Patterson v. The Bonnet Shores Fire District

• Decision Date: 17 December 2020
• Docket Number: C. A. WC-2020-0130
• Parties: MARY BURKE PATTERSON, ROBERT E. PATTERSON, MELISSA JENKINS, VALERIE ANN HENRY, PAULA CHILDS, DAVID H. STENMARK, and CAROL M. STENMARK Plaintiffs, v. THE BONNET SHORES FIRE DISTRICT Defendant.
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

MARY BURKE PATTERSON, ROBERT E. PATTERSON, MELISSA JENKINS, VALERIE ANN HENRY, PAULA CHILDS, DAVID H. STENMARK, and CAROL M. STENMARK Plaintiffs, v. THE BONNET SHORES FIRE DISTRICT Defendant.

C. A. No. WC-2020-0130

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Washington

December 17, 2020

For Plaintiff: Matthew T. Oliverio, Esq. Santiago H. Posas, Esq.

For Defendant: Thomas M. Dickinson, Esq.

DECISION

TAFT-CARTER, J.

Before this Court for decision is the Defendant Bonnet Shores Fire District's (BSFD) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties and the objection by the Plaintiffs-Mary Burke Patterson, Robert E. Patterson, Melissa Jenkins, Valerie Ann Henry, Paula Childs, David H. Stenmark and Carol M. Stenmark (Plaintiffs). Jurisdiction is pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and 12(b)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1.

I. Facts and Travel

The BSFD was incorporated in 1930 by act of the General Assembly. It is located in the northern part of the Town of Narragansett. (Compl. ¶ 8.) The Bonnet Shores Fire District Charter & Related Legislation (BSFD Charter) grants to the BSFD

"all rights and powers generally had and enjoyed by business corporations and fire districts in the state including (but without limiting the generalities of the foregoing) the right to acquire, hold and dispose of real and personal property necessary for its corporate purposes; the right to have and use a common seal; the right to sue or be sued; and the right to borrow money from time to time and to issue its notes, bonds or other evidences of indebtedness theretofore." Id. at Ex. A, § 1(4).

In addition, the BSFD is also empowered to perform certain quasi-municipal governmental functions and to exercise general governmental powers, including the power to impose and collect taxes. Id. at Ex. A, § 7. Under the BSFD Charter, § 6, BSFD voters

"may elect a clerk, three assessors of taxes, a collector of taxes, a district council or not less than three and no more than seven qualified voters, one or more fire wardens, one or more police officers and such other officers and committees as said district may require for its corporate purposes." Id. at Ex. A, § 6.

Voting within the BSFD is governed by the BSFD Charter, § 2, which provides that:

"Every firm, corporation, unincorporated association and every person, irrespective of sex, of the age of eighteen years, who is possessed in his or her own right of real estate in said district of the value of one Four Hundred ($400) Dollars over and above all encumbrances, being an estate in fee simple, fee tail, for the life of any person, or an estate in reversion or remainder, the conveyance of which estate shall if by deed, have been recorded at least ninety (90) days, shall thereafter have a right to vote at all meetings of the corporation." Id. at Ex. A, § 2.

As such, owners of real property located within the BSFD who have at least $400 of equity in property are entitled to vote in the BSFD elections, regardless of whether they reside within the BSFD. (Compl. ¶ 27.) According to Plaintiffs, this results in the prohibition of non-owner residents from either voting in the BSFD elections or participating in its governance. Id. ¶ 29.

The BSFD Charter restricts voting to individuals who are qualified voters and hold a deeded property interest in the BSFD. Id. ¶ 33; see also id. at Ex. A, § 2. Plaintiffs are qualified voters and residents of the BSFD. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-7.) Of the seven plaintiffs, six hold a deeded property interest in the BSFD. Id. While these six plaintiffs are permitted to vote in the BSFD elections, Plaintiff Jenkins is not permitted to vote at the BSFD elections because she does not hold a deeded property interest within the BSFD. Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 36. Accordingly, the Complaint alleges that the BSFD's voting provision has resulted in the ability of nonresident property owners, including over 4000 owners of the Bonnet Shores Beach Club's-a Rhode Island Condominium Association-bathhouses or cabanas, to vote. Id. ¶ 37.

