Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas, Inc.

Citation971 S.W.2d 439
Decision Date23 June 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-0889,97-0889
PartiesPatti PATTERSON, M.D., Interim Commissioner of Health, in her official capacity, William Reyn Archer, recently appointed Commissioner of Health, in his official capacity, and the Texas Department of Health, Appellants, v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF HOUSTON AND SOUTHEAST TEXAS, INC., Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Texas

Edward P. Watt, Daniel R. Castro, Austin, Kelly J. Shackelford, Dallas, Dedra L. Wilburn, Dan Morales, Toni Hunter, Laquita A. Hamilton, Austin, for Appellants.

Martha S. Dickie, David C. Duggins, Charles R. Burton, Austin, for Appellee.

HANKINSON, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, and HECHT, ENOCH, SPECTOR, OWEN, and BAKER, Justices, joined.

On direct appeal, the Texas Commissioner of Health asks us to reverse the judgment of the trial court declaring rider 14 to the 1997-1999 Department of Health family planning appropriation to be unconstitutional. The rider forbids the use of state funds to dispense prescription drugs to minors without parental consent. Planned Parenthood challenged rider 14 on the grounds that it conflicts with federal law and violates the unity-in-subject clause of the Texas Constitution. Because we determine that the challenge to rider 14 is not ripe, we vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction.

The State of Texas voluntarily participates in four federal programs that provide funds for family planning services: (1) Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300, which provides project grants to public and private agencies for family planning services; (2) Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, 42 U.S.C. § 701 (TANF, also known as the Welfare Reform Act), which provides grants to the states to assist needy families; (3) Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Medicaid), which provides medical care to the needy through a cooperative federal-state program; and (4) Title XX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1397, which provides block grants to the states for social services, including family planning. The funds from these four programs compose the state's family planning appropriation, identified in the General Appropriations Act as Department of Health Strategy D.1.2. See General Appropriations Act, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1452, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 5535, 5663. The federal government is the sole source of funds for all the programs except Medicaid. As a voluntary participant in the Medicaid program, the state agrees to match every nine dollars of federal funds with one dollar of state funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(5). In 1997 the legislature appropriated approximately $93 million for family planning services for each year of the coming biennium, with approximately $5.4 million per year representing the state's required matching funds for Medicaid. In 1997 the legislature also attached rider 14 to the family planning appropriation, declaring that "no state funds may be used to dispense prescription drugs to minors without parental consent." General Appropriations Act, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1452, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 5535, 5675.

As part of its family planning services, plaintiff Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas, Inc., provides prescription medication, including contraceptives and drugs for treating sexually transmitted diseases, to minors without requiring parental consent. Planned Parenthood contracts with the state to receive funds for these services under Title X, Title XX, and TANF. Planned Parenthood is also an enrolled Medicaid provider, and is reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis by the Department of Health (through an insurance program) for the family planning services it provides to Medicaid-eligible individuals. The federal regulations governing these programs have been interpreted to proscribe the imposition of a parental notification or consent requirement. See New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191, 1196 (2d Cir.1983) (invalidating federal regulation requiring parental notification of prescription contraceptives as unauthorized by Title X); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 710, 722 (D.C.Cir.1983) (explaining that federal regulations forbid state from denying Title X services to minors who lack parental consent); T___ H___ v. Jones, 425 F.Supp. 873, 878 (D.Utah 1975), aff'd in part, 425 U.S. 986 (1976) (invalidating state parental consent requirement for family planning services as conflicting with federal welfare and Medicaid requirements).

Concerned about what it perceived to be a conflict between the federal program rules' forbidding a parental consent requirement and rider 14's explicit parental consent requirement, Planned Parenthood asked defendant Texas Department of Health about the Commissioner of Health's opinion on the effect of rider 14 on family planning funds. The Department of Health and its commissioner are charged with administering and distributing funds the legislature appropriates for family planning services. The Commissioner in turn requested an opinion from the United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). A regional health administrator for DHHS replied by letter that, in his view, rider 14 "is, on its face, inconsistent with the applicable Title X family planning legislative authority and implementing regulations. Because the Title X Family Planning Program operates under total budgeting principles, if this Rider is fully implemented, the Texas Department of Health would be ineligible to receive Title X funding." The concept of "total budgeting principles" means that if a family planning program receives any money through Title X, Title X regulations apply to all of the funds in that program, "including but not limited to grant funds, grant-related income or matching funds." 42 C.F.R. 59.2 (1997).

