Patterson v. Natural Premium Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1898
• Citation: 75 N.W. 980,100 Wis. 118
• Parties: PATTERSON ET AL. v. NATURAL PREMIUM MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

100 Wis. 118

75 N.W. 980

PATTERSON ET AL.

v.NATURAL PREMIUM MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 23, 1898.

Appeal from circuit court, Dane county; R. G. Siebecker, Judge.

Action by George E. Patterson and others against the Natural Premium Mutual Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

This is an action to recover upon an insurance policy issued by the appellant July 20, 1895, upon the life of Alexander W. Patterson, and originally payable to the administrators, executors, or assigns of the insured. On the 4th of October, 1895, the policy was assigned, with the consent of the company, to the plaintiffs, who are the children of the insured. Alexander W. Patterson was 49 years of age at the time of the issuance of the policy, and was then married to his second wife, by whom he had no children; the plaintiffs being his children by a previous marriage. The first year's premium was paid upon the policy, and the insured died by his own hand February 25, 1896. Proofs of the death were duly made. There was a written application, on which the policy was issued, which contained the following warranty: “I hereby certify that I have read all the statements and answers in this application, and warrant and agree that no circumstance or information has been withheld or omitted touching my past and present state of health and habits of life, and that said statements and answers, together with this declaration, as well as those made or to be made to the company's medical examiner, are true, and shall be the basis of the contract applied for.” The policy itself contained the following provisions, among others: “This policy is absolutely incontestable from the date of its delivery and acceptance, except for nonpayment of premiums or misstatement of age; and the latter may be corrected or adjusted if the age of entry was within the limit of ages insured by this company. * * * Engaging in military or naval service in time of war or insurrection, without the written permission of the company, or death in consequence of, or in, violation of law by said insured, are risks not assumed by this company.” There was no special provision as to death by suicide. The defense was that Patterson intentionally suppressed facts, and made deliberate false statements of other facts, as to his health, in the written application, and also that he fraudulently procured the issuance of the policy, with intent to commit suicide, as a part of a scheme to defraud the defendant out of the sum of $3,000 for the benefit of his children, and that in furtherance of said scheme he deliberately shot and killed his wife, and then immediately afterwards shot and killed himself, and that his death was in consequence of, or in, violation of law. The evidence showed that the deceased, in his application represented his health as fair, but that he had some palpitation of the heart, dyspepsia, and malaria, and that he had applied for a pension on the ground of indigestion caused by exposure in the army. Upon this application the medical examiner of the company reported the health of the insured as fairly good, but that he had dyspepsia, and was a second-class risk. It appeared further that in 1890 the insured had made application for a pension on account of disability resulting from rheumatism, severe stomach and heart trouble, and throat trouble, with general debility and prostration. There was also some testimony tending to show that the deceased was in better physical condition at the time of the issuance of the policy than he was when he made application for the pension. The policy was actually written July 20, 1895; but the premium was not paid, nor the policy taken from the office by the insured, until October 1, 1895. On the 4th of October, 1895, he assigned the policy to his children, at the company's office, and then inquired as to his wife's legal rights in his property in case she survived him. The insured had no active employment, and was in financial difficulties, and shortly prior to his suicide talked with his children considerably about his business affairs, but showed no evidence of insanity. On the night of February 25, 1896, he deliberately shot and killed his wife at his home, and then called his daughter to the room, to see that she was in fact dead, after which he shot and killed himself. The expert evidence given on the trial tended strongly to show that the insured was sane when he killed himself. A verdict for the plaintiffs was directed for the face of the policy, and from judgment thereon the defendant appeals.A. R. Bushnell and R. M. La Follette, for appellant.

Jones & Stevens, for respondents.

WINSLOW, J. (after stating the facts)

There was evidence tending to show that the deceased was sane when he shot himself; hence, the verdict having been directed, it must be assumed upon this appeal that such was the fact. Starting from this basis, the argument of the defendant is, in substance: (1) That intentional self-destruction while sane is not a risk covered by a policy of life insurance, even when there is no clause in the policy specifically exempting the company from liability for such death; (2) the incontestable clause does not cover such a death, and, even if it be held to do so by its terms, such a stipulation would be void, as against public policy; (3) intentional self-destruction while sane is a crime, and hence the stipulation providing that death in violation of law is not a risk assumed by the company defeats a recovery.

Upon the first proposition, reliance is placed upon the recent decision of the supreme court of the United States in the case of Ritter v. Insurance Co. (not yet officially reported) 18 Sup. Ct. 300. In this case it was distinctly held that intentional self-destruction by the assured while sane is not a risk covered by a life insurance policy, even when the policy contains no exception as to such a death; and it was further said that such a risk could not be legally covered by a policy, because it would be against public policy to make such a contract. This was an action by the executors of the estate of the assured upon a policy payable directly to his executors, administrators, and assigns; and there was much evidence tending to show that the assured deliberately effected this, and a large amount of other life insurance, with the intention of committing suicide, and thus enriching his estate and paying his debts. Another and perhaps the only other direct adjudication to the same effect is the decision in the case of Supreme Commandery v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436. The principle upon which these decisions rest is thus well stated in the last-named case: “Death, the risk of life insurance, the event upon which the insurance money is payable, is certain of occurrence. The uncertainty of the time of its occurrence is the material element and consideration of the contract. It cannot be in the contemplation of the parties that the assured by his own criminal act shall deprive the contract of its material element,--shall vary and enlarge the risk and hasten the day of payment.” The authorities upon which these decisions are principally based consist of certain expressions of opinion contained in Hartman v. Insurance Co., 21 Pa. St. 466, Moore v. Woolsey, 4 El. & Bl. 243, and Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (N. R.) 194, in none of which cases, however, was the question directly in issue. Support for the proposition is also drawn from the well-established principle of the law of fire insurance, that, if the insured intentionally set fire to the property insured and destroy it, he cannot recover for the loss. It is certainly not to be denied that the reasoning in favor of the proposition is cogent, and were the question a new one in the law, the argument would be well nigh irresistible, especially where, as in the Ritter Case, the policy runs in favor of the estate of the insured, and the proceeds will go to the enrichment of such estate, instead of to other beneficiaries. But it is by no means a new question, and there are numerous authorities which directly hold that, where life insurance is effected for the benefit of wife or children, suicide while sane is not a defense, in the absence of a...