Patterson v. State
| Decision Date | 21 December 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 34A02-9409-CR-550,34A02-9409-CR-550 |
| Citation | 659 N.E.2d 220 |
| Parties | Rodney G. PATTERSON, Appellant-Defendant Below, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Rodney G. Patterson (Patterson) appeals the revocation of his probation.
On December 16, 1993, Patterson pleaded guilty to theft, a class D felony, 1 and was sentenced to a term of two years, with 180 days executed, sixty days of which was to be served on home detention. The remainder of his sentence was to be served on unsupervised probation. As conditions of home detention, the court ordered that Patterson refrain from committing any other offense, and that he travel from his house only to go to, and return from, work:
On March 9, 1994, after having signed the conditions of home detention, Patterson began serving the sixty-day period of his sentence. Soon thereafter, on March 13, 1994, Patterson was apprehended by the Kokomo Police Department and placed under arrest for an incident which occurred that day. As a result of that incident, a Notice of Violation, alleging that Patterson had violated both Paragraphs 8 and 13, was filed.
Evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing regarding Patterson's alleged noncompliance with the terms of his probation, showed that he had entered a Kroger store and had snatched a customer's billfold. He fled the store, but was apprehended in the parking lot by two store employees. Patterson testified that, at the point he committed the theft, he did not possess the ability to differentiate between those actions which were right and wrong. He testified that he knew it was wrong to steal and, with the benefit of hindsight, he knew that his actions were wrong. The trial court found that Patterson had violated the condition of home detention, in Paragraph 13, because he had committed a second "purse-snatching" while on probation. He was ordered to serve the remainder of his two-year sentence. It is this order from which Patterson appeals.
Patterson presents several issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
I. whether the trial court erred in its determination that sufficient evidence existed to revoke Patterson's probation, though he presented uncontroverted evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or defect;
II. whether the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appoint a psychiatrist to examine Patterson prior to his probation revocation hearing;
III. whether the trial court erred in failing to take judicial notice of its file upon the crime which precipitated the State's action for revocation of Patterson's probation; and
IV. whether the trial court violated Patterson's privilege against self-incrimination by overruling his objection to the State's question.
Patterson initially contends that the trial court's determination that he violated the terms of his probation is contrary to law. This is so, Patterson claims, because he presented "uncontroverted" evidence proving that he was mentally ill at the time he committed the underlying theft upon which the revocation was based. Appellant's Brief at 3. Patterson's argument implies that, because he could not have possessed the requisite culpability to commit the underlying crime which formed the basis for revocation, his probation could not be revoked due to commission of that theft.
The evidence alluded to reflects that for approximately one year prior to the purse-snatching which led to the probation revocation, Patterson had been under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Silsby. Patterson testified that he had trouble distinguishing between right and wrong and had trouble conforming his actions to what is right as opposed to what is wrong. The trial court admitted into evidence an exhibit filed in the underlying robbery case which was a Notice of Intent to Interpose Defense of Mental Disease or Defect. Patterson thereafter testified that he knew it was wrong to steal but that at the time he took the victim's purse or wallet from her, he Record at 143.
Although proof of a conviction of a crime is not necessary for a revocation of probation, a mere arrest for an offense will not suffice. There must be proof that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct. Gleason v. State (1994) Ind.App., 634 N.E.2d 67. The proof must be by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Cass (1994) Ind.App., 635 N.E.2d 225, trans. denied. Because the conduct must be unlawful, Hoffa v. State (1977) 267 Ind. 133, 368 N.E.2d 250; Justice v. State (1990) Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 809; Brown v. State (1983) Ind.App., 458 N.E.2d 245, this requirement of proof would seem to contemplate a degree of culpability with regard to the alleged conduct. The conclusion, however, is not readily drawn from Indiana case law. In Brown, supra, this court held that where conviction for an offense committed during probation was reversed, the probation revocation could not stand without other evidence of criminal activity. 458 N.E.2d at 251. Justice, supra, is somewhat to the same effect, holding that although the probationer was acquitted of the alleged offense, his probation could be revoked by evidence of the commission of that offense. 550 N.E.2d at 812. Hoffa, supra, held that evidence at the revocation hearing indicated that the arrest was reasonable and that there was probable cause to believe that the probationer had violated a criminal law. 368 N.E.2d at 252. These cases suggest that the burden of proof for revocation is not particularly stringent. On the other hand, Hensley v. State (1991) Ind.App., 583 N.E.2d 758, 760-61, recognized that a culpable state of mind was a factor in probation revocation when it observed that the defense of duress may be asserted by one accused of probation violation.
Several jurisdictions have considered the specific defense of insanity with regard to probation revocation. Florida and Texas have held that insanity is a full defense. The Second Circuit and Wisconsin have held that it is not a defense. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Washington, Illinois, and Ohio have held that although insanity is not a full and complete defense it is to be considered as a mitigating factor. See Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Probation Revocation: Insanity as Defense, 56 A.L.R. 4th 1178 (1987 & Supp.1995).
A court has several dispositional options in a revocation proceeding. Indiana Code 35-38-2-3 (Burns Code Ed.Repl.1994) provides that the court may revoke the probation and order the suspended sentence be served, extend the period of probation by not more than one year, or continue the person on probation with or without modifying the conditions. The probationer's mental state at the time and under the circumstances of the alleged violation is a factor to be considered. We therefore hold that, at a minimum, a probationer's mental state must be considered in the dispositional determination of a probation revocation proceeding. 2
Be that as it may, the fact that Patterson presented evidence that he had a mental disease or defect is not dispositive of our case. Under the facts, it was well within the prerogative of the court to determine that, notwithstanding the asserted mental condition, the circumstances of the second purse-snatching indicated a knowing or intentional course of conduct. Furthermore, Patterson's testimony at the revocation hearing was not so convincing or conclusive as to compel the court to find that the probation violation was excused or mitigated by the alleged mental condition.
Patterson relies upon I.C. 35-36-2-2 (Burns Code Ed.Supp.1994) for the proposition that the court erred in not appointing two or three psychiatrists or psychologists to examine him and testify. We reject the argument.
Patterson's own psychiatrist was presumably available to testify concerning the probationer's mental condition as it related to the probation violation. He was not called by the defense. More importantly, however, the statute concerns a "criminal case" in which a notice of an insanity defense has been filed. Id. A probation revocation proceeding is in the nature of a civil case. It has been held not to be a "criminal proceeding" for purposes of double jeopardy. Ashba v. State (1991) Ind.App., 570 N.E.2d 937, aff'd, 580 N.E.2d...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Turner v. State
...already imposed. See Mitchell v. State, 619 N.E.2d 961, 963–64 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), overruled on other grounds by Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 223 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not giving mitigating weight to Turner's admission. C......
-
Monday v. State
...by a preponderance of the evidence. Mitchell v. State, 619 N.E.2d 961, 963 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), overruled on other grounds, 659 N.E.2d 220, 223 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). Notwithstanding this statutory provision, Monday contends that the fundamental notion of liberty set forth in Art. I, § 1 req......
-
Hill v. State
...its discretion when it did not account for his mental disability when it resentenced him. For support, he cites Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 222–23 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), in which we stated: “The probationer's mental state at the time and under the circumstances of the alleged violation ......
-
Treece v. State
...probation revocation proceeding.” Mitchell v. State, 619 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), overruled in part by Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 223 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (holding that in a probation revocation proceeding, probationer's mental health should be considered). 3 In additio......