Patterson v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 06 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 10-1153-PHX-JAT,CV 10-1153-PHX-JAT |
| Parties | Maurice Patterson, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan; et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Pending before the Court is Petitioner, Maurice Patterson's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition). (Doc. 1). The Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that this Court deny the Petition. (Doc. 19). Petitioner has filed an Objection to the R&R (Objection). (Doc. 20).
On March 27, 2007, a direct complaint was filed in Maricopa County Superior Court charging Patterson with possession or use of narcotic drugs. R&R at 2. Following his pretrial release, Patterson failed to appear for his preliminary hearing scheduled for April 3, 2007, and the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest. Id. He was arrested 73 days later, on June 15, 2007. Id. Patterson was indicted on June 21, 2007, where he waived a preliminary hearing, entered into a plea agreement, and was released for drug and alcohol monitoring and ordered to appear at sentencing scheduled for July 2, 2007. Id.
Patterson failed to appear for sentencing on July 2, 2007, due to a family accident;counsel successfully moved to continue the sentencing to July 16, 2007, and the 14 days during that time period were excluded. Id. Patterson appeared with counsel on July 16, 2007; the sentencing was again continued for 30 days to allow defense counsel to prepare mitigation evidence, and that 30-day time period was also excluded. Id. On August 15, 2007, sentencing was again continued to August 23, 2007, and that period of 8 days was excluded. Id. On August 23, 2007, neither Patterson nor his counsel appeared and a bench warrant was issued for Patterson's arrest. Id.
Patterson was again arrested on December 12, 2007, 102 days after the warrant was issued. Id. Before the trial court on that day, the State withdrew the plea agreement without objection by counsel, and the trial court set the initial pretrial conference for January 14, 2008. Id. On January 3, 2008, Patterson filed a pro se state habeas petition, seeking suppression of evidence and dismissal of the case because of a lack of probable cause to stop him, and because of the excessive force used to restrain him. Id. On January 14, 2008, the State filed allegations of prior convictions, and explained that Patterson was ineligible for probation pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-901.01 because of his prior drug convictions, Patterson also filed a motion to dismiss his attorney and represent himself, and the trial court set a pretrial conference for February 14, 2008. Id.
On January 29, 2008, Patterson filed several pro se documents: a second state habeas petition, two motions to dismiss, and a motion for disclosure. Id. at 3. At the February 14 hearing, Patterson declined the State's second plea offer of a Class 4 felony without priors and a 2.5 year prison term, and the trial court set the next hearing for February 22, 2008. Id. The next day Patterson filed another motion, reiterating the argument raised in his motion to dismiss: that the alleged drug did not exist because the substance had been field-tested and it came back negative. Id.
At the hearing on February 22, 2008, the trial court granted Patterson's request to represent himself and ordered counsel to remain as advisory counsel. Id. The trial court then conducted an evidentiary hearing on the legality of Patterson's stop and arrest. Id. Thearresting officer was examined by the State and cross-examined by Patterson, and the matter was taken under advisement. Id. The trial court subsequently denied all of Patterson's motions and filed Patterson's executed Waiver of Counsel form. Id. Patterson then filed 15 additional pro se documents, including some that were duplicative of earlier filings. Id.
On March 21, 2008, the trial court denied three of Patterson's pending motions and allowed oral argument on the remaining motions. Id. Following oral argument, the trial court noted that Patterson had knowingly and intelligently rejected a revised plea offer, ordered withdrawal of Patterson's attorney,1 ordered the appointment of new advisory counsel, and denied all but three remaining motions. Id.
On March 25, 2008, Patterson filed seven more pro se motions, including another state habeas petition and a request for independent chemical analysis. (Ex. HH). On April 3, 2008, the trial court denied all pending motions. (Ex. II).
Following the filing of eight additional pro se documents on April 8, 2008, the trial judge recused himself and the case was transferred to another judge. R&R at 4. On May 27, 2008, the trial court heard oral argument on all pending motions, including four additional pro se documents filed after the case had been reassigned; the trial court denied all pending motions. Id.; (Ex. MM).
