Patterson v. Harris
| Decision Date | 20 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-3339 (RDM) |
| Parties | BRENDA A. PATTERSON, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT S. HARRIS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Brenda A. Patterson, proceeding pro se, filed this action on December 17, 2021, against the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the President of the United States, the Attorney General of the United States, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, the governor of Florida, several Florida state employees, Miami-Dade County and its mayor, and the Chief Judge and Clerk of this Court. Dkt. 1 (Compl.); Dkt. 6 (Am. Compl.). Although the relationship between these various parties is not obvious, Plaintiff's claims arise from the arrest and incarceration of her son, Dimitri Patterson, and subsequent efforts by Plaintiff to petition the Department of Justice, the Supreme Court, and this Court on her son's behalf. Dkt. 6 (Am. Compl.). She seeks a judgment of $400 million in actual damages; “injunctive relief ordering the DOJ to investigate and intervene on behalf of the Plaintiff;” and a permanent injunction “enjoining and restraining the . . . Clerk [of the Supreme Court] from refusing to file and Docket the Petition.” Id. at 69 .
Now before the Court are motions to dismiss by Miami-Dade County and its mayor, Dkt. 17; the Florida government officials and state agency (“the Florida defendants”), Dkt. 12; and the Department of Justice, federal government employees, and federal judicial defendants (“the Federal Defendants”), Dkt. 37. For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT Defendants' motions to dismiss.
Each of Plaintiff's claims arise from the arrest, detention, and prosecution of her son, Dimitri Patterson, and her efforts to file civil-rights complaints, lawsuits, and petitions on his behalf. According to Plaintiff's amended complaint (hereinafter, “complaint”), Dimitri Patterson was first arrested in May 2018 by several United States Marshals and Orange County police officers, allegedly “absent probable cause and a certified warrant.” Dkt. 6 at 4 . Plaintiff alleges that her son “has never been charged with a crime by the State of Florida” but that he was held following his initial arrest at the Orange County jail and a correctional facility in Miami, Florida. Id. at 5 . She further alleges that her son was again arrested by Orange County police officers in October 2018, id. at 5 , after which he was detained in a series of facilities, including the Orange County jail, the Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center (TGK), the South Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center, and a Miami-Dade County detention center, where he is “currently being unlawfully detained.” Id. at 5 . Plaintiff alleges that Florida state Judge Alberto Milian, Miami-Dade County, criminal defense attorney Jean-Michel D'Escoubet, and the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel are “currently engaging in a criminal conspiracy . . . against [Mr. Patterson], by purporting to preside over” and take part in a “fake [c]ase” against him. Id. at 13 .
Plaintiff has filed a series of complaints and petitions with the Department of Justice, the United States Supreme Court, and this Court relating to her son's prosecution and detention in Florida. Those filings began with a November 2017 civil-rights complaint that she submitted to the Department of Justice, which allegedly detailed “conspiracies to deprive [Mr. Patterson] of his constitutional rights by Miami-Dade County and its Officers.” Id. at 3 . According to the complaint, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice responded to Plaintiff's complaint in June 2018, expressing the Division's position that her “complaint does not involve prosecutable violations of federal criminal civil rights statutes” and that “this is not the type of case that [the] office prosecutes.” Id. at 4 . Plaintiff allegedly filed a second civil-rights complaint with the Department of Justice in June 2021, this time via the “DOJ Online Portal.” Id. at 5 . The DOJ allegedly failed to respond to that second complaint, aside from suggesting in November 2021 that she “may want to contact the FBI” and that “the DOJ does not have the resources to follow-up on or reply to every letter.” Id. at 5-6 .
Beyond her complaints to the Department of Justice, Plaintiff alleges that she has filed several petitions with the Supreme Court of the United States on her son's behalf. Id. at 6-8 . Plaintiff also allegedly sent President Trump a letter in September 2019, detailing “the deliberate indifference by the DOJ, obstruction by the SCOTUS Clerk, and Officers of the State of Florida conspiring to deprive [Mr. Patterson] of his civil rights,” id. at 8 , and she allegedly sent a similar letter to President Biden in April 2021, id. at 10 .
Plaintiff and her son have filed actions similar to this one in two other federal district courts, both of which have dismissed their claims. See Patterson v. Orlando-Orange Cnty., No. 18-cv-950, 2018 WL 6249790 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2018); Omnibus Order, Patterson v. Orange Cnty., No. 19-cv-21960 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 2020), ECF No. 111. Plaintiff has also filed two related lawsuits in this Court, see Amended Complaint, Patterson v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., No. 21-cv-1427, 2021 WL 6196991 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2021), ECF No. 3; Complaint, Patterson v. Harris, No. 22-cv-697, 2022 WL 16758554 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2022), ECF No. 1, one of which she contends was stalled by the Clerk of this Court's failure to docket her petitions for default judgment, see Dkt. 6 at 18-19 . In considering those cases, this Court has ruled on many of the same questions it addresses today. See Patterson, No. 21-cv-1427, 2021 WL 6196991; Patterson, No. 22-cv-697, 2022 WL 16758554.
Because “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)), they have “an affirmative obligation to consider whether the constitutional and statutory authority exist for [them] to hear each dispute” brought before them, James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scies., 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). If the “court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
“[D]efect[s] of standing” constitute “defect[s] in subject matter jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The “plaintiff bears the burden of . . . establishing the elements of standing,” and each element “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.'” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Accordingly, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim [of standing] that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of [standing], supported by mere conclusory statements, [will] not suffice,” id. () (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678), and the Court need not “assume the truth of legal conclusions” nor must it “accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint,” id. (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over each defendant. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To do so, the plaintiff must “make a prima facie showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts,” First Chi. Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988), meaning that the plaintiff must “allege specific acts connecting [each] defendant with the forum,” Clay v. Blue Hackle N. Am., LLC, 907 F.Supp.2d 85, 87 (D.D.C. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). “Mere conclusions or ‘bare allegation[s]'” of jurisdiction are insufficient. Fawzi v. Al Jazeera Media Network, 273 F.Supp.3d 182, 186 (D.D.C. 2017) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
“When deciding personal jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing-as here-the ‘court must resolve factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff.'” Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). That does not require the Court to “accept inferences drawn by [a] plaintiff[] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts,” however. Id. (quoting same). Ultimately, the Court must “satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to hear the suit,” and “may look beyond the allegations of the complaint” to do so. Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 170 F.Supp.3d 164, 173 (D.D.C. 2016).
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