill so approved shall become effective and the item or items of appropriations so disapproved shall not take effect unless the same are separately reconsidered and repassed in accordance with the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of bills over the executive veto. In all cases in which the governor shall exercise the right of disapproval hereby conferred he shall append to the bill at the time of signing it a statement of the item or items disapproved, together with his reasons for such disapproval, and transmit the bill and such appended statement to the secretary. If the general assembly be then in session he shall forthwith cause a copy of such statement to be delivered to the house in which the bill originated for reconsideration of the disapproved items in conformity with the rules prescribed for legislative action in respect to bills which have received executive disapproval.'

The governor's power of partial veto is only that conferred by the provisions of § 15 of article fourth of the constitution. Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, supra. In other words, if the action of the governor in disapproving §§ 7, 10 and 11 of the special act was legal, it could be so only because that action was authorized by § 15 of article fourth of the constitution.

When we turn to the special act it is obvious that it a 'bill making appropriations of money embracing distinct items' within the language of § 15 of article fourth. It is also clear that the portions of the bill vetoed by the governor are not sections which contain appropriations of money either in distinct items or in any other way. Woodward v. Reynolds, 58 Conn. 486, 490, 19 A. 511. 'An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation The defendants claim that since the inclusion in the special act of the three sections vetoed was in violation of the provisions of General Statutes § 2-35, it rendered the sections void. Although the special act was clearly an appropriation bill, § 2-35 could not effectively prevent the General Assembly from including §§ 7, 10 and 11 in the special act. '[O]ne Legislature cannot control the exercise of the powers of a succeeding Legislature.' Preveslin v. Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 140, 151 A. 518, 522, 70 A.L.R. 1426; State v. Staub, 61 Conn. 553, 564, 23 A. 924. To the extent that the General Assembly failed to conform to the provisions of § 2-35, those provisions were rendered ineffective. It was not, strictly speaking, a case of an implied repeal of § 2-35, at least in the ordinary meaning of the term, since the subject matter of the three sections in question was neither inconsistent with nor repugnant to that of § 2-35. Rather, it was the action of the General Assembly, in inserting the three sections in the special act, which was inconsistent with and repugnant to § 2-35. That action was the equivalent of an affirmative enactment suspending, to the extent that the action violated § 2-35, the prohibitory part of § 2-35. State v. Staub, supra, 566, 23 A. 924. The effect is really that of repeal by implication. 'When expressions of the legislative will are irreconcilable, the latest prevails.' Moran v. Bens, 144 Conn. 27, 30, 127 A.2d 42, 44. To hold otherwise would be to hold that one General Assembly could effectively control the enactment of legislation by a subsequent General Assembly. This obviously is not true, except where vested rights, protected by the constitution, have accrued under the earlier act.

of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.' Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, supra, 299 U.S. 414, 57 S.Ct. 254. 'An item in an appropriation bill is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose.' Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 296, 11 S.E.2d 120, 127. Clearly, the vetoed sections constitute items of general legislation. Since obviously the bill is basically an appropriation bill, the three sections in question had no proper place in the bill, and their insertion was in violation of the provisions of § 2-35 of the General Statutes, the last two sentences of which read as follows: 'Each appropriation bill shall specify the particular purpose for which appropriation is made and shall be itemized as far as practicable. No general legislation shall be made a part of such appropriation bill.'

We now come to the question whether, under the provisions of § 15 of article fourth of the constitution, the governor was empowered to disapprove, that is, to veto, the three sections in question which were not items of appropriation.

The power of partial veto conferred on the governor by § 15 of article fourth can be exercised only with respect to 'any bill making appropriations of money embracing distinct items.' The special act did constitute such a bill since it clearly made, in most of the sections other than the three in question, 'appropriations of money embracing distinct items.' This is true even though, contrary to the provisions of General Statutes § 2-35, it also contained 'general legislation', at least in the three sections vetoed.

Section 15 of article fourth further limits the partial veto power conferred on the governor to disapproval of 'any item or items' of such a bill and further provides that the 'item or items of appropriations so disapproved shall not take effect unless the same are separately reconsidered and repassed in accordance with the rules and limitations prescribed [under § 14 of article fourth] for the passage of bills over the executive veto.'

The defendants' basic claim is that the words 'item or items' of the bill mean 'part or parts' of the bill, whether those parts do or do not constitute appropriations. In other words, they claim that This construction of the words 'item or items' as meaning the same as 'part or parts' is not a permissible one for several reasons. In the first place, like any other enactment, § 15 of article fourth must be construed as an entirety, giving effect, if possible, to each sentence, clause or phrase in such a manner that none is treated as insignificant and unnecessary. State v. Springer, 149 Conn. 244, 248, 178 A.2d 525; McAdams v. Barbieri, 143 Conn. 405, 419, 123 A.2d 182. The construction claimed by the defendants gives no effect to the phrase 'item or items of appropriations so disapproved' which refers back to the earlier words 'item or items.'

'item or...