Patterson v. Farmington St. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 April 1904
• Citation: 76 Conn. 628,57 A. 853
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: PATTERSON v. FARMINGTON ST. RY. CO. et al.

57 A. 853

76 Conn. 628

PATTERSON

v. FARMINGTON ST. RY. CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 15, 1904.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfieid County.

Action in equity by James T. Patterson against the Farmington Street Railway Company and others. From a judgment abating the action as to a nonresident defendant, and from a further judgment sustaining demurrers to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The foundation of this action is an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant Coykendall and others, June 2, 1898. The other parties to the agreement assign their interest to Coykendall, and, for the purposes of this case, he and the plaintiff may James W. Friend and Harry T. Friend, discharged from any trust." Porter C. Friend appealed from the decree of the register of wills admitting his mother's will to probate, and petitioned the orphans' court of Allegheny county for an issue devisavit vel non, on the ground that his brother James W. had procured the execution of it by undue influence. This petition was dismissed by that court, and on appeal to us its decree was affirmed. Friend's Estate, 198 Pa. 363, 47 Atl. 1106. The appellants thereupon insisted that their brother, in view of the clause referred to in their mother's will, was not entitled to what she had left him, and now ask that the $20,000, with the accrued interest, be awarded to them. Their contention was not sustained by the court below, which, in an opinion by its learned president judge, held that, as Porter C, the son, had probable cause for instituting the proceedings to contest the will, he had not forfeited the interest which his mother gave him in her estate.

It is not to be questioned that it was competent for the testatrix, possessing the absolute power to dispose of what she possessed just as she pleased, to impose the condition upon which the appellants rely in asking that their brother shall be deprived of all interest in her estate; and it is equally clear, in view of his attempt to annul her will, that the burden is upon him to show that he now ought to have what it gives him. Such conditions to testamentary gifts and devises are universally recognized as valid, and, by some courts, enforceable without exception. The better rule, however, seems to us to be that the penalty of forfeiture of the gift or devise ought not to be imposed when it clearly appears that the contest to have the will set aside was justified under the circumstances, and was not the mere vexatious act of a disappointed child or next of kin. A different rule—an unbending one—that in no case shall an unsuccessful contestant of a will escape the penalty of forfeiture of the interest given him, would sometimes not only work manifest injustice, but accomplish results that no rational testator would ever contemplate. This is manifest from a moment's reflection, and is illustrated by the class of cases to which the one now before us belongs, in which there is an allegation of undue influence which procured the execution of the will. If, as a matter of fact, undue influence is successfully exerted over one about to execute a will, that same influence will have written into it a clause which will make sure its disposition of the alleged testator's property. He who will take advantage of his power to unduly influence another in the execution of a will will artfully have a care to have inserted in it a clause to shut off all inquiry as to the influence which really made the will; and, if the rule invoked by the appellants is to be applied with no case excepted from it, those who unscrupulously play upon the feelings of the testator may, with impunity, enjoy the fruits of their iniquity, and laugh in scorn at those whom they have wronged. If the condition of forfeiture is to be enforced in every case, those who improperly influence a testator may boast to a child against whom he discriminated of the power they exerted over him, and of what they were able to accomplish for themselves, taunting and goading on such child to a contest; and yet if, in the end, those who so invited it, and whose conduct made it justifiable, succeed in sustaining the will by retracting or denying what they said, the contestant will not only be deprived of his gift or devise, but those who drew him into the contest may acquire his portion as part of their own plunder. Would any rational testator ever contemplate such a result from a forfeiting clause in his will? Again, in illustration, a will may be admitted to probate to which there are no subscribing witnesses. Two or more of those familiar with the handwriting of the alleged testator may testify before the register that the signature attached is genuine. Subsequently information is brought to some one interested in the estate that would justify any reasonable person in believing that it was a forgery. In perfect good faith, and apparently fully justified by reliable information, a contestant of the will presents and makes out a clear prima facie case. The proponents then succeed in showing, not that the contest was not justified, but that the contestant had been deceived and imposed upon, either intentionally or otherwise, and the will is sustained. Should forfeiture be the penalty in such a case? No testator, if he could speak from his grave, would declare such to have been his intention when he wrote his will and tried to protect it from assault. What may fairly be regarded as the absurdity of holding that there can be no exception to the rule finds illustration in the case of Cooke v. Turner, 15 Meeson & Welsby, 727. Turner, a lunatic, having been so duly found by inquisition, made a will devising real estate to his daughter, upon the condition that, if she contested it, or questioned his competency to make it, or refused, on request by the executor, to ratify and confirm it, she should forfeit the interest given her. She subsequently disputed the will on the ground of his incompetency to dispose of his property, and Rolfe, Baron, held the condition valid in law, and so certified to the Lord Chancellor. The Court of Chancery subsequently awarded an issue devisavit vel non under an order that saved the daughter's interest from forfeiture. Cooke v. Turner, 15 Simons, 611. Illustrations need not be multiplied to demonstrate the correctness of the rule observed by the court below that such conditions as are found in the sixth clause of the will of the testatrix are inoperative if there was probable cause of litigation, even where there is a gift over upon breach of the condition that the will shall not be contested. Coykendall all that is due him under said option agreement, and, if said stock has taken the place of said bonds, the plaintiff is also entitled to said stock; that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; that no issue of certificates of stock has been made, and the plaintiff fears that Coykendall, Soop, and Greeley are intending to transfer said stock so as to prevent his obtaining his due portion thereof, and that the Farmington Street Railway Company will allow such transfer to be made on its books.

