Patton v. Etowah Cnty.

• Decision Date: 05 January 2016
• Docket Number: Case No.: 4:15-CV-540-VEH
• Citation: Patton v. Etowah Cnty., Case No.: 4:15-CV-540-VEH (N.D. Ala. Jan 05, 2016)
• Parties: KENNETH WAYNE PATTON, Plaintiff, v. ETOWAH COUNTY, ALABAMA, TODD ENTREKIN, JONATHAN SHADWRICK, SCOTT HASSELL, and MIKE O'BRYANT, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

KENNETH WAYNE PATTON, Plaintiff, v. ETOWAH COUNTY, ALABAMA, TODD ENTREKIN, JONATHAN SHADWRICK,SCOTT HASSELL, and MIKE O'BRYANT, Defendants.

Case No.: 4:15-CV-540-VEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION

January 5, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Plaintiff Kenneth Wayne Patton's ("Patton") constitutional rights were violated while in custody at the Etowah County Detention Center ("ECDC"). Pending before the court are two motions to dismiss Patton's Amended Complaint. (See docs. 21 & 23). The first is by Defendant Jonathan Shadwrick ("Shadwrick"), doc. 21, the second by Defendants Scott Hassell ("Hassell"), Mike O'Bryant ("O'Bryant"), and Todd Entrekin ("Entrekin") (collectively, "Supervisors"). (Doc. 23). The second motion will be GRANTED and the complaint dismissed as to Hassell, O'Bryant, and Entrekin, but the claim against Shadwrick will survive. Accordingly, his motion will be DENIED.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Since this is a motion to dismiss, all of the facts alleged in the complaint are taken to be true. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The parties in the case are Patton, a man who was assaulted while in custody at the ECDC, doc. 20, ¶ 4, Entrekin, who was the Etowah County Sheriff at the time of the events described in the complaint, id., ¶ 5, Hassell, Chief Deputy of Detention at the ECDC, id., ¶ 6, O'Bryant, who was a Compliance Sergeant at the ECDC, id., ¶ 7, and Shadwrick, the booking deputy at the ECDC. (Id., ¶ 8). All defendants are sued in their individual capacities only, id., ¶¶ 4-8, and Entrekin, Hassell, and O'Bryant are alleged to have been responsible for the promulgation and enforcement of policy at the ECDC and its management. (Id., ¶ 4-7).

Patton was arrested on April 9, 2013 for a domestic violence offense and was brought to the ECDC for booking. (Id., ¶ 9). While being booked, Patton twice informed Shadwrick that he was a correctional officer and requested protective custody through administrative segregation; i.e., segregation from the ECDC's general population. (Id., ¶¶ 10 & 12). Hassell authored the ECDC's Policy and Procedure ("The Policy") governing administrative segregation of certain inmates, including for the inmate's safety, and this policy binds all members of the ECDC staff. (Id., ¶¶ 13-17). The Policy indicates law enforcement officers may qualifyfor administrative segregation, but before a detainee may be placed in segregation, the Officer in Charge and Classification Sergeant are to review the case to determine whether it is warranted. (Id., ¶¶ 18 & 20-21). No such review was conducted in Patton's case. (Id., ¶ 19).

At the time of booking, Patton was intoxicated, verbally abusive, and directed profanity at ECDC personnel and certain inmate workers, Denzil Beck ("Beck") and Henry Kicklighter. (Id., ¶ 22). Specifically, Patton referred to them as "f***boys." (Id., ¶ 23). Thereafter, Shadwrick placed Patton into holding cell #7 with Moses Reyes, who was known to Shadwrick to have violent propensities. (Id., ¶¶ 24-27). Shadwrick intended the placement in holding cell #7 to punish Patton for his disorderly conduct and foul language. (Id., ¶ 33).

After his placement in holding cell # 7, Beck punched his fist into his hand to signal to Reyes to attack Patton; he did so in clear sight of Shadwrick. (Id., ¶ 35). In short order, an argument ensued between Patton and Reyes that steadily escalated, and despite overhearing the commotion, Shadwrick did not remove Patton from the cell. (Id., ¶ 38). Reyes then began to beat Patton, and Shadwrick delayed calling emergency personnel to stop the beating. (Id., ¶ 39). As a result of the beating, Patton suffered cuts and lacerations to his face, a broken tooth and nose, and he required surgery. (Id., ¶ 41). He also suffered unnecessary pain andsuffering and mental distress. (Id.).

