Patterson v. Lippincott

• Decision Date: 17 November 1885
• Citation: 47 N.J.L. 457,1 A. 506
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Parties: PATTERSON v. LIPPINCOTT.

1 A. 506

47 N.J.L. 457

PATTERSON

v. LIPPINCOTT.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY.

November 17, 1885.

On certiorari to the court of common pleas, Atlantic county. J. J. Crandall, for prosecutor. Slape & Stephany, for defendant.

J. J. Crandall, for the prosecutor.

Slape & Stephany, for the defendant.

SCUDDER, J. An action of debt was brought in the court for the trial of small causes by Jacob M. Patterson against Barclay Lippincott, to recover the balance, $75, claimed under a contract in writing for the sale of the exclusive right to use, manufacture, and sell the plaintiffs patent "air heating attachment," in Atlantic county, New Jersey. The writing was signed "Geo. P. Lippincott, per Barclay Lippincott," on the part of the purchaser. The statement of demand avers that by virtue of this agreement the plaintiff did, in due form, convey said patent-right to George P. Lippincott; that said George and Barclay, on request, have refused to pay said balance; and that since payment became due the plaintiff has found out and charges that said George is under the age of 21 years. He further avers that he never had any contract or negotiations with George, and that Barclay's warranty of authority to act for his minor son is broken, whereby an action has accrued to the plaintiff against the defendant. The averment that the plaintiff never had any contract or negotiations with George is not sustained by the proof, for the testimony of Joseph N. Risley, the agent who made the sale, which is the only evidence on this point that appears in the case, is that the defendant told him he was going out of business and intended to transfer it to George; requested him to see George; he did so; talked with him; he looked at the patent; was satisfied with it; and talked with his father about buying it. The deed for the patent-right in Atlantic county was drawn to George P. Lippincott. It is proved by the admission of the defendant, Barclay Lippincott, that at the time of such sale and transfer his son George was a minor. This admission is competent testimony in this suit against him. A verdict of a jury was given for the plaintiff against the defendant in the court for the trial of small causes; and on the trial of the appeal in the court of common pleas there was a judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiff. The reason for the nonsuit does not appear on the record, but the counsel have argued the cause before us on the case presented by the pleadings and proofs, the contention being here, as it was below, that the plaintiff could not aver and show the infancy of George P. Lippincott, and bring this action against Barclay Lippincott as principal in the contract, in contradiction of its express terms.

On the face of the written agreement George P. Lippincott is the principal and Barclay Lippincott the agent. The suit on the contract should therefore be against the principal named, and not against the agent, unless there be some legal cause shown to change the responsibility. The cause assigned by the plaintiff is the infancy of George at the time the agreement was made in his name by his father. The authority on which he bases his right of action is Bay v. Cook, 2 Zab. 343, which follows and quotes Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 536, to the effect that if a person undertakes to contract, as agent, for an individual or corporation, and contracts in a manner which is not legally binding upon his principal, he is personally responsible; and the agent, when sued on such contract, can exonerate himself from personal responsibility only by showing his authority to bind those for whom he has undertaken to act. Bay v. Cook was an action against an overseer who had employed a physician to attend a sick pauper without an order for relief under the provisions of the act concerning the poor. As his parol...