At a BSFD Council meeting held on October 16, 2019, a council member, Anita Langer, moved to amend the current distribution of voting rights under the BSFD Charter. Id. at Ex. F, 2-3. In moving the council to amend the BSFD's voting provision, Anita Langer stated that the right to vote should be in connection to residency "because the current taxpayer requirement is unconstitutional." Id. at 2. The motion did not receive a second and therefore failed. Id. at 3.

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on March 13, 2020, seeking declaratory relief against the BSFD with respect to the distribution of votes within the district. Plaintiffs claim dilution and disenfranchisement of their votes under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 2; article II, section 1; and article III, section 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution. (Compl. 1.) As such, Plaintiffs request the following from this Court:

"A. A finding and declaration that BSFD is a quasi-municipal entity which exercises general governmental authority over its geographic area;

"B. A finding and declaration that the limitation of voting rights to property holders holding over $400 in equity found in the BSFD Charter is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;

"C. A finding and declaration that the limitation of voting rights to property holders holding over $400 in equity found in the BSFD Charter is unconstitutional under Article I, § 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution;

"D. A finding and declaration that the distribution of voting rights to nonresidents of BSFD is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;

"E. A finding and declaration that the distribution of voting rights to nonresidents of BSFD is unconstitutional under Article I, § 2 and Article II, § 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution;

"F. A finding and declaration that subsequent elections for BSFD offices must be open only to all residents of BSFD who are over eighteen years of age, consistent with Article II, § 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution;

"G. A finding and declaration that currently-elected BSFD officers must exercise their offices as trustees of BSFD, for the benefit of the residents of BSFD, until such time as the General Assembly amends the BSFD Charter in conformance with this Court's decision or new elections consistent with this Court's decision may be held;

"H. Judgment against BSFD for depriving Plaintiff Melissa Jenkins of her right to vote in BSFD elections pursuant to official policy;

"I. Judgment against BSFD for depriving Plaintiffs Mary Burke Patterson, Robert Patterson, Valerie Ann Henry, Paula Childs, David H. Stenmark, and Carol M. Stenmark of their constitutional right not to have their votes debased and diluted;

"J. An award of costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

"K. Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper under the circumstances." Id. at 14-15.

In response to Plaintiffs' Complaint, the BSFD filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties on May 4, 2020. Plaintiffs objected on June 8, 2020, and Defendant subsequently replied on June 15, 2020. This Court heard oral arguments on September 2, 2020, and now issues a decision on the Motion.

II Standards of Review

Rule 12(b)(7) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party. See Woonsocket Historical Society v City of Woonsocket, 120 R.I. 259, 387 A.2d 530 (1978). "Indispensable parties are persons who have an interest in the controversy of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience[.]" Robert B. Kent, et al., Rhode Island Civil and Appellate Procedure § 12:11 (2019). "The complaint should not be dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party where the defect can be cured by making the person a party. If this salutary approach is taken, the action will be dismissed only if the absent party is indispensable and cannot be brought before the court." Id.

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, "[i]f the court lacks jurisdiction over the class of cases to which the particular action belongs, it must dismiss the action." Id. § 12:5. "The principle is well established that a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time by either party or by the court on its own motion. The jurisdiction of the Superior Court is statutory." Id.

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) vests this Court with the "power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Section 9-30-1. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that under the UDJA, "[a] court may not assume subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory-judgment action when a plaintiff fails to join all those necessary and indispensable parties who have an actual and essential interest that would be affected by the declaration." Rosano v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 91 A.3d 336, 340 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation omitted); see also Abbatematteo v. State, 694 A.2d 738, 740 (R.I. 1997) ("[W]hen a [declaratory] judgment is not binding on all persons who have a direct interest in the dispute, the Superior Court should not assert jurisdiction.").

Although Rule 12(b)(7) motions regarding declaratory judgment are typically reviewed under both Rule 19 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and the UDJA, this Court will proceed with...