On June 2, 2008, Patterson requested a status conference on three of the motions that he had filed. (Ex. NN). On June 4, 2008, the trial court again heard oral argument and denied all pending motions, conducted voir dire and empaneled the jury. R&R at 4. On June 5, 2008, following the State's opening statement and Patterson's waiver of an opening statement, the prosecutor began examining the arresting officer. Id. Advisory counsel then informed the trial court that Patterson wanted advisory counsel to represent him because of a medical condition that prevented Patterson from proceeding with the trial. Id. The jurywas excused until June 9, 2008. Id.
On June 9, 2008, Patterson informed the trial court that he was physically able to proceed. Id. Following the testimony of two police officers, a forensic scientist testified that she had analyzed the substance at issue and determined that it was crack cocaine. Id. Patterson did not testify; the trial court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. Following closing arguments and instructions to the jury, the jury deliberated and convicted Patterson of a class 4 felony: possession of a narcotic drug. Id.; (Ex. TT).
On June 12, 2008, Patterson filed five more pro se motions, including a reiteration of his motion for probation eligibility under A.R.S. § 13-901.01. R&R at 4. On July 10, 2008, the State presented evidence on the prior convictions linking Patterson to three prior felony convictions, the third of which counted as a historical prior felony conviction. Id.; (Ex. YY at 18-21). The trial court took Patterson's motion and the allegations of prior convictions under advisement. Id.2 At sentencing on July 17, 2008, the State argued that it had proven one historical prior felony conviction, and recommended a presumptive term of 4.5 years, which the trial court adopted. Id. at 5.
On January 7, 2009, Patterson filed a pro se petition with the Superior Court for post-conviction relief, raising six issues. Id. at 6. In addition, he filed two more pro se state habeas petitions and a motion to dismiss. Id.; (Ex. NNN-QQQ).
On January 30, 2009, Patterson filed his appeal with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Ex. EEE). In his opening brief, Patterson argued a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of the law because he was denied probation only because he had been triedin Maricopa County, and the trial court followed the decision in Division One. R&R at 5. He argued that had he been tried in Pima County, he would have been eligible for probation. Id.
On April 29, 2009, while his appeal was pending and following the trial court's briefing schedule, Patterson filed a post-conviction petition arguing that the trial court erred when it based his sentence on a finding of one historical prior felony conviction that was older than ten years. Id. at 6; (Ex. TTT).
On October 20, 2009, in a published opinion affirming Patterson's conviction and sentence, the court of appeals concluded that Patterson had failed to prove an equal protection violation. R&R at 5; (Ex. HHH). In so ruling, the court of appeals reasoned as follows:
The Arizona Supreme Court has recognized that our court "consider[s] decisions of coordinate courts as highly persuasive and binding, unless we are convinced that the prior decisions are based upon clearly erroneous principles, or conditions have changed so as to render these prior decisions inapplicable." Scappaticci, 135 Ariz. at 461, 662 P.2d at 136 (quoting Castillo v. Indus. Comm'n, 21 Ariz. App. 465, 471, 520 P.2d 1142, 1148 (1974)). Departments of our court adhere to this principle. E.g., White v. Greater Ariz. Bicycling Ass'n, 216 Ariz. 133, 137-38, ¶ 14, 163 P.3d 1083, 1087-88 (App. 2007); In re Estate of Gordon, 207 Ariz. 401, 405, J[ 18, 87 P.3d 89, 93 (App. 2004) (expressing the principle that "[w]hen we disagree with a prior decision of our Court . . . we should do so only upon the most cogent of reasons being presented" (quoting Neil v. McGinnis Equip. Co., 2 Ariz. App. 59, 62, 406 P. 2d 409, 412 (1965 )); Wilson, 162 Ariz. at 250, 782 P.2d at 726; State v. Dungan, 149 Ariz. 357, 361, 718 P.2d 1010, 1014 (App. 1985).
The superior court is bound by our decisions, regardless of the division out of which they arise. See Francis v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp 192 Ariz. 269, 271, 963 P.2d 1092, 1094 (App. 1998). Because the superior court is one court, there is no legal distinction between courts located in Division 1 and Division 2 except as specified by statute. See Marks, 186 Ariz. at 142, 920 P. 2d at 22. When confronted with conflicting decisions by different departments of our court, a trial court must use its discretion to adopt the decision that most persuasively interprets the law, regardless of the division to which the department making the decision belongs or within which the trial court sits. This is the standard trial courts already use when evaluating legal authority from other states to decide an issue with no Arizona law on point. See Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 291, 972 P.2d 606, 624 ...
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