Patterson v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 30 September 1878
• Citation: 90 Ill. 174,1878 WL 10129,32 Am.Rep. 22
• Parties: MELVINA PATTERSONv.RICHARD A. LAWRENCE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

90 Ill. 174

1878 WL 10129 (Ill.)

32 Am.Rep. 22

MELVINA PATTERSON

v.RICHARD A. LAWRENCE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1878.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Knox county; the Hon. ARTHUR A. SMITH, Judge, presiding.

Mr. F. S. MURPHY, for the plaintiff in error.

Messrs. WILLIAMS, MCKENZIE & CALKINS, for the defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

In the month of August, 1867, Melvina Brazee was married to one Robert Patterson. On the second day of the following September she obtained a conveyance of lot 9, in block 45, of the original plat of the city of Galesburg. The conveyance was to her by the name of Melvina Brazee, which was her name by a former husband, from whom she was divorced. On the same day she executed, by the same name, a deed of trust to O. F. Price, for the use of N. Brisco, on this lot, to secure the payment of $600, which sum she paid for the lot. On the 8th of September, 1868, she went to one McChesney, an insurance and loan agent, to procure a loan of money, introducing herself as Mrs. Brazee, saying her property was advertised for sale under the trust deed, and she would lose it unless she could procure $600. McChesney stated the facts to R. A. Lawrence. Lawrence offered to loan the money to her if she would secure its payment. The title was examined, and found to be in her name as Brazee, and being asked by McChesney if she was a widow, she answered she was. Being satisfied with the title and security, Lawrence loaned the money, and took two notes, of $300 each, drawing ten per cent interest, executed by her in the name of Melvina Brazee, and also a trust deed on the lot, in the same name. Failing to pay the interest at the expiration of a year, she requested the loan of $40, which Lawrence let her have, and took a note for $100 to cover the interest and this loan, securing the same by a second trust deed, executed in the same manner. Failing to make payment at the end of the second year, the property was advertised and sold under these trust deeds, and purchased by Lawrence for the amount of the debt, interest and costs, and he received a conveyance from the trustee.

It also appears, that Mrs. Patterson took a lease in the name of Brazee, and an agreement, that on the payment of $900 by the 1st of February, 1871, Lawrence would convey the premises to her. On the termination of the lease she refused to surrender possession. Thereupon, Lawrence commenced an action of forcible detainer, to recover possession, and at the trial she produced the certificate of her marriage to Patterson, which seems to have been the first information which came to Lawrence's knowledge that she was a married woman, or her name was not Brazee. That suit was dismissed, and a bill in chancery was filed, setting up the facts, charging fraud in procuring the money and in the execution of the trust deeds, and alleging that there was due $798--that the property belonged to Mrs. Patterson, and her husband had no interest therein. The bill charges, that by reason of the fraudulent concealment of her marriage, and the husband not joining in executing the trust deeds, the fee to the lot did not pass by the sale to complainant, and prays that the title be decreed to be in complainant, and for other and further relief.

An answer was filed, admitting that she executed the trust deeds in the name of Brazee because the title was so conveyed to her, and she supposed it was necessary, to convey title; sets up her coverture, and denies all fraud on her part, and the indebtedness is that of the husband, and not of the wife; denies all right to relief. A replication was filed.

On a hearing, the court below, on bill, answer, replication and proofs, found for complainant, found the amount due, and ordered that in default of its payment in thirty days the master sell the lot, on the usual notice, subject to redemption. Defendant, Melvina Patterson, brings the record to this court on error, and asks a reversal.

It is urged in affirmance, and as the court below found, that this loan was obtained by fraud. On the other side it is claimed, and set up in the answer, that plaintiff in error intended, at the time, to execute the trust deeds in such a manner as to be valid and binding--that no fraud was intended and none was perpetrated. McChesney swears positively that he asked her the question whether she was a widow, and she said she was, and that this was before the loan was made; and defendant in error testified that she always represented herself to him as a single woman. On the contrary, plaintiff in error denies that she ever made such statements to either of them. It is insisted that she is corroborated by Dr. McDowell, with whom she consulted at McChesney's office, on the day she says she obtained the money, in reference to the sickness of her husband; but they state McChesney or defendant in error was not present. This evidence, we think, strongly preponderates in favor of defendant in error. He and McChesney seem to testify fairly. On the other hand, plaintiff in error seems to have, from the beginning, acted in bad faith. She introduced herself to McChesney, and defendant in error says to his family, as Mrs. Brazee. We apprehend no one is so ignorant as not to know, in this country, that the name of the wife is, by the marriage, changed to that of the husband. She, then, must have known, when she passed herself by the name of her former husband, that she was stating what was not true,--that if believed, she was deceiving defendant in error,--and that he was relying on such statement. She could not have been so ignorant as not to have known that she was not signing her name to the notes and trust deeds. Why, if not for fraudulent purposes, did she thus give her name and so sign these papers? She says she supposed it was necessary because the deed was in that name. She should have given her true name, and it was a fraud to conceal it. If an unmarried woman, a widow, using her former name, were to so act, would not all persons say that such person was guilty of fraud? That concealing their own name and the use of the name of another, or a fictitious name, is evidence of deliberate, intentional fraud? Would any one credit the pretense that the party supposed he was acting properly? Then, why should this be distinguished from the supposed case?

We are clearly of opinion that plaintiff in error was guilty of fraud in misrepresenting her name, in using a fictitious name, and, also, in concealing her name, when she must have known that defendant in error would not have loaned the money and taken the trust deeds, without her husband joining with her in their execution, if she had given her true name and disclosed the fact that she was married.

Plaintiff in error testified, her husband told her to come from Burlington to Galesburg and do the best she could; that she transacted the business and got the loan before she returned. When she got back she told him she had transacted her business satisfactorily. Now, it is but a reasonable inference to suppose she consulted with her...