Patterson v. Walden
| Decision Date | 18 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION 13-0109-WS-B |
| Parties | BETTY PATTERSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCOTT WALDEN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
This matter comes before the Court on Motions to Dismiss (docs. 9, 11 & 13) filed by defendants, Scott Walden, Jason Dean, and City of Atmore. All three Motions have been briefed and are ripe for disposition.
Plaintiffs, Betty Patterson and Dewayne Russell, as Administrators of the Estate of Adam Dewayne Patterson ("Patterson"), filed suit in federal court against four named defendants, including the City of Atmore (the "City"); Scott Walden ("Officer Walden"), who at all relevant times was an Atmore police officer; Jason Dean ("Chief Dean"), who at all relevant times was Atmore's Chief of Police; and Willie Lee Patrick.1 The Complaint specifies that Chief Dean "is sued in his individual capacity" (doc. 1, ¶ 4), but is silent as to the capacity or capacities in which Officer Walden is sued.
According to the well-pleaded facts in the Complaint (which are accepted as true for purposes of the Motions to Dismiss), on or about March 6, 2011, Officer Walden observed defendant Patrick operating a motor vehicle at a speed in excess of the posted limit. (Doc. 1, ¶ 7.) Officer Walden initiated a pursuit, and "began to chase [Patrick's vehicle] at a high rate ofspeed ... for several blocks." (Id.) The Complaint alleges that Officer Walden was "following closely behind Defendant Patrick's automobile at a high rate of speed." (Id.) As Patrick's vehicle approached a railroad crossing atop an elevated slope, Officer Walden's patrol vehicle struck Patrick's car from behind, sending it airborne and causing Patrick's vehicle to "flip[] over and land[] in a ditch." (Id.) Plaintiffs' decedent, Patterson, "was killed as a result of the accident." (Id.)2
On the strength of these limited facts, plaintiffs assert the following causes of action: (i) a claim against Officer Walden pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that this defendant's "use of excessive force ... was unreasonable and was a violation of Patterson's Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights" (doc. 1, ¶ 10); (ii) a wrongful death claim against Officer Walden under Alabama law, alleging that this defendant's "negligence or wantonness" proximately caused Patterson's death (id., ¶ 12); (iii) a state-law false arrest claim against Officer Walden; (iv) a claim against Officer Walden for the Alabama tort of outrage; (v) a § 1983 claim against Chief Dean, alleging that his "deliberate indifference to the hiring, lack of training and supervision of [Officer] Walden ... caused ... Patterson to be deprived of his Fourth Amendment right not to have excessive force used against him, and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, the equal protection of the law, and not to be subjected to the outrageous conduct of a police officer" (id., ¶ 18); and (vi) a § 1983 claim against the City, alleging that Chief Dean's acts and omissions "represent[] the official policy practice or custom of the City," giving rise to municipal liability (id., ¶ 20).3 Plaintiffs demand judgment of $25 million as to each of these asserted causes of action, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees.
The municipal and law enforcement defendants have now moved to dismiss most of the claims and causes of action asserted by plaintiffs, on the grounds that they fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
To withstand Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," so as to "nudge[] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted). "This necessarily requires that a plaintiff include factual allegations for each essential element of his or her claim." GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1254 (11th Cir. 2012). Thus, minimum pleading standards "require[] more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, these principles require that a complaint's allegations be "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
Of course, in reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) motions, federal courts must "accept[] the facts alleged in the complaint as true, [and] draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010); see also American United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1066 (11th Cir. 2007) (). That said, the obligation to accept well-pleaded facts as true does not extend to conclusory allegations or mere legal conclusions. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (); Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) ().
As noted, plaintiffs' claims against Officer Walden consist of the following: (i) a § 1983 claim, alleging "excessive force in striking Defendant Patrick's vehicle," in violation of "Patterson's Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights" (doc. 1, ¶ 10) (Count I); (ii) astate-law wrongful death claim (Count II); (iii) a state-law false arrest claim (Count III); and (iv) a state-law outrage claim (Count IV). Although the Complaint does not delineate the capacity in which Officer Walden is being sued, plaintiffs' opposition brief states, "In this action, Plaintiffs are suing Defendant Walden in both his official and individual capacity." (Doc. 26, at 2.) Officer Walden has moved for dismissal of the official-capacity claims, as well as portions of Count I and the entirety of Counts III and IV.
With regard to the official-capacity claims, Officer Walden's only argument is that they "are actually claims against Atmore itself, which means that they are due to be dismissed as to Officer Walden." (Doc. 10, at 2.) It is well settled that "[a] claim asserted against an individual in his or her official capacity is, in reality, a suit against the entity that employs the individual." Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 855 (11th Cir. 2010) () (citation omitted). From that principle, however, it does not follow that official-capacity suits against an individual fail to state a claim and must be dismissed. To the contrary, official-capacity claims nominally raised against individual government officials are routinely litigated to conclusion on the merits as the functional equivalent of a direct suit against the municipality itself.4 Nothing in the cases cited by Officer Walden supports his apparent contention that official-capacity suits against individual government officials are per se barred for failure to state a claim.5 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the official-capacity claims against Officer Walden on this basis is not well taken.
Next, the Court turns to Counts III and IV (state-law torts of false arrest and outrage), which Officer Walden has moved to dismiss on abatement grounds. Under Alabama law, unfiled state-law tort claims do not survive the death of the claimant. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, --- So.3d ----, 2013 WL 646468, *2 (Ala. Feb. 22, 2013) () (citations omitted).6 In other words, when Patterson died on March 6, 2011 (almost two years to the day before this lawsuit commenced), his then-unfiled tort claims for false arrest and outrage were extinguished, as a matter of law. As Officer Walden correctly argues (with no response or disagreement from plaintiffs), black-letter Alabama law precludes the estate's administrators from initiating legal proceedings on such abated tort claims after Patterson's death. The Motion to Dismiss is therefore granted as to Counts III and IV, which fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted.
The remaining issue raised by Officer Walden's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion is whether Count I (Section 1983 claim under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) states a cognizable cause of action. Officer Walden seeks dismissal of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment aspects of Count I.7 With respect to the Fifth Amendment, defendant argues (again, with no oppositionor response from plaintiffs) that it has no application here because the due process component of the Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal government, whereas Officer Walden was a municipal employee. Settled law supports this argument. See, e.g., Buxton v. City of Plant City, Fla., 871 F.2d 1037, 1041 (11th Cir. 1989) (...
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