Patterson v. Hampton, 8346.
| Decision Date | 06 January 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 8346.,8346. |
| Citation | 355 F.2d 470 |
| Parties | Wayne K. PATTERSON, Warden, Appellant, v. Charles Ansel HAMPTON, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
James W. Creamer, Jr., Denver, Colo., for appellant.
Larry G. Cassil, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and BREITENSTEIN and SETH, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a judgment after full hearing in a habeas corpus proceedings in which the trial court held that the appellee had been deprived of his constitutional right to a sanity hearing touching his mental capacity to enter a guilty plea to a state charge of assault with intent to commit rape. The case was accordingly continued to permit the state to afford the petitioner a hearing within sixty days. Upon failure to do so, the matter was to be reconsidered. The threshold question is whether petitioner had exhausted his state remedies under Rule 35(b), Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we have construed to be "substantially similar" to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Henry v. Tinsley, 10 Cir., 344 F.2d 109.
We are convinced that the Colorado rule is adequate, effective and available to test the question presented here; that petitioner did not avail himself of it and that the case must, therefore, be reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss without prejudice. See Case v. State of Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422.
The relevant facts are that upon the filing of the state charge of assault with intent to commit rape (Rev.Colo.Stat. 40-2-34) the accused was referred to the Colorado Psychiatric Hospital for examination and report touching his mental capacity. The report, apparently made available to the state and to the sentencing court, stated in effect that the accused knew right from wrong but was unable to control his sex behavior, making him dangerous to himself, his family and society, and that he would receive maximum benefit in an institutional setting.
When he appeared before the court on arraignment, represented by counsel, the court advised him that upon a plea of guilty he could be sentenced to imprisonment at the penitentiary for a term of years, to the reformatory for an indefinite term or to a state hospital or other institution for a period of one day to life under the Sex Offender Act of 1953, Rev.Colo.Stat. 39-19-1. A plea of guilty was entered through counsel, and the accused was again referred to the Colorado Psychiatric Hospital for a full and complete report prior to sentencing.
When he appeared for sentencing represented by counsel, the further psychiatric report from the state hospital reiterated the opinion No issue of mental capacity to enter the plea was formally raised, and the sentencing court thereupon accepted the plea of guilty without conducting a formal hearing concerning the accused's mental capacity to enter the plea. The court did specifically find in the language of the Sex Offender Statute that the accused "* * * if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public * * * and is unquestionably ill". The court then proceeded to impose an indeterminate sentence of one day to life as provided by the Act. The accused was duly committed to the Colorado State Hospital, an institution apparently designated as suitable for sex offenders.
Several years later petitioner was transferred to the state penitentiary upon an executive order finding that he was a potential escapee and dangerous to be at large. He was classified as an inmate of the penitentiary. Sometime later appellee petitioned the state trial court for "discharge after restoration". He alleged he had been committed to the state hospital on a finding of "not guilty by reason of insanity" and that he had been transferred to the penitentiary and treated as a convict; that he had been restored to reason and should, therefore, be discharged from confinement. The motion was denied on the grounds that he had not been committed as an insane person and the provision of the law relating to discharge upon restoration to reason had no application.
Soon thereafter appellee again moved for relief under Rule 35(b), Colo.R.Crim. P. contending that the sentencing court was without jurisdiction to impose a sentence under the Sex Offender Act. The motion was denied on the grounds that "* * * the defendant was lawfully sentenced." Appellee did not seek review of the court's order by writ of error as provided by Rules 37 and 39, Colo.R.Crim.P., but filed this petition in the District Court of Colorado for a writ of habeas corpus.
The handwritten petition raised several issues which prompted the trial court to...
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Jones v. District Court In and For Twenty-first Judicial Dist.
...of the sentence. E. g., Hampton v. Tinsley, 240 F.Supp. 213 (D.Colo. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Patterson v. Tinsley, 355 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1966); Garrison v. People, 151 Colo. 388, 378 P.2d 401 (1963). Oftentimes, pre-trial motions bear as significantly on the ultimate outco......
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Cappelli v. Demlow
...critical criminal procedures. See Hampton v. Tinsley, 240 F.Supp. 213 (D.Colo.1965), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Patterson v. Hampton, 355 F.2d 470 (10th Cir.1966). And, as noted above, the use of a lower threshold "reason to believe" standard furthers that interest. These differences ......
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