Patterson v. State

• Decision Date: 05 December 1921
• Docket Number: 21927
• Citation: 127 Miss. 256,90 So. 2
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: PATTERSON v. STATE

90 So. 2

127 Miss. 256

PATTERSON v. STATE

No. 21927

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 5, 1921

1. CRIMINAL LAW. Where indictment informs of nature of accusation, an objection to omission of "feloniously" cannot be first raised in supreme court.

Under section 1426, Code 1906 (section 1182, Hemingway's Code) the sufficiency of an indictment for a statutory felony couched in the language of the statute, from which the word "feloniously" is omitted, cannot be raised in the supreme court for the first time if by the language of the indictment the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

2. CRIMINAL LAW. Confession may be considered with other evidence to establish corpus delicti.

On the trial of a criminal case a confession by the accused may be considered together with other evidence to establish the corpus delicti, provided such other evidence is of such character as will satisfy the mind that it is a real and not an imaginary, crime which the accused has confessed.

HON. W H. HUGHES, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Simpson county, HON. W. H. HUGHES Judge.

Hulon Patterson was convicted of unlawful making and distilling intoxicating liquors, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

A. W. Dent, for appellant.

The appellant was indicted, tried and convicted and sentenced under section 18, chapter 189, Laws 1918, which provided in part, that any person . . . who shall make or distill . . . intoxicating liquor shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished, etc. The indictment charges that "Hulon Patterson did then and there unlawfully make and distill intoxicating liquor," etc. Objection was not made to the indictment in the court below by demurrer or motion to quash, because the indictment was good as charging a misdemeanor. We object now because the sentence was for a felony. The motion for a new trial should have been sustained.

In every indictment for a felony the use of the word "feloniously" is essential. Hays v. State, 57 Miss. 783; Nile v. State, 60 Miss. 260; Dedeaux v. State, 87 So. 664.

We respectfully submit that this case should be reversed and the defendant discharged.

H. Cassidy Holden, special assistant attorney-general, for the state.

It is contended that the indictment against the defendant failed to use the word, "feloniously," the manufacturing and distilling of intoxicating liquor being a felony by virtue of section 18, chapter 189, Laws of 1918. The appellant explains that no objection was made to the indictment in the court below because it was sufficient as for a misdemeanor, but the punishment being as for a felony, the objection is now made. But the manufacturing and distilling of intoxicating liquor is not a misdemeanor; it is a felony denounced expressly as such by the statute just cited. A crime cannot be a misdemeanor and a felony at the same time. The absurdity of such an idea is readily apparent. When the defendant was indicted for manufacturing and distilling intoxicating liquor, he is bound to have known that he was being indicted for a felony. Any objection which he wished to raise to the indictment because of any defect appearing on the face thereof should have been taken by demurrer to the indictment and cannot be taken otherwise. See section 1182, Hemingway's Code (Section 1426, Code of 1906). At the time Hays v. State, 57 Miss. 783, and Wile v. State, 60 Miss. 260, were decided we had no admonitory statute similar to section 1182, above mentioned. The requirements of this statute are wise and salutary indeed and promote highly efficient administration of justice in our courts. It is not right that a defendant be permitted to raise objections to an indictment for the first time in the appellate court. He should be made to take advantage of any defect in the indictment at the time of the trial, and otherwise be barred from calling attention to such defect. It is too often forgotten or but dimly realized that the institution of law is primarily for the protection of society and not dedicated as a sanctuary for society's renegades. It is becoming daily recognized in every jurisprudence of the civilized world that too many safeguards have been hitherto set about those accused of crime. No longer are courts adhering to the pedantic and often ridiculous technicalities in the criminal law which anciently characterized the administration of such laws. One accused of crime is not, and cannot be denied every opportunity to defend himself at the bar of justice, but the old familiar avenues of escape by technicality are being fast closed to those guilty of violating the laws of the land.

Of what can this appellant complain? He was charged with manufacturing and distilling intoxicating liquor. By reference to the statute condemning this crime, he and his counsel knew beyond any doubt whatever, that a felony was being charged. He and his counsel knew that the only law denouncing the manufacturing and distilling of intoxicating liquor was section 18, chapter 189, Laws of 1918, and that this law made the crime a felony. They knew that there was no law denouncing this crime as a misdemeanor. The accused and his counsel were therefore fully and clearly informed of the nature of the charge against which they were to prepare a defense. The defendant suffered no...