The complaint asks, by way of equitable relief, a decree ordering the delivery to the plaintiff of 135 of said bonds, or the transfer to him of 810 shares of said stock, an injunction restraining said Coykendall, Soop, and Greeley from transferring their stock so as to deprive him of his rights, and an injunction restraining the Farmington Street Railway Company from allowing such transfer to be made on its books, and such other and further relief as is due in the premises.

The defendant Coykendall filed a plea to the jurisdiction, and the court adjudged that the action abate as to him. He did not otherwise appear. Soop did not appear.

The defendants Greeley and the Farmington Street Railway Company each filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the court sustained, and rendered judgment in favor of the demurring defendants.

The appeal assigns error in the rendition of the judgment on the plea to the jurisdiction, in the rendition of the judgment on the demurrers, and in disallowing an amendment to the complaint.

Charles E. Perkins and Howard H. Knapp, for appellant.

Edward D. Robbins, for appellees.

HAMERSLEY, J. (after stating the facts). The claims of the plaintiff are based on two transactions, and assume a sort of common-law marriage between the two, whereby the property rights incident to the first are transferred to or merged in the second. A reliance upon this assumption, without stating facts which justify it, accounts for the vagueness and uncertainties of the complaint, and constitutes its radical defect.

The first transaction centers in the option contract of June 2, 1898, between the plaintiff and the defendant Coykendall. Upon the allegations relating to this transaction, the plaintiff claims that on June 1, 1900, there was a completed contract of sale between Coykendall and himself, which Coykendall has refused to execute, and the plaintiff seeks under this complaint a specific performance by Coykendall of that contract of sale, namely, the delivery to him by Coykendall, in exchange for their purchase price, of 135 of the 315 bonds issued by the Hartford & West Hartford Horse Railroad Company (hereinafter called the West Hartford Company). The other centers in a sale of all the property and franchises of the West Hartford Company under an order of court in an action brought to foreclose the mortgage given by said company to secure the payment of its bonds, which sale took place August 1, 1899; in the purchase at that sale of the mortgage property by the defendants Coykendall, Soop, and Greeley; the subsequent organization of the defendant the Farmington Street Railway Company; and the acquirement through subscription of all its capital stock by Coykendall, Soop, and Greeley, each acquiring one-third thereof—630 shares. The plaintiff claims that the allegations of the...