In light of this express suggestion that Texas might lose its federal family planning funds, Planned Parenthood filed this action against the Department and its commissioner seeking a declaration that rider 14 is unconstitutional. It alleged that the rider violates the Supremacy Clause, Article 6, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution by imposing a parental consent requirement in conflict with federal law, and violates the unity-in-subject clause, article III, section 35, of the Texas Constitution by amending or repealing certain provisions of the general law in an appropriations act.

At trial before the court, the parties stipulated to a number of facts, including that "[e]ffective September 1, 1997, Planned Parenthood will no longer be eligible to receive Medicaid funds for providing prescription medication to minors without consent." Planned Parenthood called as its sole witness Carol Pavlica, the director of the family planning program for the Department of Health. She explained that although the Department had not yet made any final or official decisions, it was considering two plans in its efforts to implement rider 14. Under the first plan (identified by the parties as "Plan A"), the state would simply require all minors receiving prescription drugs from family planning programs to have parental consent. She acknowledged that in her opinion this plan would jeopardize all federal family planning funds.

To avoid potentially jeopardizing federal family planning funds, the Department was considering a second plan ("Plan B"). Under Plan B, the state would continue to pay for prescriptions to minors without parental consent, but would pay for those prescriptions with federal funds other than Medicaid funds (Medicaid being the only program with a matching state component), including prescriptions for Medicaid-eligible minors. Thus under this plan, in Pavlica's opinion, the state could comply with the legislature's dictate that no state funds be used to dispense prescription drugs to minors lacking parental consent, without violating the federal rules that receipt of family planning services cannot be conditioned on parental consent, or jeopardizing other federal family planning funds. She made clear that under Plan B, neither Planned Parenthood nor its minor clients (including those eligible for Medicaid) would suffer any change in requirements, services, or funding; in other words, the state does and will continue to pay for prescriptions for minors even if they lack parental consent, but from federal funds without a state matching fund component. She also testified she believed the state would not be jeopardizing its federal funds by implementing Plan B because the state would not in fact be imposing a parental consent requirement.

The trial court declared rider 14 unconstitutional on the bases that (1) it conflicts with the federal laws governing the four federal programs in the family planning appropriation, and (2) it violates article III, section 35, of the Texas Constitution by attempting to repeal or amend certain provisions of Chapter 32 of the Texas Human Resources Code. The court rendered judgment enjoining the Commissioner from implementing rider 14. It also issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Under federal law, the trial court concluded that the rules governing the federal family planning programs in which the state participates forbid imposition of parental consent requirements, and preempt any state law to the contrary that would affect programs drawing on those federal funds. Although the trial court termed it "an admirable effort" to comply with both federal law and rider 14, the court concluded that the Department's proposed plan to track prescriptions and payments (Plan B) and use federal funds without a state matching component to pay for prescriptions without parental consent would not avoid the conflict with federal law: "While a state can restrict the use of state money appropriated solely for state purposes, a state cannot restrict the use of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
413 cases
  • Madeksho v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols Etc.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 10, 2003
    ... ... 14-01-00453-CV ... Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.) ... July 10, 2003 ... Olvera, 77 S.W.3d at 343; V-F Petroleum, Inc. v. A.K. Guthrie Operating Co., 792 S.W.2d 508, ... 7. Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Southeast ... ...
  • Zaatari v. City of Austin
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 27, 2019
  • Commitment of Fisher v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • December 18, 2003
    ... ... The STATE of Texas, Appellee ... No. 13-01-00714-CV ... Court ... Citing Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439 ... Brooks and Pamela Post-Oak (also-known as Houston) ...         8. Michael Fisher shall ... ...
  • Brice v. Denton
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • March 10, 2004
    ... ... 10-01-392-CV ... Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco ... March 10, 2004 ... [135 S.W.3d ... Patterson, 27 Tex. 491, 496 (1864). It is the blackest of ... 95 (1945); Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex.2002), ... art. I, §§ 13, 19; Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & S.E. Tex., Inc., 971 ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Chapter 21-4 Case or Controversy Requirement
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Texas Commercial Causes of Action Claims Title Chapter 21 Pleading Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Texas State Trial Courts
    • Invalid date
    ...mootness, ripeness, and standing, to determine if a case or controversy exists.50--------Notes:[49] See Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998).[50] Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.21-4 Case or Controversy Requirement Texas courts do not have subject......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT