Patterson v. State

• Decision Date: 11 January 1915
• Docket Number: 792
• Citation: 67 So. 997,191 Ala. 16
• Parties: PATTERSON et al. v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

67 So. 997

191 Ala. 16

PATTERSON et al. v. STATE.

No. 792

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 11, 1915

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cullman County; A.H. Alston, Judge.

Clyde Patterson and others were convicted of murder, and they appeal. Affirmed.

F.E St. John, of Cullman, and Callahan & Harris, of Decatur, for appellants.

R.C Brickell, Atty. Gen., and T.H. Seay, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

McCLELLAN J.

The appellants were ajudged guilty of the murder of Robert Miller, and are sentenced to imprisonment during their lives. Robert Miller and Rube Carter were shot to death, from a roadside, while traveling in a wagon. A clear case of assassination was made by the proof. The issue was whether appellants, father and son, were among the guilty agents. There was evidence which, if credited, supported the jury's finding. Able counsel appeared in their defense below and appear on this appeal, presenting in full brief the grounds upon which insistencies for reversible errors are rested. In the order of their discussion by appellant's counsel in brief, we will treat in the opinion the asserted errors.

At the instance of the prosecution the court gave the following special instruction to the jury:

"I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that if you believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants were lying in wait for the deceased, Robert Miller, and killed him by shooting him with a gun while lying in wait, then they would be guilty of murder in the first degree."

This instruction was in accord with the pertinent language and legal effect of the statute (Code, § 7084), as well as with Mitchell's Case, 60 Ala. 28, 29.

According to Bouvier, "lying in wait" means "being in ambush for the purpose or murdering another." Such is the significance of the phrase, as employed in the quoted instruction.

Appellants complain of the refusal of the court to give the jury this charge:

"The court charges the jury that if the witness Mac Miller willfully and intentionally swore falsely that he did not have the conversation with Dr. Baird, as testified to by Dr. Baird, then they may discard all the testimony of Mac Miller."

The substance of the just quoted request for instruction was sufficiently contained in the following charges given at the defendant's instance:

"The court charges the jury that if they find from the evidence that Mac Miller has made contradictory statements as to material facts in this case or any of such facts, the jury may look to these contradictory statements in order to determine what credence they will give to the testimony of Mac Miller. ***

"If the jury believe from the evidence that the witness Mac Miller swore willfully falsely in one particular, the jury are authorized to disregard the evidence of said Mac Miller. ***

"If the witness Mac Miller has been impeached, then the jury may disregard the entire testimony of said Mac Miller unless it be corroborated by other testimony not so impeached. *** "

So, even assuming (for the occasion only) that there was error in refusing the quoted request for instruction, it was without prejudice to the appellants.

On the cross-examination of defendants' witness W.H. Waldrop, following a simple question propounded to him, the bill recites this matter:

"Thereupon the presiding judge stated to the witness in the presence of the jury, and while the witness was on the stand, that it looks like a man who had been a justice of the peace ought to have sense enough or intelligence enough to answer the questions asked."

The evident purpose was to reprimand the witness for a failure to answer the "questions asked," and to promote the orderly, prompt taking of the testimony on the trial. The statement of court had no bearing or effect upon the credibility of the witness or upon the credence to be accorded or that might be accorded the...