The complaint further alleges that Entrekin, Hassell, and O'Bryant ratified and approved Shadwrick's conduct because they failed to discipline him after an internal investigation. (Id., ¶ 42). Patton further asserts that Shadwrick's conduct was consistent with a de facto jail policy of failing to administratively segregate and provide protective custody to corrections officers who are threatened by other inmates which is evidenced by internal investigations, documents, inmate disciplinary reports, and statements from ECDC personnel that they regularly failed to segregate detainees who requested protective custody. (Id., ¶ 42-45).

II. Discussion

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for individuals whose constitutional rights are violated under color of state law. Relevant here, a detainee pleads a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights¹ when the complaint reflects 1) a substantial risk of bodily harm to the prisoner, 2) that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk, and 3) their deliberate indifference caused the plaintiff's harm. Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir.2013). As to the second element, deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that 1) the defendants were subjectively aware of the substantial risk of bodily harm, 2) they disregarded that risk, and 3) their disregard was more than negligent. Id. at 1331-32.

It is well-established that a section 1983 action for violation of the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment will lie when a prison official was subjectively aware of a substantial risk that one prisoner would injure another, yet the prison official failed to act to prevent the injury. Cf. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (announcing the rule in the context of a Bivens action).² But the heavy lifting, for the prisoner, is in showing that the defendant was indeed subjectively aware of the risk. See id. at 837-38.

In pleading the elements of a section 1983 action, and indeed any action, the plaintiff must make "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), that "give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). When the complaint is attacked by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the factual allegations must"raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and the complaint must contain more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" or "labels and conclusions." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). More to the point, stating a claim requires a "complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true)," id. at 556, to plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief—not merely (on some conceivable set of facts) possibly entitled to relief. See id. at 557-58.

Notwithstanding the Supervisors' suggestion to the contrary, "[a]fter Iqbal it is clear that there is no 'heightened pleading standard' as it relates to cases governed by Rule 8(a)(2), including civil rights complaints." Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010). So Twombly and Iqbal are all that matters, and they require a court ruling on a motion to dismiss to undergo a two-step analysis, wherein the court separates the complaint's wheat from its chaff. First, the "complaint's conclusory legal allegations" must be discarded, and, second, the well-pleaded factual allegations are examined to determine whether—when accepted as true—they "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "Conclusory legal allegations" include "formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action" and "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. at 678.

A. The Claim Against Shadwrick Survives

Shadwrick's motion to dismiss alleges three grounds for dismissal: 1) the complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to satisfy Rule 8 in light of Twombly and Iqbal; 2) Shadwrick is entitled to Qualified Immunity; and 3) in any event, Shadwrick did not violate Patton's constitutional rights. None of these arguments are meritorious.

i. The Twombly/Iqbal Objection Fails

Patton's factual allegations clearly describe a violation by Shadwrick of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, so Shadwrick's Twombly/Iqbal objection fails. Discarding the complaint's chaff (legal conclusions and naked assertions), as Iqbal requires, the following allegations remain: First, Shadwrick was twice informed that Patton was a corrections officer, which meant he was eligible for administrative segregation.³ Second, Shadwrick placed Patton into a cell with an inmate Shadwrick knew had violent propensities. Third, Shadwrick observed an inmate, Reyes—who Patton had previously insulted—make a threatening gestureabout Patton to Reyes. Fourth, Shadwrick was aware of Patton's beating at the hands of Reyes, but he purposefully delayed in calling for emergency assistance. Taken together, these allegations show that Shadwrick was aware of a risk that Patton would be attacked, because Shadwrick knew that Patton was part of a class of persons eligible for administrative segregation (a fact that is at least marginally probative of a known risk of injury to Patton), Shadwrick knew Reyes had violent propensities, and Shadwrick saw Beck threaten Patton. By far the most important factor, however, is that Shadwrick observed Patton being beaten and intentionally delayed in calling for emergency assistance to stop the beating. If that is not deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of bodily harm, then nothing is.

ii. Patton's Constitutional Rights Were Violated

Because determining that Shadwrick is not entitled to qualified immunity necessarily requires finding that Patton's constitutional rights were violated, see Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996) (government agents shielded from liability unless they violate an individual's clearly established...